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Update on pit production and Los Alamos plans August 21, 2019 Dear colleagues -- With conference negotiations pending or underway on FY2020 legislation and important new plans unveiled by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (see below), a short update on pit production seems timely. Overall we remain very concerned about a severe lack of transparency in the Administration about this program, which we believe hides intellectual chaos at NNSA and DoD regarding ambitions, schedules, costs, as well as comparable issues in the related W87-1 program. The latter program appears so poorly justified it could be knocked over with a feather. Why hasn't that happened? Some of us can't understand this. In our view, the Administration (and Congress) will not be able to really think straight about pit production unless there is more transparency and informed outside scrutiny. We explain some of the reasons in a recent letter to New Mexico Governor Lujan Grisham and in a prior letter to Senator Udall. As you see in those letters, we see transparency regarding NNSA's plans on the one hand, and its compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) on the other hand, as intertwined. The NEPA issues are concisely treated in these comments on the scope of the environmental impact statement for plutonium pit production at the Savannah River Site (SRS). (These are the simplest treatment of these issues linked here and so are recommended for reading above the others which follow.) As you know, we are concerned about the inadequacy of, asymmetry in, and contemplated flouting of a court order in those NEPA plans:
In case you are interested further, we comment more here:
Congress could direct NNSA to do NEPA right. The 2017 Pit Production Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) assumed an EIS at any pit production site, and noted such an EIS would not lie on the critical path for the mission. At that time NNSA was no doubt unaware of the standing court order to conduct a supplemental programmatic EIS, which might indeed be on the critical path. We are by now pretty sure DOE has no coordinated plan or budget for pit production (in Weapons Activities, WA), plutonium disposition (in Nuclear Nonproliferation, NN), legacy waste removal (in Environmental Management, EM), plutonium staging and storage (WA and NN), and WIPP operations (EM). Good NEPA analysis would force better coordination and planning. Meanwhile Triad, the new LANL contractor, has very big plans for LANL. Triad has taken what it sees as a bipartisan consensus for a ≥30 pit per year (ppy) mission (according to NNSA, that will produce an average of 41 ppy; see p. 13 in NNSA’s AoA) and turned it into the main (but not the only) driver for what they see as a mandate for $13 billion in capital projects. Some of these would be government-owned; some would be leased from private developers. On August 8, two of us attended a recent LANL contracting forum attended by 700 representatives from 400 contractors in 30 states. The Albuquerque Journal wrote about this forum ("LANL officials detail potential building boom" Aug 9, 2019 ) and later the Associated Press ("National lab details $13B in building plans over next decade," AP, Aug 17, 2019). By comparison, expenditures by the Manhattan Project at Site Y (Los Alamos) and the Trinity Test Site through 1945 totaled just 2.07 billion in 2019 dollars (see Atomic Audit, p. 59). So the reconstruction of LANL that is planned would cost more than six times that figure and approaches the $17 billion claimed replacement value of LANL as a whole (slide 41). Basically LANL wants to, and claims it needs to, rebuild much of the infrastructure across the entire site. This raises some fundamental questions, which are beyond the scope of this note. LANL subsequently published presentation slides from the morning sessions, but not from the blockbuster lunch presentation (from which we only got a few snapshots, at the link). We have requested the underlying site plan, so far without success. Congress urgently needs to assess the new, i.e. actual, price tag for 30 ppy production at LANL -- which, whatever it is, looks a lot more than the $3 billion NNSA estimated in 2017. As you know, LANL has a legal mandate to "implement surge efforts to exceed 30 pits per year to meet Nuclear Posture Review and national policy" and to have "a detailed plan for designing and carrying out production of plutonium pits 31–80..." and "an assessment of the strategy considered for manufacturing up to 80 pits per year at Los Alamos National Laboratory through the use of multiple labor shifts and additional equipment at PF–4 [LANL's 41-year-old main plutonium facility] until modular facilities are completed to provide a long-term, single-labor shift capacity" (emphasis added). In the August 8 presentations, slide 37 tells of "145" new "gloveboxes/enclosures," plus another "170" new gloveboxes to be installed in existing facilities for the new pit mission. By way of comparison, NNSA's Plutonium Pit AoA says (e-page 27) that the "at least 30" ppy mission requires only 90 pieces of equipment and the "at least 80" ppy mission requires only 133. So no matter how you slice it, LANL wants an awful lot of new gloveboxes for a "30 ppy" mission, especially given that LANL already has all the gloveboxes and equipment installed to produce pits at some level (10-20 ppy?). The proposed 6-story parking garage at TA-55 is one of three new proposed parking facilities serving that same location, as the slides show. Why so much parking? Presenters told us on August 8 that an additional 1,500 people would be needed at TA-55. That's more than three times the "350-500" additional staff estimated (slide 11) to be necessary to implement the 80 ppy mission at LANL. Regarding large parking garages at TA-55, we do not know if the new LANL managers have absorbed the unpleasant institutional knowledge LANL holds about the geotechnical situation at TA-55. I am sure they could be built heavily enough, but given the seismic situation, the geotechnical situation, and all the rest of the problems with the overall site, would it be worth it? LANL also believes new shortcut connecting White Rock, Albuquerque, and Santa Fe is necessary to lessen the site's isolation (first slide here).Despite LANL's mandate to implement surge production beyond 30 ppy and to provide a detailed plan for ≥80 ppy, and despite an aging PF-4 that still lacks structural confidence and essential safety features, LANL is claiming that all of what is being proposed at TA-55 and in supporting investments is only what is necessary for the "30 ppy" mission. As you know, we don't think pit production for the stockpile is necessary at all at this time. A decent compromise position might be for LANL to continue restore de minimus production in a life-extended PF-4. (A new PF-4 at LANL may be, in practical terms, impossible.) We also don't see how a mere 30 ppy is enough to support a new warhead build. It seems to us that if Congress is serious about limiting pit production, which would be rational, it must also be serious about ending the W87-1 program, the irrationality of which boggles the mind. We remain outraged by what we see as the unethical subordination of New Mexico hazardous waste regulation to a political agenda by both New Mexico senators. We discuss this in Bulletin 262: New Mexico Democrats push Trump nuclear weapons agenda regardless of environmental costs, Jul 24, 2019.I have written some guest editorials on pit production, which I suppose most of you have seen:
Trish, my wife and partner in these enterprises, will be in Washington during the week of Sept. 9-13. We hope we can see some of you then. Until then, thank you for your attention, and best wishes, Greg Mello |
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