Press note 28 October 2019

GAO: Surplus Plutonium Disposition: Processing of surplus plutonium warhead cores ("pits") at Los Alamos is uncertain, may conflict with production of new pits

Contact: Greg Mello, 505-265-1200 office / 505-577-8563 cell

Albuquerque -- On October 23, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued an important, data-rich report on a crucial aspect of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's) Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) program: processing of at least 26.2 metric tons (MT) of surplus plutonium (Pu) warhead cores ("pits") and possibly other stores of Pu metal ("Surplus Plutonium Disposition - NNSA's Long-Term Plutonium Oxide Production Plans Are Uncertain").

This succinct report provides an authoritative window into the history and current status of a major component of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) ever-evolving SPD program -- namely, Pu oxidation -- but also into the substantial tensions between Pu oxidation and the Los Alamos portion of the pit production mission, both of which missions are to be conducted in a single aging facility designed for neither.

That facility is Building PF-4 (photo) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). PF-4 is currently operating without important modern safety features, variously scheduled for completion in the 2021-2026 period. Whether or not these engineered safety systems can be built at PF-4 will not be known until at least 2021, when the latest seismic evaluation of the building may be complete.

The subject GAO report was noticed by the Santa Fe New Mexican ("Plan for plutonium disposal has holes, GAO finds," Danielle Prokop, Oct. 23) and in the trade press (Nuclear Security and Deterrence Monitor, "NNSA Could Check Dilute-and-Dispose Plan to Accommodate Pit Production, GAO Says," Dan Leone, Oct. 25).

Previously the Los Alamos Reporter ("Mello Discusses LANL Plutonium Dilute & Dispose Program, Lab Expansion Plans At Capitol Town Hall Meeting," Maire O'Neill, Sept. 20) anticipated aspects of the present report, emphasizing LANL's largely-unrecognized role in the SPD program.

This report is not long and can hardly be summarized further. We cannot do justice to it here; interested parties should read it in its entirety.

Nevertheless here are a few of its most salient points, the significance of which could be missed. Page numbers refer to the report.

• In 1994 and 2007, DOE declared a total of 61.5 metric tons (MT) Pu as surplus. Over the 25-year period since 1994, only 3.2 MT (5%) of this has been disposed (at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, WIPP). Another 1.1 MT is in process, leaving 57.2 MT (93%) of the surplus Pu still requiring disposition (p. 2). The total U.S. plutonium inventory in 2009 was 95.4 MT, leaving about 33.9 MT of Pu in non-surplus pits, warheads, and other forms.
  
  
• Three DOE offices manage multiple forms of Pu (pp. 7-8). DOE has surplus metallic Pu suitable for oxidation in three main forms: pits (33.3 MT, managed by NNSA); metal (6.5 MT, managed by DOE Environmental Management, "EM"); and unused nuclear fuel (4 MT, managed by DOE Nuclear Energy, "NE") (p. 14), for a total of 43.8 MT Pu metal suitable for oxidization.
  
  
• Oxidation followed by "dilute and dispose" (D&D) is now DOE's program-of-record for 32.7 MT of surplus plutonium metal (p. 14, note 26), including 26.2 MT of surplus pits that are to be oxidized at PF-4 between now and 2045 (p. 16).
  
  
• NNSA cancelled the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in January 2012, having spent $730.1 million (M) on design (p. 11).
  
  
• In 2012, DOE planned to oxidize 2 MT of Pu at LANL by 2018 and an additional 3.7MT at SRS by 2017 (p. 11). Apparently SRS actually produced only 0.035 MT by 2018, less than 1% of the planned amount, while LANL has produced about 1 MT of Pu as oxide over the 1998-2019 period, less than half the planned amount (p. 12).
  
  
• NNSA now declares PF-4 to be its only cost-effective Pu oxide production capability (p. 12).
  
  
• If PF-4 is NNSA's only cost-effective Pu oxide production capability, and if D&D is the preferred disposition path for Pu metal and oxide, the PF-4 oxidation mission could potentially grow from 26.2 MT to 43.8 MT, i.e. by 67%.
  
  
• However neither NNSA nor DOE now have any Pu oxidation plans or commitments beyond 2025 (which happens to be the year before LANL's PF-4 will supposedly be producing at least 30 new pits per year). Regarding this:
  
  
  • In its now-obsolete May 2018 "conceptual plan" (citation on p. 5, note 13), NNSA planned to increase oxide production at PF-4 to 1.5 MT/year by 2033 and to continue at this rate until 2045, when 26.2 MT of surplus pits would had been converted, plus possibly an additional 3.5 MT of Pu metal managed by EM.
    
    
  • To achieve this 1.5 MT/year NNSA planned to expand the oxidation floor space in PF-4 by 50%, add new equipment and hire 200 additional staff, and construct a new employee entrance to PF-4 (p. 16).
    
    
  • An independent cost estimate for this plan was produced ("Surplus Plutonium Disposition Dilute and Dispose Option, Independent Cost Estimate (ICE), Apr 2018, obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists). The ICE report assumed LANL oxidation rates of 0.1 MT from 2018-2022 and 1.117 MT from 2023 to 2045 (p. 4). The ICE thus assumed LANL would oxidize 3.75 MT of Pu between 2019 and 2025, inclusive.
    
    
  • In February 2019, multiple congressional sources told us this 2018 plan had been scrapped. In addition to the additional floor space, staff, and new entrance mentioned above, GAO also noted these NNSA concerns:
    

NNSA officials told us in February 2019 that as a result of pit production requirements, the agency might need to use a portion of the processing areas in PF-4 for pit production that the agency had planned to use for plutonium oxide production. Pit production requirements also may use more space in the high-security vault in PF-4 where plutonium must be temporarily stored. [note 37] Also in February 2019, NNSA officials said that PF-4’s high-security storage space is already near full capacity and that pit production may demand storage space that NNSA had planned to use for plutonium oxide production.[note 38] (p. 18)

• Thus between February and September 2019, NNSA apparently had no formal plan for Pu oxidation. In September NNSA approved a short-term plan only. GAO:

In September 2019, NNSA approved a short-term plan to produce a total of nearly 1.2 MT of plutonium oxide at PF-4 from 2019 through 2025. This short-term plan closely matches the total plutonium oxide production outlined in NNSA’s 2018 conceptual plan for the same time frame. [note 31] (p. 16).

This 1.2 MT was however just 32% -- one-third-- of the 3.75 MT Pu as oxide by 2025 that was assumed by the ICE authors.

• Meanwhile in August 2019 NNSA officials told GAO they were considering increasing LANL production to 2.1 MT by 2025, in part by adding 70 additional personnel, less than the 200 required for the May 2018 plan (p. 21).
  
  
• NNSA believes its new LANL equipment can produce as much as 0.7 MT/year, though this level of production has been neither approved nor demonstrated (p. 21, note 48).
  
  
• NNSA's Pu oxidation plans end in 2025. Neither DOE and NNSA have longer-term or clear plans for other forms of metallic Pu.

"...NNSA officials said that establishing firm long-term plutonium oxide production plans [for its 33.3 MT of metallic Pu, p. 8] now would be premature and that the agency would use the next several years to balance plutonium oxide production, pit production, and shipment issues as they refine long-term production plans." (p. 22)

"NNSA’s cost estimate included the cost of converting 29.7 MT of surplus plutonium metal to an oxide to include 3.5 MT managed by EM, but the conversion at PF-4 only included NNSA’s 26.2 MT of surplus pits. EM officials said they had not determined how they planned to convert their 3.5 MT of surplus plutonium metal to an oxide." (p. 15, note 27)

"DOE has not made any decisions on the 4 MT of surplus plutonium contained in metal reactor fuel and managed by NE." (p. 14, note 26)

The reasons NNSA has no long-term oxidation plans, and hence no long-term D&D plans, are twofold: conflict with PF-4's pit production role; and requirements to move Pu from SRS (p. 16).

• Preparing LANL for the 30 pit per year (ppy) production mission is a large, challenging, and expensive effort.
  

According to an August 2019 LANL presentation to potential subcontractors, this effort will include the installation of more than 140 new gloveboxes or other enclosures in PF-4 and the construction of more than 700,000 square feet of supporting infrastructure (such as offices, a parking garage, and a cafeteria). The President’s budget for fiscal year 2020 includes over $3 billion for this effort through 2024. (p. 17)

• As GAO notes, pit production takes precedence over surplus Pu oxidation.
  

In April 2019, the NNSA Administrator said meeting pit production requirements was the agency’s highest infrastructure priority. [note 34]

• Furthermore, "NNSA also may have to increase pit production at LANL beyond 30 pits per year" (p. 17). 
  

For example, in May 2018 the Nuclear Weapons Council stated that it was essential that NNSA provide resources for surge pit production capacity in PF-4 at LANL until pit production is fully established at SRS.[note 35] In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2019 requires the Department of Defense and NNSA to contract with a federally funded research and development center to conduct an assessment of, among other things, a strategy for producing 80 pits per year at LANL. [note 36] NNSA officials told us in February 2019 that as a result of pit production requirements, the agency might need to use a portion of the processing areas in PF-4 for pit production that the agency had planned to use for plutonium oxide production. Pit production requirements also may use more space in the high-security vault in PF-4 where plutonium must be temporarily stored. [note 37] Also in February 2019, NNSA officials said that PF-4’s high-security storage space is already near full capacity and that pit production may demand storage space that NNSA had planned to use for plutonium oxide production. [note 38] (p. 17)

• It's not just planned pit production growth that competes with oxidation for space in PF-4.
  

...LANL reported that a number of programs, including pit production, were planning to increase operations in PF-4, placing demands on the aging facility that could lead to more frequent maintenance outages. [note 40: DOE’s 2018 conceptual plan required that pits be converted to plutonium oxide at least through 2045, at which time PF-4 will have been in operation for more than 75 years.]

• As noted above, Pu oxidation is "vault-intensive." At present, the PF-4 vault is "near full capacity" (p. 18).
  

• Per law, NNSA's Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE) group will evaluate the impact of the Pu oxidation mission on pit production, and GAO will review the result (p. 19).
  

Our own conclusions and opinions -- not GAO's -- include the following:

• Neither DOE nor NNSA has a comprehensive (or viable) plan for using existing and planned facilities to execute their SPD programs, including Pu oxidation.
  

• Given the strong conflicts between the Pu oxidation mission, the pit production mission, and the age and condition of PF-4, NNSA cannot pursue these two missions simultaneously at LANL.

• NNSA knows this, as evidenced by its reluctance to formally require Pu oxidation at LANL on a production basis past 2025.
  

• NNSA has already chosen.

• With no extant plan for Pu oxidation there is also no real D&D plan overall, even as D&D has begun for a smaller fraction of surplus plutonium already in oxide form. Unresolved complications at WIPP are another source of uncertainty for the D&D program. 

• Therefore NNSA should fundamentally reconsider its oxidation, dilute, and dispose strategy for Pu metal, especially for Pu metal in pits. Are the first two of these steps really necessary? Isn't pit "sterilization" worthy of study (pp. 33-34)? We believe it is. We believe cost and duration for the "demilitarization" option (our preferred term) would be on the general order of 10% of the oxidation+D&D option. We see no obvious safety, security, and nonproliferation risks.
  

• The Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) needed for LANL should include an alternative that focuses on Pu oxidation as the sole production mission in PF-4, as well as a No Action alternative that includes no industrial missions. (This is not a complete list.) Of course all industrial Pu missions are major federal actions with very significant environmental impacts.
  

• The D&D plan can be seen as a "bait-and-switch" plan to end the MOX program and divert its funding stream to Weapons Activities while liberating its partially-built facility for pit production. Factually speaking, that facility, now called the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) offers NNSA its only realistic hope for pit production at stockpile scale, though not on a 2030 deadline. We do not believe industrial pit production is necessary or desirable and may not be possible. It also may not be survivable (pp. 4-7).

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