A glance back to when LANL was assigned the pit production mission on the promise it could do 50 ppy on a $110 M investment

May 30, 2019

Dear colleagues --

I believe you understand that I think a key task before Congress as regards nuclear warhead policy is to delay or cancel the poorly-studied, ill-considered W87-1 LEP, which stands in the center of a knot of policies all needing more light and deeper consideration. We don't need that LEP and we don't need pits for it. It will hurt US national security.

Setting that aside for the moment, LANL has had the pit production mission for about 25 years, on the basis of what turned out to be a number of erroneous assumptions.

As far as pit production goes, very little has turned out as expected at LANL.

The basic lineaments of the pit production decision then have some similarities to today:

• plutonium missions two sites vs. one (but then, with pit production at one site or another, not at both as proposed today),
  
• large costs at LANL that were not included in the cost of the LANL option,
  
• greater capacity and flexibility at SRS, and
  
• lots of optimistic assumptions throughout.
  

From the Analysis of Stockpile Management Alternatives, DOE, July 1996 (the data and deliberations were actually done largely in 1995) (apologies for not providing link right now; we can send that document or create a link upon request, within a few hours), we learn that acquiring a production capacity of 50 pits per year (ppy), single-shift, 5 days per week was said to require:

• At LANL alone: a $110 million (M) capital investment, followed by $30 M/year operating costs. Production could begin in 2002 (p. 8-7). An additional $44 M would provide capacity of 100 ppy, single-shift, 5 days per week (p. 8-19). 100 ppy was thought to be the maximum LANL capacity (p. 8-2).
  

• At LANL and SRS: a $290 M capital investment, followed by $60 M/year operating costs. Production could begin in 2006 (p. 8-1). With an additional capital cost of $20 M and an additional operating cost of $98 M/year, SRS could provide a single-shift capacity of 100 ppy (p. 8-19) -- or with multiple shifts, a 250 ppy capacity, with an annual cost increment of $110 M over the 50 ppy base case (p. 8-2).
  

To both plans, $200 M to upgrade PF-4 was added, since PF-4 operations were needed in any case -- then as now.

(Multiply the 1996 costs by 1.66 to inflate to today with the standard urban consumer price index).

Needless to say, estimates for both sites included use of facilities which are no longer available today. At LANL, the plan collapsed quickly -- but there was no actual need for production.

It is important to note the misplaced optimism that led DOE to believe that at LANL, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) Upgrades (CMRU) project, and the Nuclear Materials Storage Facility (NMSF) upgrades project, large projects which were funded separately and not included in the above comparison (!), would be successfully completed. The CMRU was abandoned, as was the successor CMR Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) project, a far more expensive project. The much smaller part of the CMRR project -- the Radiological, Utility and Office Building (RLUOB) -- continues. RLUOB is being made a lesser nuclear facility, i.e. is being adapted to conduct a small part of the former CMRR-NF mission, with what success we do not yet know.

Other assumptions were that on-site LANL waste management facilities would be adequate and available, and that the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) would be available. These assumptions are only partially,, and to a still unknown degree, true today.

In addition, it was assumed that PF-4 would be fully available during and after upgrades. Now, 25 years and many hundred millions of dollars later, we won't know if this assumption is valid for another 5 years -- if then.

Far too many people are still making very optimistic assumptions. The Institute for Defense Analyses reports, which purport to examine those assumptions, remain sequestered. The practical effect of this is to limit congressional oversight.

It seemed important to provide this historical perspective sooner rather than later, in case it is useful. I will write this up more thoroughly for a wider audience on another early occasion.

Best wishes, and wisdom to you,

Greg Mello