Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]
Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001.

8 January 2002

Nuclear Posture Review Report

Foreword
The Congress directed the Defense Department to conduct a comprehensive
Nuclear Posture Review to lay out the direction for American nuclear
forces over the next five to ten years. The Department has completed that
review and prepared the attached report.

Early on, we recognized that the new security environment demanded that
the Department go beyond the Congressional mandate in developing a
strategic posture for the 21st century. President Bush had already
directed the Defense Department to transform America's military and
prepare it for the new, unpredictable world in which we will be living.
The result of his direction is the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).
Building on the (QDR) this Nuclear Posture Review puts in motion a major
change in our approach to the role of nuclear offensive forces in our
deterrent strategy and presents the blueprint for transforming our
strategic posture.

This report establishes a New Triad, composed of:

* Offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear);
* Defenses (both active and passive); and
* A revitalized defense infrastructure that will provide new capabilities
in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats.

This New Triad is bound together by enhanced command and control (C2) and
intelligence systems.

The establishment of this New Triad can both reduce our dependence on
nuclear weapons and improve our ability to deter attack in the face of
proliferating WMD capabilities in two ways:

* The addition of defenses (along with the prospects for timely
adjustments to force capabilities and enhanced C2 and intelligence
systems) means that the U.S. will no longer be as heavily dependent on
offensive strike forces to enforce deterrence as it was during the Cold
War.
* The addition of non-nuclear strike forces--including conventional
strike and information operations--means that the U.S. will be less
dependent than it has been in the past on nuclear forces to provide its
offensive deterrent capability.

The combination of new capabilities that make up the New Triad reduce the
risk to the nation as it draws its nuclear forces toward the goal of
1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads announced
by President Bush on November 13, 2001.

The following is a summary of the highlights in this report.

First and foremost, the Nuclear Posture Review puts the Cold War
practices related to planning for strategic forces behind us. In the
decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union, planning for the
employment of U.S. nuclear forces has undergone only modest revision,
despite the new relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Few changes had
been made to the size or composition of the strategic nuclear force
beyond those required by the START Treaty. At the same time, plans and
funding for sustaining some critical elements of that force have been
inadequate.

As a result of this review, the U.S. will no longer plan, size or sustain
its forces as though Russia presented merely a smaller version of the
threat posed by the former Soviet Union. Following the direction laid
down for U.S. defense planning in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the
Nuclear Posture Review shifts planning for America's strategic forces
from the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based
approach. This new approach should provide, over the coming decades, a
credible deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with
U.S. and allied security.

Second, we have concluded that a strategic posture that relies solely on
offensive nuclear forces is inappropriate for deterring the potential
adversaries we will face in the 21st century. Terrorists or rogue states
armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely test America's
security commitments to its allies and friends. In response, we will need
a range of capabilities to assure friend and foe alike of U.S. resolve. A
broader array of capability is needed to dissuade states from undertaking
political, military, or technical courses of action that would threaten
U.S. and allied security. U.S. forces must pose a credible deterrent to
potential adversaries who have access to modern military technology,
including NBC weapons and the means to deliver them over long distances.
Finally, U.S. strategic forces need to provide the President with a range
of options to defeat any aggressor.

To meet the nation's defense goals in the 21st century, the first leg of
the New Triad, the offensive strike leg, will go beyond the Cold War
triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range nuclear-armed bombers. ICBMs,
SLBMs, bombers and nuclear weapons will, of course, continue to play a
vital role. However, they will be just part of the first leg of the New
Triad, integrated with new non-nuclear strategic capabilities that
strengthen the credibility of our offensive deterrence.

The second leg of the New Triad requires development and deployment of
both active and passive defenses--a recognition that offensive
capabilities alone may not deter aggression in the new security
environment of the 21st century. The events of September 11, 2001
underscore this reality. Active and passive defenses will not be perfect.
However, by denying or reducing the effectiveness of limited attacks,
defenses can discourage attacks, provide new capabilities for managing
crises, and provide insurance against the failure of traditional
deterrence.

The third leg of the New Triad is a responsive defense infrastructure.
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. defense infrastructure has
contracted and our nuclear infrastructure has atrophied. New approaches
to development and procurement of new capabilities are being designed so
that it will not take 20 years or more to field new generations of weapon
systems. With respect to the nuclear infrastructure, it needs to be
repaired to increase confidence in the deployed forces, eliminate
unneeded weapons, and mitigate the risks of technological surprise.
Maintaining our ability to respond to large strategic changes can permit
us to reduce our nuclear arsenal and, at the same time, dissuade
adversaries from starting a competition in nuclear armaments.

The effectiveness of this New Triad depends upon command and control,
intelligence, and adaptive planning. "Exquisite" intelligence on the
intentions and capabilities of adversaries can permit timely adjustments
to the force and improve the precision with which it can strike and
defend. The ability to plan the employment of the strike and defense
forces flexibly and rapidly will provide the U.S. with a significant
advantage in managing crises, deterring attack and conducting military
operations.

Constructing the New Triad, reducing our deployed nuclear weapons, and
increasing flexibility in our strategic posture has resource
implications. It costs money to retire old weapons systems and create new
capabilities. Restoring the defense infrastructure, developing and
deploying strategic defenses, improving our command and control,
intelligence, planning, and non-nuclear strike capabilities require new
defense initiatives and investments. However, these investments can make
the U.S. more secure while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons.

The Quadrennial Defense Review established the foundation for America's
post-Cold War defense strategy. Building on the Quadrennial Defense
Review, the Nuclear Posture Review will transform the Cold War era
offensive nuclear triad into a New Triad designed for the decades to
come.

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

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Body of the Report

"Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the
United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military
options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale
conventional military force. These nuclear capabilities possess unique
properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of
targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political
objectives." (p. 7)

However, "U.S. nuclear forces, alone are unsuited to most of the
contingencies for which the United States prepares. The United States and
allied interests may not require nuclear strikes." A "new mix" of
nuclear, non-nuclear, and defensive capabilities "is required for the
diverse set of potential adversaries and unexpected threats the United
States may confront in the coming decades." (p. 7)

"Greater flexibility is needed with respect to nuclear forces and
planning than was the case during the Cold War. The assets most valued by
the spectrum of potential adversaries in the new security environment may
be diverse and, in some cases, U.S. understanding of what an adversary
values may evolve. Consequently, although the number of weapons needed to
hold those assets at risk has declined, U.S. nuclear forces still require
the capability to hold at risk a wide range of target types. This
capability is key to the role of nuclear forces in supporting an
effective deterrence strategy relative to a broad spectrum of potential
opponents under a variety of contingencies. Nuclear attack options that
vary in scale, scope, and purpose will complement other military
capabilities. The combination can provide the range of options needed to
pose a credible deterrent to adversaries whose values and calculations of
risk and of gain and loss may be very different from and more difficult
to discern than those of past adversaries." (p. 7)

"Advances in defensive technologies will allow U.S. non-nuclear and
nuclear capabilities to be coupled with active and passive defenses to
help provide deterrence and protection against attack, preserve U.S.
freedom of action, and strengthen the credibility of U.S. alliance
commitments. " (p. 7)

"Missile defenses are beginning to emerge as systems that can have an
effect on the strategic and operational calculations of potential
adversaries. They are now capable of providing, active defense against
short- to medium-range threats." (p. 11)

U.S. military forces themselves, including nuclear forces will now be
used to "dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or
operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and
friends." (p. 9)

"Defensive systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles may reduce
the need for nuclear weapons to hold at risk an adversary's missile
launchers." (p. 9)

"A modern, responsive nuclear weapons sector of the infrastructure is
indispensable, especially as the size of the operationally deployed
nuclear arsenal is reduced." (p. 10-11)

"The planning process [for the New Triad] not only must produce a variety
of flexible, pre-planned non-nuclear and nuclear options, but also
incorporate sufficient adaptability to support the timely construction of
additional options in a crisis or unexpected conflict." (p. 11)

II. "CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NEW TRIAD TO DEFENSE POLICY GOALS" (p.12)

(Assure, Dissuade, Deter, Defeat)

"ASSURE" -"U.S. nuclear forces will continue to provide assurance to
security partners, particularly in the presence of known or suspected
threats of nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks or in the event of
surprising military developments. This assurance can serve to reduce the
incentives for friendly countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own
to deter such threats and circumstances. Nuclear capabilities also assure
the U.S. public that the United States will not be subject to coercion
based on a false perception of U.S. weakness among potential adversaries.
(p. 12)

"Defense of the U.S. homeland and protection of forward bases increase
the ability of the United States to counteract WMD-backed coercive
threats and to use its power projection forces in the defense of allies
and friends." (p. 13)

"DISSUADE" - "Systems capable of striking a wide range of targets
throughout an adversary's territory may dissuade a potential adversary
from pursuing threatening capabilities. For example, a demonstration of
the linkage between long-range precision strike weapons and real-time
intelligence systems may dissuade a potential adversary from investing
heavily in mobile ballistic missiles." (p. 12)

"Defenses can make it more arduous and costly for an adversary to compete
militarily with or wage war against the United States. The demonstration
of a range of technologies and systems for missile defense can have a
dissuasive effect on potential adversaries. The problem of countering
missile defenses, especially defensive systems with multiple layers,
presents a potential adversary with the prospect of a difficult,
time-consuming and expensive undertaking." (p. 13)

"The capacity of the infrastructure to upgrade existing weapon systems,
surge production of weapons, or develop and field entirely new systems
for the New Triad can discourage other countries from competing
militarily with the United States." (p. 14)

"DETER" - "[Missile] [D]efense of U.S. territory and power projection
forces, including U.S forces abroad, combined with the certainty of U.S.
ability to strike in response, can bring into better balance U.S. stakes
and risks in a regional confrontation and thus reinforce the credibility
of U. S. guarantees designed to deter attacks on allies and friends."

"The [defense R&D and industrial] infrastructure must provide confidence
in the reliability of the nuclear stockpile and the ability of command
and control structures to withstand attack. More broadly, [it] helps to
enhance deterrence of aggression by supporting improved U.S. capabilities
to hold at risk high-value targets in the face of an adversary's efforts
to conceal, harden, and disperse them." (p. 14)

"DEFEAT" - "Composed of both non-nuclear systems and nuclear weapons, the
strike element of the New Triad can provide greater flexibility in the
design and conduct of military campaigns to defeat opponents decisively.
Non-nuclear strike capabilities may be particularly useful to limit
collateral damage and conflict escalation. Nuclear weapons could be
employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, (for
example, deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities)." (p. 12-13)

"Missile defenses could defeat small-scale missile attacks intended to
coerce the United States into abandoning an embattled ally or friend.
Defenses that provided protection for strike capabilities of the New
Triad and for other power projection forces would improve the ability of
the United States and its allies and friends to counterattack an enemy.
They may also provide the President with an option to manage a crisis
involving one or more missile and WMD-armed opponents." (p. 13)

COMMAND, CONTROL, PLANNING, AND INTELLIGENCE (p. 15)

"As forces are incrementally changed to meet the New Triad force
requirements, command and control (C2) becomes more critical to ensure
the effectiveness of the elements of the residual force structure...
Strike options will require intricate planning, flexibility, and
interface with decision makers throughout the engagement process. Command
and control will become more complex and the supporting systems and
platforms will require augmentation, modernization, and replacement." (p.
15)

"Accurate and timely targeting information can increase both the
lethality of strike capabilities and the possibilities for non-nuclear
strike capabilities to substitute for nuclear weapons or provide for the
timely positioning of missile defense assets." (p. 15)

DEFENSE POLICY GOALS AND RELATED NUCLEAR WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS (p. 15)

"In a fluid security environment, the precise nuclear force level
necessary for the future cannot be predicted with certainty. The goal of
reducing, over the next decade, the U.S. operationally deployed strategic
nuclear force to the range of between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads provides a
degree of flexibility necessary to accommodate changes in the security
environment that could affect U.S. nuclear requirements." (p. 15)

SIZING THE NUCLEAR F0RCE (p. 16)

"In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions
can be made among the contingencies for which the United States must be
prepared. Contingencies can be categorized as immediate, potential or
unexpected."

"Immediate contingencies involve well-recognized current dangers...
Current examples of immediate contingencies include an Iraqi attack on
Israel or its neighbors, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or a
military confrontation over the status of Taiwan."

"Potential contingencies are plausible, but not immediate dangers. For
example, the emergence of a new, hostile military coalition against the
United States or its allies in which one or more members possesses WMD
and the means of delivery is a potential contingency that could have
major consequences for U.S. defense planning, including plans for nuclear
forces." (p. 16)

Unexpected contingencies are sudden and unpredicted security challenges,"
like the Cuban Missile Crisis. "Contemporary illustrations might include
a sudden regime change by which an existing nuclear arsenal comes into
the hands of a new, hostile leadership group, or an opponents surprise
unveiling of WMD capabilities." Ibid.

'North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that
could be involved in immediate, potential, or unexpected contingencies.
All have longstanding hostility toward the United States and its security
partners; North Korea and Iraq in particular have been chronic military
concerns. All sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have active WMD and
missile programs." Ibid

"Due to the combination of China's still developing strategic objectives
and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces,
China is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential
contingency." (p. 16-17)

"Russia maintains the most formidable nuclear forces, aside from the
United States, and substantial, if less impressive, conventional
capabilities. There now are, however, no ideological sources of conflict
with Moscow, as there were during the Cold War. The United States seeks a
more cooperative relationship with Russia and a move away from the
balance-of-terror policy framework, which by definition is an expression
of mutual distrust and hostility. As a. result, a [nuclear strike]
contingency involving Russia, while plausible, is not expected." (p. 17)

(U) "Adjusting U.S. immediate nuclear force requirements in recognition
of the changed relationship with Russia is a critical step away from the
Cold War policy of mutual vulnerability and toward more cooperative
relations." (p. 17)

(S) "Russia's nuclear forces and programs, nevertheless, remain a
concern. Russia faces many strategic problems around its periphery and
its future course cannot be charted with certainty. U.S. planning must
take this into account. In the event that U.S. relations with Russia
significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may need to revise its
nuclear force levels and posture." (p. 17)

OPERATIONALLY DEPLOYED AND RESPONSIVE NUCLEAR FORCES

"The operationally deployed forces are sized to provide the capabilities
required to meet the U.S. defense goals in the context of immediate, and
unexpected contingencies. That is, a sufficient number of forces must be
available on short notice to counter known threats while preserving a
small, additional margin in the event of a surprise development. The
1700-2200 warheads the United States is scheduled to deploy in 2012 would
constitute the operationally deployed force." (p. 17)

"The responsive force is intended to provide a capability to augment the
operationally deployed force to meet potential contingencies ... The
responsive force ... retains the option for leadership to increase the
number of operationally delayed forces in proportion to the severity of
an evolving crisis. A responsive force need not be available in a matter
of days, but in weeks, months, or even years. For example, additional
bombs could be brought out of the non-deployed stockpile in days or
weeks. By contrast, adding additional weapons to the ICBM force could
take as long as a year for a squadron in a wing. The responsive force
[also] provides a reserve from which replacements can be provided for
operationally deployed weapons that evidence reliability problems."

US NUCLEAR FORCE SIZE

"Based on current projections, an operationally deployed force of
1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads by 2012 ...will support U.S.
deterrence policy to hold at risk what opponents value, including their
instruments of political control and military power, and to deny
opponents their war aims. The types of targets to be held at risk for
deterrence purposes include leadership and military capabilities,
particularly WMD, military command facilities and other centers of
control and infrastructure that support military forces."

"The planned force structure for 2012 comprises 14 Trident SSBNs (with
two of the 14 in overhaul at any time) 500 Minuteman III ICBMs, 76 B-52H
bombers, and 21 B-2 bombers."

THE PATH FOR NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

"A conceptual path toward an operationally deployed force of 1,700-2,200
warheads in 2012 ... eliminates Peacekeeper ICBMs, removes 4 Trident
SSBNs from strategic service, and downloads weapons from Trident SLBMs,
Minuteman III ICBMs; and B-52H and B-2 bombers. This will result in 3,800
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2007 (SLBM warheads
for SSBNs in overhaul will not be counted as operationally deployed
because those submarines are unavailable for alert patrols)." (p. 19)

"Subsequent reductions below the 3,800 operationally deployed warheads
can be achieved through a variety of methods. The precise method will be
determined in the course of periodic reviews the Department will conduct
beginning in 2003. The Secretary of Defense will direct that these
reviews be undertaken with the participation of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Strategic Forces Command,
and the NNSA Administrator." (p. 19)

III. CREATING THE NEW TRIAD

"To meet the demands of the New Triad, an overhaul of existing
capabilities is needed. This includes improving the tools used to build
and execute strike plans so that the national leadership can adapt
pre-planned options, or construct new options, during highly dynamic
crisis situations." (p. 23)

"In addition, the technology base and production readiness
infrastructures of both DoD and NNSA must be modernized so that the
United States will be able to adjust to rapidly changing situations
....adjustments may be needed to match capabilities of the remaining
nuclear forces to new missions... a need may arise to modify, upgrade, or
replace portions of the extant nuclear force or develop concepts for
follow-on nuclear weapons better suited is the nation's needs. It is
unlikely that a reduced version of the Cold War nuclear arsenal will be
precisely the nuclear force that the United States will require in 2012
and beyond." (p. 23)

"The FY04 DPG [Defense Planning Guidance] will provide guidance to
coordinate and deconflict requirements for nuclear and non nuclear
systems." (p. 24)

"Initiatives reflected in the proposed FY03-07 Future Years Defense Plan
(FYPD) include:

* Mobile and Relocatable Targets. DoD proposed to develop a systems-level
approach, applied across the Services, for holding at risk critical
mobile targets.
* Defeating Hard and Deeply-Buried Targets. DoD would implement a program
to improve significantly the means to locate, identify, characterize, and
target adversarial hard and deeply buried targets.
* Long Range Strike. DoD will pursue a systems level approach to defeat
critical fixed and mobile targets at varying ranges, in all terrain and
weather conditions, and in denied areas.
* Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs). DoD has proposed to fund the
conversion of four SSBNs, withdrawn from the strategic nuclear service,
to SSGN configuration.
* Precision Strike. Effort to increase the number of targets than can be
attacked on a single mission. Elements include a "Multifunction
Information Distribution System" to provide "a jam-resistant, secure,
digital network for exchange of critical information for strike
capabilities," a "Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile," A "Small
Diameter Bomb," and the "Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle."
* New Strike System. "DoD will begin in FY03 to explore concepts for a
new strike system that might arm the converted SSGNs. Desired
capabilities for this new strike weapon include timely arrival on target,
precision, and the ability to be retargeted rapidly." (p. 24-25)

Ballistic Missile Defense

"The President has stated that the mission for missile defense is to
protect all 50 states, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies
against ballistic missile attacks. The Department has rerganized its
ballistic missile defense program. The program is pursuing missile
defense based an the following guidance:

* Missile defense is most effective if it is layered; that is, able to
intercept ballistic missiles of any range in all phases of their flight.

* The United States seeks effective defenses against attacks by small
numbers of longer range missiles as well as defenses against attacks by
larger numbers of short- and medium-range missiles.
* Missile defense systems, like all military systems, can be less than
100-percent effective and still make a significant contribution to
security by enhancing deterrence and saving lives if deterrence fails."
(p. 25)

"Other than the PAC-3, the United States has not yet chosen systems for
deployment; that decision will depend on the evolution of both technology
and the threat. The Department is exploring a wide range of alternative
approaches. There are two dimensions to the missile defense program:
near-term emergency capabilities; and improved variants of these
capabilities leading to more robust, operational systems. Several
near-term and mid-term options (2003-2008) that could provide an
emergency missile defense capability are under consideration, including:

* A single Airborne Laser for boost-phase intercepts may be available for
limited operations against ballistic missiles of all ranges;
* A rudimentary ground-based midcourse system, consisting of a small
number of interceptors taken from the test program and an upgraded Cobra
Dane radar in Alaska, could be available against longer-range threats to
the United States; and
* A sea-based Aegis system could be available to provide rudimentary
midcourse capability against short to medium-range threats." (p. 26)

"Based on the technical progress of these systems, the United States
could deploy operational capabilities beginning in the 2006-2008 period
including:

* 2-3 Airborne Laser aircraft
* Additional ground-based midcourse sites
* 4 sea-based midcourse ships
* terminal systems, able to defend against shorter range threats: PAC-3,
which began deployment in 2001, and THAAD, which could be available by
2008." (p. 26)

"DOD will develop the low-orbit constellation of SBIRS-Low satellites to
support missile defense. This system will provide capabilities to track
enemy ballistic missiles and to assist in the discrimination of reentry
vehicles and other objects in flight." (p. 28)

Command and Control Intelligence

[the Secretary of Defense] "established a Federal Advisory Committee
(FAC) to conduct an independent, end-to-end review of all activities
involved in maintaining the highest standards of nuclear weapons safety,
security, control, and reliability." This "End-to-End Review" was
conducted concurrently with the NPR but was not completed before the NPR
deadline. While the review is not yet final, the FAC presented an "urgent
preliminary finding to the Secretary subsequent to the events of
September 11 identifying the need to expand the current nuclear command
and control (C2) architecture to a true national command and control
conferencing system." (p. 26)

"The attacks of September 11 dramatically highlighted the requirement for
secure, wideband communications between fixed and mobile command centers
and national decision makers. The Department is developing a secure
wideband communications architecture and procedures ... The Department
will initiate a satellite communications system in FY03, the Advanced
Wideband System (AWS), that incorporates interoperable laser
communications and will be designed to meet the needs of the defense and
intelligence community for wideband tactical, protected tactical
(replaces Advanced EHF satellites) broadcast, and relay communications
with a planned system first launch during FY09. The Department supports
the effort to implement a secure, wideband capability on all strategic C2
platforms. Wideband complements, but does not replace, the requirement
for assured, survivable, and enduring nuclear C2." (p. 27)

The "2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and
Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States" provided immediate
upgrades to aircraft for national leadership, and the Department has
programmed funding for additional wideband upgrades including the E-4
National Airborne Operations Center aircraft.

"Three Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) spacecraft are planned
for an initial operating capability of FY08 that will provide
nuclear-survivable (e.g. against high altitude electromagnetic pulse),
anti-jam, low and medium data rate communications to strategic and
tactical users."

"The Department will initiate in FY03 an Extremely High Frequency (EHF)
communications satellites program primarily for national and strategic
users requiring nuclear protected communications in the mid-latitude and
polar regions with a planned first launch during FY09. Survivable,
jam-resistant, secure voice conferencing among principal nuclear C2
decision makers remains essential to facilitate discussions of tactical
warning and assessment, response options, and force management." (p. 27)

"... substantial investment in nuclear C2 cryptographic systems ... new
nuclear C2 capabilities must be leveraged with new technologies. (p. 27)

Intelligence

"Significant capability shortfalls currently exist in: finding and
tracking mobile and relocatable targets and WMD sites: locating,
identifying, and characterizing hard and deeply buried targets (HDBTs);
[and] providing intelligence support to Information Operations and
federated intelligence operations " (p. 28)

"To provide continuous and persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance of critical regions, the Department proposes to develop in
its FY03-07 FYDP a "system of systems that consists of space, airborne,
surface, and subsurface capabilities. Sensors for this system will
include a mix of phenomenology, allow for agile and flexible response,
and operate across the electro-magnetic spectrum." (p. 28)

"New concepts for persistent surveillance - from air- and space-based
platforms - including hyper-spectral imaging, are proposed in the FY03
budget. (ibid).

"Intelligence for Information Operations (IO). Information Operations
targeting, weaponeering, and execution requires intelligence collection
of finer granularity and depth than is currently available. The
intelligence community lacks adequate data on most adversary computer
local area networks and other command and control systems. Additionally,
there is limited analytical capability to exploit these networks using IO
tools. Investments must continue in order to upgrade and, populate the
Modernized Integrated Database to enable effective IO targeting,
weaponeering, and combat assessment essential to the New Triad."

Adaptive Planning (p. 29)

"The current nuclear planning system, including target identification,
weapons system assignment, and the nuclear command and control system
requirements, is optimized to support large, deliberately planned nuclear
strikes. In the future, as the nation moves beyond the concept of a
large, Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and moves toward more
flexibility, adaptive planning will play a much larger role."

"Deliberate planning creates executable war plans, prepared in advance,
for anticipated contingencies. Adaptive planning is used to generate war
plans quickly in time critical-situations. Deliberate planning provides
the foundation for adaptive planning by identifying individual
weapon/target combinations that could be executed in crises."

"For contingencies for which no adaptive planning has been done, fully
adaptive planning will be required. The desire to shorten the time
between identifying a target and having an option available will place
significant stress on the nuclear planning process as it currently
exists. Presently 12-48 hours is required to develop a plan to attack a
single new target, depending on the weapon system to be employed. A more
flexible planning system is needed to address the requirements of
adaptive planning."

"To make the Strategic Warfare Planning System (SWPS) more responsive to
adaptive planning scenarios, a comprehensive SWPS Transformation Study
has been initiated and is being conducted by U.S. Strategic Command.
Results will be available in late spring 2002. To meet the requirements
of adaptive planning, an upgrade of the existing nuclear C2 architecture
is needed.

DOD Infrastructure Issues

"DOD has identified shortfalls in current infrastructure sustainment
programs far nuclear platforms. These include the following: solid rocket
motor design, development and testing; technology for current and future
strategic systems; improved surveillance and assessment capabilities;
command and control platforms and systems; and design, development, and
production of radiation-hardened parts." (p. 30)

"In support of this effort, the Defense Science Board Task Force on
System Technology for the Future US Strategic Posture is considering
strategies for enhancing the ability of the U.S. technology base to deal
with or hedge against uncertainties in the nature and timing of potential
strategic threats, the capability of the technology and industrial base
to respond in a timely manner, and the adequacy and responsiveness of
science and technology programs related to possible future strategic
capabilities. In addition, the U.S. Strategic Command Advisory Group on
Strategic Platforms is addressing weapon system viability arid nuclear
force readiness." (p. 30)

The Current U.S. Nuclear Warhead Infrastructure

"Underinvestment in the infrastructure - in particular the production
complex - has increased the risks that if substantial problems in the
stockpile are discovered, future options to refurbish or replace existing
designs will be limited. For example, although an interim pit production
capability will be established later in this decade, no current
capability exists to build and certify plutonium pits, certain secondary
components, or complete warheads." (p. 30)

"The need is clear for a revitalized nuclear weapons complex that will:
...be able, if directed, to design, develop, manufacture, and certify new
warheads in response to new national requirements; and maintain readiness
to resume underground nuclear testing if required." (p. 30)

Stockpile Maintenance

"DOD and NNSA are in the preliminary stages of determining the
requirements for nuclear warheads for the New Triad. As the New Triad is
developed and fielded, DoD and NNSA will have to reassess how the
warheads in the stockpile are characterized. At present, the warhead
stockpile is divided into two categories: active and inactive:

* Active stock pile warheads are maintained in a ready-for-use
configuration with tritium and other limited life components installed.
They incorporate the latest warhead modifications. The active stockpile
includes all deployed warheads, warheads for the responsive force, and
logistics spares for each warhead type.
* Inactive stockpile warheads do not have limited life components
installed, and may not have the latest warhead modifications. These
warheads serve a number of purposes ranging from reliability replacements
that act as a hedge against the discovery of a problem with a large
number of active warheads, to the more predictable replacement of
warheads consumed by quality assurance and reliability testing. This
hedge is required because the United States will not have, for a decade
or more, the capacity to produce certain new components for warheads. The
time it would take to deploy warheads in the inactive stockpile depends
on the delivery system, and availability of tritium gas and other
limited-life components. These warheads or their components could also be
used to provide new capabilities. This time would range from weeks in the
case of bombers, to years in the case of ICBMs." (p. 31-32)

"There are almost 8,000 warheads in the active stockpile today. As the
initial nuclear warhead reductions are implemented, some warheads will be
transferred from the active to the inactive stockpile. For example, the
removal from strategic service of the 4 SSBNs will result in the transfer
of over 700 W76 warheads to the inactive stockpile. By 2012 approximately
3,000 warheads, now in the active stockpile, are planned to be
transferred to the inactive stockpile or retired." (p. 32)

"Some of the W87 Peacekeeper warheads will be redeployed on Minuteman
ICBMs under the Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program Each W87
warhead will displace one W62, or three W78 warheads currently deployed
on Minuteman. To provide warhead diversity in the force, some
SERV-modified Minuteman missiles would carry the W78 warhead. A number of
W78 and W87 warheads will be retained as reliability replacements and
surveillance assets to support the responsive force. In addition, the W62
will be retired by the end of Fiscal Year 2009. (p. 32)

"The active stockpiles also includes the nonstrategic nuclear weapons."

"The United States will retain an inactive stockpile of nuclear weapons.
The size of that stockpile is yet to be determined. It will be driven by
the capacity of the nuclear weapon complex to refurbish and dismantle
weapons. For example, today the complex can process - either refurbish or
dismantle - roughly 350 weapons per year. If the NNSA's proposed plan is
funded, that number should increase to roughly 600 per year." (p. 32)

"A major challenge for nuclear weapons programs over the next two decades
will be to refurbish, and thereby extend the life of, at least seven
types of nuclear warheads" [a table lists these as B61 -3, 4, 10; B61-7,
11; W76; W78; W80-0, 1; B83-0; B83-1; W87; and W88.]

Restoring Production Infrastructure

"Warhead Assembly and Disassembly:...Plans are underway to expand the
capacity and capability of the Pantex Plant to meet the planned workload
for dismantlement and remanufacturing of existing weapons." (p. 33)

"Uranium Operations: At least seven to eight years of effort will be
required to restore the capability to produce a complete nuclear weapon
secondary at the Y-12 Plant in Tennessee. Qualified processes for some
material and manufacturing steps are not currently in place. Plans are
underway to expand the capacity and capability of the Y-12 Plant to meet
the planned workload for replacing warhead secondaries, and other uranium
components." (p. 33)

"Plutonium Operations: One glaring shortfall is the inability to
fabricate and certify weapon primaries, or so-called "pits". Work is
underway to establish an interim capability at Los Alamos National
Laboratory late in this decade to meet current demand created by
destructive surveillance testing on the W88 warhead. For the long term a
new modern production facility will be needed to deal with the
large-scale replacement of components and new production." (p. 33)

"Other Component and Material Production:... Tritium production, halted
since 1988, is programmed to resume in FY03 with first deliveries to the
stockpile scheduled for FY06. Additionally, warhead refurbishment plans
require modern facilities at Y-12's Special Materials Complex for
manufacturing unique materials." (p. 14)

NNSA Initiatives for Nuclear Weapons Programs

"As a result of the NPR, NNSA will undertake several initiatives...

Advanced Concepts Initiative:...There are several nuclear weapon options
that might provide important advantages for enhancing the nation's
deterrence posture: possible modifications to existing weapons to provide
additional yield flexibility in the stockpile; improved earth penetrating
weapons (EPWs) to counter the increased use by potential adversaries of
hardened and deeply buried facilities; and warheads that reduce
collateral damage. (p. 34-35)

"To further assess these and other nuclear weapons options in connection
with meeting new or emerging military requirements, the NNSA will
reestablish advanced warhead concepts teams at each of the national
laboratories and at headquarters in Washington. This will provide unique
opportunities to train our next generation of weapon designers and
engineers. DoD and NNSA will also jointly review potential programs to
provide nuclear capabilities, and identify opportunities for further
study, including assessments of whether nuclear testing would be required
to field such warheads." (p. 35)

"The [Feb. 2001 Foster] Panel recommendation that DOE/NNSA assess the
feasibility and cost of reducing the time [to resume testing] to 'well
below the Congressionally-mandated one year' (sense of the Congress as
expressed in the 1996 Resolution of Ratification for the START II Treaty)
was addressed as part of the NPR." (p. 35)

"Test Readiness is maintained principally by the participation of nuclear
test program personnel in an active program of stockpile stewardship
experiments carried out underground at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). There
are two concerns about the current test readiness program."

"First, ... the current 2-3 year test readiness posture will not be
sustainable as more and more experienced test personnel retire. Not all
of the techniques and processes required to carry out underground nuclear
tests - including nuclear diagnostic instrumentation, containment, design
and emplacement of diagnostic equipment in a vertical shaft, drillback
and radiochemical analysis are exercised with the subcritical
experimentation work carried out a the NTS. As experienced personnel
retire, it will become more difficult to train new people in these
techniques, further degrading test readiness. This argues for an approach
in which all key capabilities required to conduct underground nuclear
tests are identified and exercised on projects making use of a variety of
nuclear testing related skills." (p. 35-36)

"Second, the 2-3 year posture may be too long to address any serious
defect that might be discovered in the future."

"Given the certainty of surprise in the future and the broad spectrum of
threats, the United States also must have the capability to understand
the technological implications of nuclear weapon concepts and
countermeasures tested by other states, to ensure that U.S. weapons and
delivery platforms (including advanced conventional strike systems)
perform effectively. If necessary, this will enable the United States to
initiate research into whether it needs to develop an entirely new
capability - one that it not a modification of an existing weapon - in
time to address the threat." (p. 36)

"To address these concerns... NNSA proposes over the next three years to
enhance test readiness by: augmenting key personnel and increasing their
operational proficiency; beginning the mentoring of the next generation
of testing personnel; conducting additional field experiments including
additional subcritical experiments and test related exercises of
appropriate fidelity; replacing key underground-test-unique components
(e.g. Field Test Neutron Generators); modernizing certain test diagnostic
capabilities; and decreasing the time required to show regulatory and
safety compliance. DoD and NNSA will work to refine test scenarios and
evaluate cost/benefit tradeoffs in order to determine, implement, and
sustain the optimum test readiness time chat best supports the New
Triad." (p. 36)

Meeting Warhead Production Commitments to DoD . ...A key capability that
must be recovered is manufacture of plutonium pits. In addition to our
efforts to establish a limited production capability at Los Alamos, NNSA
will accelerate preliminary design work on a modern pit manufacturing
facility so that new production capacity can be brought on line when it
is needed." (p. 36)

People with Critical Skills

The DoD and NNSA will jointly support opportunities that provide
end-to-end demonstration of integrated capabilities involved with warhead
design, development, manufacturing, and warhead/weapon integration. A key
objective is to exercise critical skills for adapting warheads to DoD
weapon delivery systems; ...NNSA will include the following as goals for
the new Advanced Concepts Initiative:

* Transfer of warhead design knowledge from the current generation of
designers to the next generation
* Exercise of DoD/NNSA program integration skills.

Nuclear Force Sustainment and Modernization

"No plans to phase-out [dual-capable] F-15E; Phase-out F-16 once
dual-capable JSF is deployed."

[Concerning ICBMs] "The focus of the Department's efforts are to extend
the life of the MM III weapons system until 2020 while beginning the
requirements process for the next-generation ICBM"

A comprehensive set of sustainment programs are planned or underway:

* Guidance Replacement Program (GRP)
* Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP)
* Propulsion System Rocket Engine (PSRE) life extension program
("replaces aging components in the post-boost vehicle")
* Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) service life extension
program
* Environmental Control System (ECS)
* Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicle (SERV) program.

"The SERV program reconfigures the MM III ICBM to carry the Mk21 reentry
vehicle which is currently deployed on Peacekeeper missiles." (p. 41)

"Peacekeeper deactivation will occur over a 36-month period [beginning in
FY03] with missiles remaining on alert and fully mission capable
throughout the deactivation period. ...The Department analyzed the role
of the Peacekeeper against projected threats in the post-Cold War
environment and judged that its retirement would not have an adverse
effect on the sufficiency of U.S. nuclear forces. DoD plans to retain the
booster stages for potential future uses such as space launch or target
vehicles." (p. 41)

"Follow on ICBM: The Air Force Systems Command (AFSPC) led the Ballistic
Missile Requirements (BMR) Study (1998 to 2000) which documented a number
of needs beyond the current baseline ICBM mission, such as extended
range, trajectory shaping, strategic relocatable targets, and hardened
deeply buried targets, that the next generation ICBM could address. The
Land Based Strategic Nuclear Deterrence Mission Needs Statement (MNS)
drew from the analysis done in the BMR study in documenting the need for
ICBMs beyond 2020. To expand on the MNS and address alternatives for the
follow on ICBM, AFSPC plans to conduct an analysis of alternatives in
FY04 and FY05 with an IOC by 2018. This work will ensure the requirements
generation process and the acquisition process remain on track for the
future ICBM force." (p. 41)

"Trident SSBN: . ..The Administration intends to convert four SSBNs from
the current force of 18 submarines to carry special operations forces as
well as conventional cruise missiles. Achieving this force structure also
requires converting four of the eight Trident I (C-4) SSBNs to carry the
Trident D-5 missile. The Navy has extended the Trident hull life to 44
years. This in turn will require the DoD to extend the service life of
the D-5 SWS [Strategic Weapons System] as well. The first of the 14
Trident SSBNs remaining in service will he retired in 2029." (p. 42)

"Trident II SLBM: ... DoD will fund the D-5 Life Extension Program, which
continues production of D-5 missiles, and upgrades the guidance and
missile electronics systems on existing missiles. The continued
production of additional D-5 missiles is needed in order to prevent a
shortage of missiles in the next decade." (p. 42)

"Follow-on SSBN: ... DoD assumes the continued requirement for a
sea-based strategic nuclear force. Therefore, the timeframe when the next
generation SSBN will need to be deployed is about 2029 when the first of
the remaining operational Trident SSBNs is planned to be retired. The
Navy is currently studying two options for future follow-on SSBNs: (1) a
variant of Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines (SSN); and (2) a
dedicated SSBN (either a new design or a derivative of the Trident SSBN)
... If the decision is made to develop a new dedicated SSBN, a program
would have to be initiated around 2016 to ensure that a new platform is
available in 2029." (p. 42)

"Follow-on SLBM. A new SLBM would be needed in about 2029 to match the
schedule for a follow-on SSBN. The Navy has begun studies to examine
range-payload requirements and missile size, but no specific plans for a
follow-on SLBM at this point other than extending the service life of the
Trident D-5." (p. 42)

"Common Missile. The Department of Defense doe not plan to pursue a
common ICBM/SLBM ballistic missile at this time. However, the Air Force
and Navy are currently cooperating in research and development on common
technologies related to current and future ballistic missiles - the
Guidance Applications Prograrn (GAP), Reentry Systems Applications
Program (RSAP), Propulsion Applications Program (PAP), and Technology for
the Sustainment of Strategic Systems (TSSS) programs." (p. 42-43)

Heavy Bombers/Air Launched Cruise Missiles (p. 43)

Strategic Bombers. The Air Force plans to keep the current B-2 and B-52
fleet operational far another 35-40 years. An aggressive sustainment and
modernization effort for both platforms is required to support this plan.
In particular, upgrades to communications, avionics, processors, radar
systems, displays, and navigation equipment are essential to keep the
fleet affordable and operationally relevant throughout this period.

"Assured, worldwide, survivable two way connectivity between the National
Command Authorities and the strategic bomber force is a fundamental
element of strategic command and control. B-52s and B-2s must transition
to Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite communications in
order to ensure continued Connectivity with National Command elements."

"Situational Awareness (SA) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) remain
the highest priority B-52 upgrades. The inability to adapt to and counter
threats, the high failure rate of SA and ECM equipment components, parts
obsolescence, and a vanishing vendor base severely limit the B-52's
ability to operate in a combat environment. To that end, the Electronic
Countermeasure Improvement, Situational Awareness Defense Improvement,
and Low-Mid Band Jammer replacement programs are essential to ensuring
the B-52 remains a viable combat asset beyond 2006."

The B-52 also requires a highly reliable and accurate navigation system
to conduct worldwide tasking and nuclear weapons deliveries. The Inertial
Navigation system (INS) represents the heart of the B-52 navigation suite
but is reaching the end of service life and is increasingly
cost-prohibitive to support. The Avionics Mid-Life Improvement program
addresses this issue by replacing the INS and other obsolete B-52
avionics components required for precision navigation and weapons
delivery."

Several upgrades are currently underway on the B-2. These upgrades
include AHFM (Alternate High Frequency Material) which improves the
ability to maintain the low observable materials of the aircraft:
UHF/SATCOM upgrade; JASSM upgrade; Mk-82 Smart Bomb Rack Assembly
upgrade; and Link-16 upgrade.

"Air-Launched Weapons Systems. The Air Force recently determined that its
current force of cruise missiles can be sustained until 2030." (p. 43)

"Follow-on Strategic Bombers" Based on current estimates, "a new bomber
will need to be operational by approximately 2040. A need for additional
or improved bomber capabilities could, however, move the 'need date'
closer to the present... The Air Force recently funded a science and
technology effort for the Long-Range Strike Aerospace Platform-X to
further explore options." (p. 43-44)

"Follow-on Air Launched Weapon Systems. There are no plans at this time
for a follow-on nuclear ALCM... However, conventional cruise missile
programs (such as the Extended Range Cruise Missile) are planned that
could support an accelerated timetable if necessary, but would have to be
modified to carry nuclear warheads."

Dual-Capable Aircraft, DoD is considering options and their associated
costs to either extend the life of the dual capable F-16C/Ds and F-15Es
or make a block upgrade to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft... The
Operational Requirements Document for the JSF requires that initial
design permit nuclear capability to be incorporated at a later date
(after IOC, currently scheduled for 2012) at an affordable price."

"Dual-capable aircraft and nuclear weapons in support of NATO. DoD will
not seek any change to the current posture in FY02 but will review both
issues to assess whether any modifications to the current posture are
appropriate to adapt to the changing threat environment. A plan is
already underway to conduct a NATO review of U.S. and allied dual capable
aircraft in Europe and to present recommendations to Ministers in summer
of 2002. Dual capable aircraft and deployed weapons are important to the
continued viability of NATO's nuclear deterrent strategy and any changes
need to be discussed within the alliance." (p. 44)

Tankers The current fleet of KC-135s will be operational for the next
35-40 years. The aging fleet will begin a long phased retirement starting
in 2013 and continuing until approximately 2040. The Air Force
anticipates constant upgrades to avionics, displays, and navigation
equipment over the coming years. However, the current KC-135 fleet is not
equipped with a survivable communications capability, limiting its
effectiveness in a stressed environment. The Air Force is evaluating a
follow-on tanker in conjunction with a follow-on common airframe air1ift
and special missions platform. The service is also considering the lease
or purchase of 100 off-the-shelf 767 tankers as an interim measure prior
to the need to produce the KC-X replacement platform. In developing
altematives, consideration needs to be given to the possibility that
aircraft will operate in a nuclear, biological and chemical weapons
environment." (p. 44-45)

Robust Flight Testing, Aging, and Surveillance. Air Force and Navy
nuclear systems require robust flight-testing programs to provide
operationally representative data on weapon system performance and to
predict weapon system reliability and accuracy... Currently, only the D-5
missile system fulfils the required annual flight tests." (p. 45)

"Nuclear Warhead Sustainment... The active stockpile quantities will be
sufficient to arm the operationally deployed and responsive nuclear
force, and provide sufficient logistics spares. The inactive stockpile
will consist of warhead types in the active stockpile plus the W84 and
B83 Mod 0, which have no active stockpile counterparts. The W62 warhead
will be retired in FY09." (p. 45)

"The NNSA his initiated a program to energize design work on advanced
concepts at the three design laboratories. This initiative will be
focused on evolving DoD requirements." (p. 46)

Limitations in the Present Nuclear Force

"Today's nuclear arsenal continues to reflect its Cold War origin,
characterized by moderate delivery accuracy, limited earth penetrator
capability, high-yield warheads, silo and sea-based ballistic missiles
with multiple independent reentry vehicles, and limited retargeting
capability."

"New capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats such as
hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT), to find and attack mobile and
relocatable targets, to defeat chemical or biological agents, and to
improve accuracy and limit collateral damage. Development of these
capabilities, to include extensive research and timely fielding of new
systems to address these challenges, are imperative to make the New Triad
a reality."

Defeating Hard and Deeply Buried Targets

"More than 70 countries now use underground Facilities (UGFs) for
military purposes. In June 1998, the Defense Science Board Task force on
Underground Facilities that there are over 10,000 UGFs worldwide.
Approximately 1,100 UGFS were known or suspected strategic (WMD,
ballistic missile basing, leadership or top echelon command and control)
sites. Updated estimates form DIA reveal this number has now grown to
over 1,400. A majority of the strategic facilities are deep underground
facilities. These facilities are generally the most difficult to defeat
because of the depth of the facility and the uncertainty of the exact
location. At present the United States lacks adequate means to deal with
these strategic facilities. A detailed report on this issue was provided
to the Congress recently (Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and
Deeply Buried Targets, July 2001). (p. 46)

"To deny the enemy sanctuary in HDBTs requires timely identification and
characterization of potential targets, realistic defeat alternatives, and
accurate assessment of damage done by the attack. Achieving the desired
level of capability requires the integration of Service and National
systems into a robust, highly responsive system of systems capable of
addressing the threat. Improved command and control and intelligence in
support of the New Triad will be a key enabler to address this capability
shortfall." (p. 47)

"In general, current conventional weapons can only 'deny' or 'disrupt'
the functioning of HDBTs and require highly accurate intelligence and
precise weapon delivery - a degree of accuracy and precision frequently
missing under actual combat conditions, Similarly, current conventional
weapons are not effective for the long term physical destruction of deep,
underground facilities. (p. 47)

"The United States currently has a very limited ground penetration
capability with its only earth penetrating nuclear weapon, the B61 Mod 11
gravity bomb. This single-yield, non-precision weapon cannot survive
penetration into many types of terrain in which hardened underground
facilities are located. Given these limitations, the targeting of a
number of hardened, underground facilities is limited to an attack
against surface features, which does not does not provide a high
probability of defeat of these important targets." (p. 47)

"With a more effective earth penetrator, many buried targets could be
attacked using a weapon with a much lower yield than would be required
with a surface burst weapon. This lower yield would achieve the same
damage while producing less fallout (by a factor of ten to twenty) than
would the much larger yield surface burst. For defeat of very deep or
larger underground facilities, penetrating weapons with large yields
would be needed to collapse the facility." (p. 47)

"To defeat HDBT it is necessary to improve significantly U.S. means to
locate, identify, characterize, and target HDBTs. This objective also
requires deliberate pre-planned and practiced missions and the
development and procurement of several types of conventional earth
penetrating munitions. A number of Special Operations Forces and
information capabilities will need to be developed to support this goal.
Investment and organization will yield a new level of capability for the
stated objectives by 2007, with new technologies deployed by 2012. One
effort to improve the U.S. capability against HBDTs is a joint DoD/DOE
phase 6.2/6.2A Study to be started in Apri1 2002. This effort will
identify whether an existing warhead in a 5,000 pound class penetrator
would provide significantly enhanced earth penetration capabilities
compared to the B61 Mod 11." (p. 47)

Mobile and Relocatable Targets

"One of the greatest challenges today is accounting for the location
uncertainty of mobile and relocatable targets... To respond to this
challenge, collection systems and techniques that defeat adversary
relocation capabilities must be developed. Sensors must also be capable
of defeating camouflage and concealment efforts and detecting and
exploiting new command and control systems."

"To locate successfully and maintain track on mobile targets until a
weapon can be planned and executed, several enhancements need to be made
to the current collection capability. Today's satellite constellation is
not optimized for the current and developing mobile target challenge.
Planned improvements to this constellation would provide the capability
to rapidly and accurately locate and track mobile targets from the time
they deploy from garrison until they return. Sensors with rapid revisit
or dwell capability over deployment areas combined with automated
exploitation sides are required to provide this capability." (p. 47-48)

Defeat of Chemical and Biological Agents

DoD and DOE efforts are underway to counter the asymmetric use of
chemical and biological weapons (referred to as agent defeat). Agent
Defeat Weapon (ADW) concepts are being evaluated to deny access to,
immobilize, neutralize, or destroy chemical or biological weapons.
Overcoming uncertainties in intelligence regarding agent production and
storage locations as well as physical geometries of known facilities and
contents appear to be the largest challenges. A variety of ADW concepts
are currently under study, including thermal, chemical, or radiological
neutralization of chemical/biological materials in production or storage
facilities, as well as several types of kinetic penetrators to immobilize
or deny use of those materials." (p. 48)

Improved Accuracy for Effectiveness and Reduced Collateral Damage

"Desired capabilities for nuclear weapons systems in flexible, adaptable
strike plans include options for variable and reduced yields, high
accuracy, and timely employment. These capabilities would help deter
enemy use of WMD or limit collateral damage, should the United States
have to defeat enemy WMD capabilities." (p. 48)

Nuclear Force Modernization

"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has initiated a Strategic
Deterrent Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment to characterize the
requirements for nuclear weapon systems in the 2020 timeframe. The
assessment is to be complete in early FY03." (p. 48)

"DoD, in coordination with the NNSA, will evaluate nuclear weapon options
to increase weapon system effectiveness and flexibility and to limit
collateral damage. Capability improvements are likely to be needed to
correct the limitations of the existing nuclear forces." (p. 49)

V. NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL

Initial Reductions

"When these reductions [i.e. retire 50 Peacekeepers, remove 4 Trident
SSBNs, and convert B-1's to solely conventional role] are complete in
FY06, the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic warheads will
be reduced by about 1,300 warheads accountable under the START I Treaty
(based on attribution rules at the time these decisions were made). The
four Trident submarines that will be removed from service will remain
accountable under the START I Treaty." (p. 51)

"The Department analyzed the role of the Peacekeeper against projected
threats in the post Cold War environment and judged that its retirement
would not have an adverse effect on the sufficiency of U.S. nuclear
forces... Funding has been programmed, beginning in FY03, to retire these
weapons in a phased approach to coincide with the Trident D-5 transition
to the Pacific fleet and to retain and maintain the silos for future
options. These silos, and the four Trident submarines converted to SSGNs,
will remain accountable under the START I Treaty."

"Additional strategic nuclear reduction will be achieved by lowering the
number of warheads assigned to the operationally deployed force. By the
end of FY07, U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
should total no more than 3,800. The drawdown of the operationally
deployed strategic nuclear warheads will preserve force structure in
that, aside from the Peacekeeper ICBM and the four Trident SSBNs, no
additional strategic delivery platforms are scheduled to be eliminated
from strategic service. These reductions are to be completed between FY03
and FY07, and will result in approximately a 40% reduction in number of
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from the present."

Longer Term Reductions

"With regard to additional reductions beyond FY07, the United States
plans to decrease the number of warheads on its ballistic missile force
by "downloading." Regarding bombers, reductions will be made by lowering
the number of operationally deployed weapons, i.e. those available for
loading at operational bomber bases."

"Warheads that will count as operationally deployed are: for ballistic
missiles, the actual number of nuclear weapons loaded on the ICBMs or
SLBMs; for bombers, those nuclear weapons located in weapon storage areas
at bomber bases (except for a small number of spares)."

START II Treaty

"...the Russian resolution of ratification, adopted in 2000, contains
unacceptable provision contrary to the new strategic framework and
establishment of the New Triad."

De-Alerting

"U.S. forces are not on "hair trigger" alert and rigorous safeguards
exist to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapons safety, security,
reliability, and command and control. Multiple, stringent procedural and
technical safeguards are in place to guard against U.S. accidental and
unauthorized launch."

"The New Triad addresses concerns about the accidental or unauthorized
launch of certain foreign forces. For example, it provides missile
defenses to protect the United States, it allies, and friends against
limited or unauthorized launches. It also will provide a spectrum of
defensive and non-nuclear response options to an accidental or
unauthorized launch, allowing the United States to tailor an appropriate
response to the specific event and to limit the danger of escalation."

"The elimination of the Peacekeeper ICBM will be phased to correspond
with the introduction of the Trident II (D-5) missile in the Pacific. As
they are eliminated, those Peacekeeper missiles remaining during the
elimination process will be kept on alert to provide a necessary
contribution to the U.S. portfolio of capabilities." (p. 54)

"Following the initial phase of U.S. nuclear reductions, subsequent
reductions will be achieved by downloading warheads from missiles and
bombers. Force structure will be retained as the basis for reconstructing
the responsive force. Delivery systems will not be retired following
initial reductions and downloaded warheads will be retained as needed for
the responsive force." (p. 54)

The Comprehensive Test Ban

"The United States has not conducted nuclear tests since 1992 and
supports the continued observance of the testing moratorium. While the
United States is making every effort to maintain the stockpile without
additional nuclear testing, this may not be possible for the indefinite
future. Some problems in the stockpile due to aging and manufacturing
defects have already been identified. Increasingly, objective judgments
about capability in a non-testing environment will become far more
difficult. Each year the DoD and DOE will reassess the need to resume
nuclear testing and will make recommendations to the President. Nuclear
nations have a responsibility to assure the safety and reliability of
their own nuclear weapons." (p. 55)

Transparency

"The START I Treaty includes provisions that provide a useful baseline of
transparency for offensive strategic forces. Any additional transparency
that may be useful to provide added confidence and predictability would
be in the form of separate political commitments."