This press release is an update of our July 23 press release, appended below for convenience

All-But-Final Defense Bill Increases Momentum for Larger Los Alamos Plutonium "Pit" Factory

Requirement to clarify need to produce new atomic bomb cores ("pits") eliminated

Bill requires planning for plutonium "surge," multiple labor shifts, underground factory complex at Los Alamos

New LANL mandate introduced by New Mexico congresspersons Lujan, Grisham, and Pearce

Study Group: "These provisions are products of LANL's long tradition of moral nihilism, political corruption, and bad engineering. They are an affront to international law. The US (and New Mexico) need more nuclear weapons like we need a hole in the head. We will oppose them."

Contact: Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group, 505-265-1200 office, 505-577-8563 cell

Permanent link * Previous press releases

Albuquerque, NM – For most of the Cold War and until 1989, the US made plutonium nuclear weapon cores ("pits") at the Rocky Flats Plant near Denver. The US has about 23,000 pits today. Approximately half are in nuclear weapons -- deployed weapons, weapons in the so-called "reserve" arsenal, and weapons awaiting dismantlement -- or in monitored storage for possible use in current and future nuclear weapons.

Pits of the types used in current warheads and bombs are known to last at least 85 to 100 years from manufacture. All of these pits were made in the 1978-1989 period at Rocky Flats. According to Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), plutonium "aging" is now known to be too slow a process to be a factor in pit replacement.

Pits are routinely reused as-is or with minor reconditioning after thorough non-destructive inspection as warheads and bombs are upgraded. Extensive surveillance and experimentation create very high confidence in pit behavior and lifetime.

If and when warranted, the outer portions of pits can be replaced with new parts, without making new plutonium components or using scarce space in high-hazard plutonium facilities. Facilities and equipment to do this in place and being expanded.

These facts and other information can be found in the Study Group's "Pit production recommendations & considerations," a memo to National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, Apr 6, 2018, and elsewhere on this page. 

Yesterday the House-Senate Conference version of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), H.R. 5515, was posted. Section 3120 incorporates Section 3120A of the House version -- a section introduced by the New Mexico delegation -- while eliminating any requirement to clarify the purpose and need for pit production.

With emphases added, the bill:

• Makes LANL the "Plutonium Science and Production Center of Excellence" for the US, a new identity;
• Requires the NNSA and LANL to "implement surge efforts to exceed 30 pits per year [ppy] to meet Nuclear Posture Review and [unstated other] national policy," a dramatic new requirement;
• Requires the Pentagon "in consultation with NNSA" (a minor addition to the House version) to assess the strategy to manufacture "up to 80 pits per year at Los Alamos through the use of multiple labor shifts and additional equipment at [LANL main plutonium facility] PF-4" until underground "modular" facilities are completed to increase capacity still further;
  
• Requires NNSA production planning to default to LANL unless a 2030 deadline, known to be virtually impossible, is miraculously met in South Carolina,
  
• Requires NNSA to assess possible conflict between pit production and LANL's other planned industrial plutonium mission, namely the processing of surplus pits to produce tens of tons of plutonium dioxide for disposal, an assessment which the bill directs the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review;
• Requires NNSA to produce two detailed plans for pit production at LANL, one for production of 30 ppy by 2026, the other for production of "31-80" ppy by 2030; and
  
• Requires the Nuclear Weapons Council to annually certify that the NNSA plan to produce 80 ppy is "on track," and requires NNSA to produce a backup or recovery plan if that certification is not forthcoming.
  

Study Group Director Greg Mello: "What began in 2016 as a relatively objective study of pit production options -- albeit one based on arbitrary, grossly-inflated requirements -- has become a narrowly-predetermined study with a mandate something like: 'How can we build a pit factory at LANL as fast as possible? We know this will be difficult, with a high risk of failure. So reassure us -- 'us' being the tiny cabal of lobbyists and officials who make these decisions on behalf of government -- so we can justify spending billions ASAP.'

"Pit production isn't needed for decades, even to maintain today's massive, diverse arsenal. Were it needed, LANL is not the place to do it, as the Pentagon and NNSA well know. The amazing thing is that both of these agencies are willing to spend billions on a plan they themselves have intense doubts about in a rush to produce new atom bombs, whether as triggers for huge H-bomb warheads and bombs, or as lower-yield tactical nukes and 'mininukes.'

"The upside-down priorities embodied in this plan only make sense as part of a growing military-oriented federal budget that betrays progressives and conservatives alike. The military, and the nuclear weapons enterprise as a small but leading part of it, are eating our future.

"These provisions are products of LANL's long tradition of moral nihilism, political corruption, and bad engineering. They are an affront to international law. The US (and New Mexico) need more nuclear weapons like we need a hole in the head. We will oppose these plans, with what immediate success we cannot predict.

"One thing is clear. These plans will be as much a disaster for LANL and the community of Los Alamos as they are for northern New Mexico.

"These plans will sooner or later fail. When, why, and with what negative consequences, no one can predict."

***ENDS***

For immediate release July 23, 2018

House Version of Defense Bill Would Advance Los Alamos Plutonium Bomb Factory

House bill would preempt further government study of the need to produce new atomic bomb cores ("pits"), instead mandates immediate planning for "surge efforts," multiple labor shifts, underground factory complex at Los Alamos alone

New LANL production mandate introduced by New Mexico congresspersons Lujan, Lujan-Grisham, and Pearce in successful floor amendment

Contact: Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group, 505-265-1200 office, 505-577-8563 cell

Permanent link * Previous press releases

Albuquerque, NM – Section 3120A of the House-passed Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), H.R. 5515, would:

• Declare Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to be the "Plutonium Science and Production Center of Excellence" for the US, a new identity;
• Require LANL to "implement surge efforts to exceed 30 pits per year to meet Nuclear Posture Review and [unstated other] national policy," a dramatic new requirement;
• Require the Pentagon [not NNSA] to assess the strategy to manufacture "up to 80 pits per year at Los Alamos through the use of multiple labor shifts and additional equipment" until underground "modular" facilities are completed to increase capacity still further; and
  
• Require NNSA production planning to default to LANL unless an early deadline, known to be virtually impossible, is miraculously met in South Carolina,
  

among other related provisions.

The Senate-passed version contains no comparable section (but see below).

Section 3120A was added to the House NDAA on May 21 by a floor amendment (see pp. 12 and 232) co-sponsored by Ben Ray Lujan, Michelle Lujan Grisham, and Steve Pearce.

House-Senate conference negotiations are in their final stages or complete as of this writing. A floor vote in the House on the final conference report is tentatively scheduled for Wednesday July 25. The House adjourns late Thursday afternoon until September 4. 

The proposed legislation is remarkable in that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) found, as recently as October 2017, after years of study, that all variations of a "modular" strategy for underground plutonium workshops at LANL were unworkable and would fail (Analysis of Alternatives [AoA], Executive Summary) because of:

• Lack of sufficient real estate in LANL's plutonium area (TA-55);
  
• Lack of sufficient working space in the "modules;"
  
• Heavy interference with LANL's plutonium missions -- including previously mandated pit production -- during the decade-plus construction and equipment installation process; and
  
• The advanced age and vulnerabilities of LANL's main plutonium facility (PF-4).

Therefore, in its 2017 study NNSA recommended returning the aging PF-4 "to the research and development mission for which it was built" as soon as adequate production space for new pits became available elsewhere either at LANL, the Savannah River Site (SRS), or the Idaho National Laboratory (INL).

As soon as the AoA was completed, NNSA hired a contractor to conduct an Engineering Assessment (EA) of its AoA alternatives. In a sharp repudiation of its just-concluded AoA, NNSA and its EA contractor decided in late 2017 or early 2018, to:

• base its analysis on a two-site strategy which the AoA had rejected as massively wasteful;
  
• Analyze a total of four production options, including three less-expensive options at LANL previously rejected in the AoA, in addition to repurposing the partially-completed Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) at SRS, which was supported in the AoA; and
  
• Omit all other top-ranking AoA alternatives at SRS, LANL, and INL. 

Although originally described as a more detailed follow-on analysis, this "quick-and-dirty" EA was completed by April 2017. Although inconclusive overall the EA did grade the "module" plan -- which would be the sole option remaining under Section 3120A in the House version of the NDAA -- as having the greatest risks of the four options studied, both to existing programs and to its own success.

Then, on May 10, 2018, NNSA, in concert with the Pentagon, formally set aside the findings of its 2017 AoA and decided instead to pursue two parallel new-pit production sites, one centered in PF-4 at LANL aiming at a minimum of 30 new pits per year and one at SRS centered in a repurposed MFFF, where at least 50 new pits per year would be made.

The proposed legislation above, if passed, would "tilt the table" by mandating analysis of LANL options only to reach 80 pits per year by 2030.

The Senate version of the NDAA contains a provision distantly similar to House's under discussion here. The Senate version requires NNSA, not the Pentagon, to contract a review of the four options in the recent EA (see Senate Report 115-262, p. 415).

Elsewhere, the House NDAA would require the Pentagon and NNSA to report on how and why the pit production mandate has suddenly increased, what these increases might cost, and the potential for reuse of pits from inventory to fulfill requirements (House Report 115-676, p. 239).

For further information please see "NNSA, DoD, DOE recommend moving most plutonium warhead "pit" production to South Carolina by 2030, May 10, 2018," and "NNSA, DoD, DOE poised to deliver decision to Congress on how and where to make plutonium warhead "pits", May 9, 2018."

Extensive background on pit production can be found on our web site.

Study Group director Greg Mello: "This poorly-drafted amendment was no doubt written wholly or in substantial part by the LANL contractor. It was introduced by Rep. Ben Ray Lujan and co-sponsored by the whole New Mexico delegation, who seem to favor pork-barrel spending in any form -- even for plutonium.

"We hope that by the time the congressional dust settles this week, saner heads will have prevailed and only the moderately bad policies found elsewhere in the NDAA will remain.

"Pit production isn't needed for decades, even to maintain today's massive, diverse arsenal. Were it needed, LANL is not the place to do it, as the Pentagon and NNSA well know. The amazing thing is that both of these agencies are willing to spend billions on a plan they themselves have intense doubts about in a rush to produce new atom bombs, whether as triggers for huge H-bomb warheads and bombs, or as lower-yield tactical nukes and "mininukes."

"The New Mexico delegation has betrayed voters. These bizarre priorities only make sense as part of a huge, growing military-oriented federal budget that betrays progressives and conservatives alike."

***ENDS***