

---

# ***Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review***

*January 9, 2002*



- **Congressional Requirement**
- **New Security Environment**
- **Capabilities-Based Force**
- **Long Term Goals and Commitments**

## *Congressional Requirement*

---

- Nuclear Posture Review required by U.S. Congress
- Written report from Secretary of Defense
- Review Co-chaired by senior DoD and DOE officials
- Constitutes a fundamental review of U.S. nuclear policy
- Linked to U.S. nuclear force reductions that reflect the changed security environment

# ***Security Environment: Yesterday vs. Today***

---

## **Cold War**

### **Context**

- Enduring hostility of Soviet Union
- Known ideological, peer opponent
- Prolonged conflict, defined blocs, limited number of contingencies
- Survival stakes



### **Implications**

- Emphasis on deterrence
  - Required high confidence
- Reliance on offensive nuclear forces exclusive of other forces
- Nuclear planning reflected continuities
  - Threat-based
  - Some flexibility for a few contingencies
  - Arms levels fixed by elaborate treaties; verification

## **New Era**

### **Context**

- Multiple potential opponents, sources of conflict, and unprecedented challenges
- New relationship with Russia
- Spectrum of contingencies
- Varying and unequal stakes



### **Implications**

- Assure, dissuade, deter, defeat
  - Uncertainties of deterrence
- Synergy of nuclear/non-nuclear & offense/defense
- Nuclear planning
  - Capabilities-based
  - Greater flexibility for range of contingencies
  - Unilateral reductions preserve flexibility; transparency

## *Extant and Emerging Threats to the U.S., Our Friends, and Allies*

---

- Proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems continues unabated
  - 12 nations have nuclear weapons programs
  - 28 nations have ballistic missiles
  - 13 nations have biological weapons
  - 16 nations have chemical weapons

## *New Environment and the President's Direction*

---

- Encourage/facilitate Russian cooperation: “new framework”
- Cold War approach to deterrence no longer appropriate
- End relationship with Russia based on MAD
- Deploy the lowest number of nuclear weapons consistent with the security requirements of the U.S., its allies and friends
- Achieve reductions without requirement for Cold War-style treaties
- Develop and field missile defenses more capable than the ABM Treaty permits
- Place greater emphasis on advanced conventional weapons

## ***QDR: Defense Policy Goals***

<b>Assure Allies and Friends</b>	<b>Deter Aggressors</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Credible non-nuclear and nuclear response options support U.S. commitments</li><li>• Defenses protect security partners and power projection forces</li><li>• Second-to-none nuclear capability assures allies and public</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Nuclear and non-nuclear options provide tailored deterrent</li><li>• Defenses discourage attack by frustrating adversary's attack plans</li><li>• Infrastructure improves U.S. capabilities to counter emerging threats</li></ul>
<b>Dissuade Competitors</b>	<b>Defeat Enemies</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Diverse portfolio of capabilities denies payoff from competition</li><li>• Non-nuclear strike favors U.S.</li><li>• Infrastructure promises U.S. competitive edge</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Strike systems can neutralize range of enemy targets</li><li>• Defenses provide protection if deterrence fails</li></ul>

# *The New Capabilities-Based Force*

---

## **Traditional Threat-Based Approach**

- U.S. force size primarily reflected response to a specific threat
- Nuclear offensive emphasis
- Some flexibility in planning
- Missile defense considered impractical and destabilizing


## **Capabilities-Based Approach**

- Capabilities for multiple contingencies and new threats in a changing environment
  - Capabilities required are not country-specific
  - Maintaining capabilities for unexpected and potential threat contingencies are a priority
  - Reduce risk to nation as reductions occur
- Includes active defense and non-nuclear capabilities
  - Defenses reduce dependency on offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence
  - Non-nuclear strike forces (conventional strike and information operations) reduce dependency on nuclear forces to provide offensive deterrent
- Effectiveness depends upon command and control, intelligence and adaptive planning




# A Capabilities Based Concept: The New Triad

## Cold War Triad



## New Triad



Now

Near Term

Mid Term

Far Term

The New Triad offers a portfolio of capabilities and the flexibility required to address a spectrum of contingencies

## *Sizing the Nuclear Force*

---

- A new approach to U.S. nuclear requirements to address the spectrum of immediate and potential contingencies
  - Operationally deployed force for immediate and unexpected contingencies
  - Responsive force for potential contingencies
  - Preplanning is essential for immediate and potential contingencies
- Goal of 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed warheads by 2012 to meet requirements of new defense policy goals
  - Force sizing not driven by an immediate contingency involving Russia
- Force structure and downloaded warheads preserved for the responsive force

## ***Sustainment of Current Nuclear Forces***

---


- **Current force projected to remain until 2020 or longer**
  - Average ages of current systems are: MM-III 26 yrs; D-5 SLBMs 9 yrs; B-52 bombers 40 yrs; B-2 bombers 5 yrs; SSBN 10 yrs
  - Life extension programs for all systems
  - Study alternatives for follow-ons
- **Fully fund Trident D-5 SLBM life extension program**
- **Accelerate DOE's test readiness**
  - Last underground nuclear test in 1992
  - No change in Administration's position on nuclear testing
    - Oppose CTBT ratification
    - Continued adherence to testing moratorium

## *Building the New Triad*

---

- Non-Nuclear Strike:
  - Improved capabilities against hard and deeply buried targets
  - Conversion of four Trident submarines to carry cruise missiles
- Missile Defense:
  - Robust Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation program
  - Deploy limited and effective missile defenses
- Command and Control, Intelligence, and Planning:
  - Develop secure, wide-band communications between national decision makers, command centers and operational forces
  - Develop advanced technology programs for intelligence, e.g. for Hard and Deeply Buried Targets and mobile targets
  - Upgrade STRATCOM's capability for adaptive planning

# The Journey to Reduction and a New Triad



## ***NPR Decisions Made***

---

- Reduce operationally deployed warheads to 1700-2200 over next decade
  - Retire Peacekeeper (MX) ICBMs beginning in calendar year 2002
  - Remove 4 Trident submarines from strategic service
  - Will not retain capability to return B-1 to nuclear role
  - Download warheads from operationally deployed ICBMs and SLBMs
- Planned reductions will be completed in phases
  - By FY 07, reductions to ~ 3800
  - Beyond FY 07, reductions to 1700-2200 will be completed by 2012

- NPR charts the path for the first step in military transformation
- More accurately reflects new security environment
- Replaces dependence on nuclear weapons with synergies between all parts of defense
- Balances near-term risks with longer-term risks