Follow usWhat follows are two opinion pieces that appeared in the Los Alamos Monitor concerning whether Article VI of the NPT imposes a necessary link between nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. I argued that there is no such necessary link; a Los Alamos analyst argued that there is. The arguments I made were esssentially those that were submitted to the International Court of Justice by several non-nuclear countries advised by the World Court Project. As it turned out, the ICJ did delink nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.
While the ICJ opinion does mention general and complete disarmament in referring to Article VI and U.N. resolutions, in its unanimously adopted formulation in the dispositif, paragraph105(2)(F) the ICJ simply stated: "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leadings to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control." Certainly, "nuclear disarmament in all its aspects" could refer to steps such as destruction of dual capable missiles that overlap with conventional disarmament in addition to steps such as destruction of warheads, control of weapons usable material, closure of weapons labs, etc., that relate to nuclear disarmament only. But, the omission of the reference to a "treaty on general and complete disarmament" (i.e., comprehensive conventional disarmament) undoubtedly was deliberate and represents the ICJ's acceptance of the position that the obligation to eliminate nuclear arsenals is not contingent upon achievement of such a treaty.
I think it may be important to be aware of these arguments because the nuclear states may try to evade the clear mandate of the ICJ's interpretation of Article VI.
"Conventional disarmament isn't linked to NPT"
By John Burroughs
Western States Legal Foundation
Los Alamos Monitor
Thursday, May 23, 1996
Opinions, Page 4
In his guest column ("Non-proliferation and nuclear arms reduction,"
May 14, 1996, page 4) Don Westervelt of the Los Alamos National Laboratory
argues that the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament under Article
VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) is necessarily linked
to a wider NPT obligation to pursue general and complete disarmament.
In other words, nuclear weapons must not be eliminated until there is
comprehensive conventional disarmament.
This view is wrong both as a reading of the NPT and as a matter of policy.
As Westervelt notes, at the April 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference and the November 1995 World Court hearings on the (il)legality
of nuclear weapons, high U.S. officials did not insist on the supposed
link. The U.S. attitude is now new.
In 1986, the chief U.S. representative at the NPT negotiations, Adrian
Fisher, stated that Article VI as submitted by the United States constitutes
"a solemn affirmation of the responsibility of nuclear-weapon states
to strive for effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear
arms race and disarmament." Fisher then stated: "Moreover, the
article does not make the negotiation of these measures conditional
upon their inclusion with the framework of a treaty on general and complete
disarmament.
As another member of the U.S. negotiating team, George Bunn, along with
a Soviet negotiator, Roland Timerbaev, have explained, the practice
of NPT parties subsequent to conclusion of the treaty confirms Fisher's
statement. For example, the final document of the 1978 United
Nations Special Session on Disarmament laid down the world's disarmament
priorities in this order--nuclear weapons, then other weapons of mass
destruction, then conventional weapons. Its program of action
then discussed separately the steps to be taken with respect to those
priorities. Subsequently, the 1985 NPT Review Conference approved the
Special Session recommendations.
Another telling example is the April 6, 1995 declaration of France,
Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States shortly before the
NPT Extension Conference. The declaration reaffirmed the Article
VI commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament,
"which remains our ultimate goal." No linkage was made to conventional
disarmament.
The text of Article VI bears out the U.S. view. It contains two
distinct obligations, separated by a comma, one to negotiate nuclear
disarmament, and the second to negotiate a treaty on general and complete
disarmament. Article VI reads: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control."
Article VI is part of the operative body of the treaty that sets out
binding obligations. It reflects the basic bargain underlying the NPT:
non-nuclear states promised not to acquire nuclear weapons, and in return
nuclear states promised to eliminate their nuclear arsenals by a process
of negotiation.
Westervelt relies on language from the treaty's preamble, which sets
out the context and aspirations against which the treaty's obligation
are to be understood. That language reads: "Desiring to
further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of
trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture
of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of their existing stockpiles, and
the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means
of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control."
This language clearly points to a possible linkage between elimination
of nuclear weapons and conventional disarmament. But in light
of the non-binding nature of the preamble, the structure and negotiating
history of Article VI, and the interpretation of Article VI by NPT parties
subsequent to the treaty's entry into force, the preamble does not impose
a necessary linkage.
A possible connection between nuclear and conventional disarmament is
readily identifiable. As the International Network of Scientists
and engineers Against Proliferation and other have explained, one element
of a nuclear weapon free world may be control or elimination of systems,
notable missiles, that can be used for the rapid delivery of warheads,
whether nuclear or conventional. William Epstein, who was the
U.N. Secretary General's representative to the NPT negotiations, told
me it was a recognition of this connection that underlay the preambular
language Westervelt emphasizes.
But Westervelt has in mind another connection, namely that the nuclear
threat deters conventional war. In this view, the nuclear threat
remains desirable until and unless the risk of devastating conventional
war is minimized. This is a formula for making nuclear disarmament
contingent upon the achievement of heaven on earth. It essentially
means "nuclear weapons(in the hands of a select few countries) forever."
This formula must be decisively rejected. It erodes the line which
the conscience of humanity has drawn between conventional weapons and
weapons of mass destruction. It treats in derisory fashion the
obligation to achieve the reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals.
As appealing as it may sound to some peace advocates, or as convenient
an excuse for avoiding nuclear disarmament as it may be for others,
there exists no necessary link between nuclear disarmament and comprehensive
conventional disarmament. Nor is any such link desirable, for
it would totally negate prospects for elimination of nuclear weapons
within a reasonable time frame. Australia and many other non-nuclear
states rightly argued to the World Court last fall that reasonably prompt
elimination of nuclear arsenals is the legal obligation of nuclear states,
not only under the NPT but the whole body of international law setting
limits on warfare.
Westervelt accuses non-nuclear states "and the abolitionist Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) that parrot their pronouncements" of ignoring the
obligation to pursue conventional disarmament and the role of nuclear
weapons in deterring conventional war. I was a representative
of one of the NGOs at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference that
formed an abolition caucus, immediately supported by 200 groups worldwide.
My small group, like Greenpeace, International Physicians for the Prevention
of Nuclear War, and other major global organizations, has long and consistently
supported nuclear disarmament, including during the Cold War, regardless
of the views of states. But we were certainly delighted to support
outspoken non-nuclear states like Mexico, long a champion of disarmament,
or South Africa, which recently dismantled its nuclear arsenal, or even
Indonesia and other states whose human rights record is atrocious but
whose position on nuclear issues is sound.
We are well aware of the contention that nuclear weapons promote stability.
Whether this proposition is true is highly debatable. For example,
as Westervelt's own argument suggests, today's technology makes even
conventional war among advanced industrial powers self-deterring.
But even if the proposition were true, we reject the risk of nuclear
war, and insist that other ways can and must be found to ensure global
security. Further, we support conventional disarmament for its
own sake, and also because, as suggested above with respect to missiles,
in certain ways it may be intertwined with the reduction and elimination
of nuclear weapons. What we cannot accept is the idea that nuclear
weapons will be abolished when humans become angels--i.e., never.
Westervelt mentions START II, which will reduce U.S. and Russian arsenals
each to 3,000 to 3,500 deployed long-range warheads, plus several thousand
warheads deployed in short-range systems or in reserve. But there
is little difference between a world in which there are tens of thousands
of nuclear weapons and one in which there are thousands or even hundreds.
The new millennium is almost upon us. The time to begin
the process of achieving a nuclear weapon free world--regardless of
whether it is perfect in other respects is now.
John Burroughs is an attorney for Western States Legal Foundation in
Oakland, Calif., a public-interest group that monitors the Lawrence
Livermore and Los Alamos national laboratories. He served as legal
coordinator for the World Court Project at the November 1995 hearings
before the International Court of Justice in the Hague regarding the
legal statues of nuclear weapons.
Non-proliferation and nuclear arms reduction
By Don Westervelt
Los Alamos Monitor
Tuesday, May 14, 1996
Opinions, Page 4
Editor's note: Following are remarks made by Don Westervelt
of Los Alamos National Laboratory to a group of visiting Russian journalists
in March. Westervelt's remarks are reprinted here because of requests
that he present them to a larger audience.
I have been asked by the Los Alamos Committee on Arms Control and
International Security to try briefly to relate the issue of nuclear
non-proliferation to the broader subject of nuclear arms reduction as
reflected, for example, in the START II Treaty now under study in the
Russian Duma and already approved for ratification by the United States
Senate. I am happy to do this.
Let me begin with a small personal anecdote. In October 1990,
during some highly technical discussions with our then-Soviet counterparts
in Moscow, my colleagues and I were invited by the leader of the Soviet
team, Professor Viktor Mikhailov(now Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy),
to travel with him to the until-then secret city known as Arzemas 16,
which was the Soviet Los Alamos. We would be the first foreign
visitors to this closed city, and most of us accepted on the authority
of our State Department leader, who full realized the precedent-setting
nature of this visit. The rest is history: our visit was
followed by exchange visits by the Laboratory Directors and others,
leading to an expanding program of cooperation that I believe will be
discussed in depth tomorrow.
Upon our arrival at Arzemas 16 we received a number of briefings, including
a historical description of the Soviet weapons program by Academician
Yuli Khariton, who had played a key role in the establishment of the
Soviet weapons laboratory under Stalin and in the development of the
Soviet weapons. At 85, Khariton was still Chief Scientist at the
Arzemas laboratory.
Following the briefings, our group was treated to a banquet in a tent
set up in a lovely pasture surrounded by forest. Traces of snow
made the picture complete. As we gathered around a large bonfire
after the meal, Khariton in a low voice made a comment to his colleagues,
including Dr.Belugin, the Arzemas Director, in Russian. Prof. Mikhailov
told me that what Khariton had said was that he "had waited all of his
life for this moment." Mikhailov then went on to say to me, "You
are looking at the most peace-loving men in the world," referring to
the distinguished Soviet weapon scientists gathered around the fire.
I replied that I had no doubt of that, and reminded him of the
statement of Los Alamos Director Norris Bradbury had made during testimony
in the early 1960s, that we did not work on bombs because we liked to
kill people, but only to give the political process time to work until
it finds other than military solutions. Most of us who have worked
in this field shared Bradbury's motives as, I am sure, have most of
our Soviet counterparts. Both groups are motivated by patriotism
and an intense desire that the catastrophe of world war never be repeated.
Thus far, it has not. It is significant in this regard that fatalities
due to war during the half-century following WWII, while distressing,
have occurred at a rate one-tenth that during the first half of this
century, and in fact are more comparable to the rate of the first half
of the 19th century.
Without question, however, nuclear weapons are on trial today, both
in the court of public opinion and, in a legal but also highly political
sense, in the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Another
arena where polarization regarding the legitimacy of nuclear weapons
and nuclear deterrence played a crucial role was the 1995 Non-Proliferation
Review and Extension Conference at the United Nations, which I observed
in a Non-Governmental role.
The goal of most of the nuclear-weapon states at the Conference was
indefinite (permanent) and unconditional extension of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), preferably by consensus or at least by a politically persuasive
majority. Instead, consensus was achieved only on the statement
that a majority of Parties favored indefinite extension, and this was
achieved only by linkage of the extension decision to other documents
providing for almost annual review of progress toward, inter alia, nuclear
disarmament by the official five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), and for
a set of Principles and Objectives for Non-Proliferation and (nuclear)
Disarmament. The latter are regarded as politically, if not legally,
binding on the Parties, and are considered to be conditions by many
Parties.
The second goal of the Review and Extension Conference was agreement
on a Final Declaration stating the agreed results of a review of the
operation of the NPT. As in two earlier review Conferences (1980,1990)
the Final Declaration proved impossible to negotiate. The impasse
was between the nuclear weapons states and those Parties, including
some from the Western Group, that insisted on a "timebound" framework
and a target date for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as well
as a fissile-materials ban, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 1995-6,
commitment to legally-binding security assurances, and to specific nuclear-arms-reduction
initiatives to follow START II and include China, France, and the U.K.
(but not India, Pakistan, or Israel). This failure portends badly
for the nearly-annual reviews (both of past and future issues) now provided
for, so long as the sides continue to talk past each other and display
hostility as they did in New York.
There is not time here to discuss even in outline the complex kabuki
drama that unfolded at the U.N. in April-May 1995, leading to the results
described. I highly recommend for this purpose the remarkable
September 1995 ACRONYM 7 report by Rebecca Johnson, who was everywhere
at the U.N. and apparently saw or heard everything. One point
that is duly noted in her report, I think deserves greater emphasis.
That is the linkage, clearly established in the language of the
NPT, between nuclear disarmament and General and Complete Disarmament
(GCD). While the United States, France and the United Kingdom
reasserted this linkage in the debate in Main Committee 1, whose efforts
ultimately collapsed in disarray, it tends to be studiously avoided
or even specifically dismissed in, for example, speeches of current
high U.S. government officials. GCD, in fact, seems to have achieved
the status of a quaint idea whose time has passed. But it is the
immense destructive capability of conventional weapons, as well as their
staggering cost, both of which now vastly exceed the levels of WWII,
that underlie the argument that at least some level of nuclear capability
remains essential.
Until the issue of GCD is rejoined, I believe the impasse over nuclear
disarmament can only be reinforced as other nations follow the lead
of India, Pakistan, and Israel. GCD is referred to in two parts
of the NPT, the Preamble and Article VI. The preambular language
is unambiguous; it refers to "the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear
weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination
from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery
pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict
and effective international control (emphasis added)." Article
VI reads: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control." This latter obligation falls
on every party, NWS and NNWS (non-nuclear weapon states) alike.
GCD was an important subject in the Geneva forum in the early 1960s,
but it has long since fallen from the agenda. But the NPT language-"pursuant
to..." is as clear as it is, in fact, compelling. "Pursuant to
means" in accordance with, "not" in pursuit of." George Bunn and Roland
Timerbaev, key figures during the drafting of the NPT, have extended
their imagination in recent years to justify an assertion that a commitment
to pursue nuclear disarmament under the terms of the NPT can be viewed
entirely independently of the GCD commitment, but their arguments simply
do not hold water. I asked Bunn in New York whether the drafters
of the NPT considered alternative (to "pursuant to") language; he replied
that no other language had ever been proposed.
Presumably, all of the present NPT Parties are aware of this language
and the implications of ignoring it. Thus the widespread insistence
on pursuit of nuclear disarmament, on which the record of the NWS is
now fairly impressive, in the absence of any serious effort toward general
(nonnuclear) disarmament (for which, as noted, all states parties are
obligated, not just the NWS), is cynical if not disingenuous.
While many NNWS, and the abolitionist Non-Governmental Organizations
that parrot their pronouncements, thus play dumb on the real issue underlying
dependence of some states and their allies on a nuclear weapons capability,
the NWS continue to proceed responsibly toward elimination of admittedly
outrageous levels achieved during the Cold War, and replacement of those
deployments with significantly smaller forces specifically designed
to maintain strategic stability. The landmark INF Treaty and START
I were major steps along this path. While START II will satisfy
neither the hawks on each side nor the abolitionists, it clearly is
a responsible next step. Beyond START II, I believe the future
depends on political progress, improved enforcement capabilities (800,000-plus
Tutsis slaughtered by machete are just as dead as the small fraction
of that number that died at Hiroshima), and a decision by the NNWS to
quit blinking their own responsibilities under the NPT.