For immediate release 26 March 2019

This is an update to our 20 Mar 2019 press release: "Trump requests a 12% increase in nuclear warhead spending, with wide variation between sites." See that release for top-line observations, site budget vectors (up or down), and comments on the W87-1 warhead program

NNSA to Congress: One more massive increase for nuclear warheads next year please; we will control costs better later

• Plan to spend $5.7 billion on plutonium warhead core ("pit") production over 5 years is "missing in action" -- as is any environmental analysis
• Savannah River Site slated for $410 million in new money for pit production engineering
• Request omits project data in many cases, making accountability for failures and fiascos (past, ongoing, future) unlikely
• Why the crash production schedules for the early 2020s? Is it to make room for intermediate-range missile warhead production in the mid-2020s, or for other infrastructure and warhead projects not yet on the books?

Contact: Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group, 505-265-1200 office, 505-577-8563 cell

Permanent link * Previous press releases

Albuquerque, NM – The Department of Energy's (DOE's) publication late yesterday of its 657-page congressional budget request for its subsidiary National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) answered some questions about what the Administration wants in US nuclear warhead programs over the next five years -- but left many others unanswered.

As noted in our previous press release, the Administration's warhead spending ("Weapons Activities") request for fiscal year (FY) 2020 is a dramatic 12% more than the current year's spending in current-year dollars. With yesterday's publication we can now see what is proposed for the four years after that.

In this chart of warhead spending (historical and proposed) over the 1948-2024 period we deflated proposed out-year spending, including in FY2020, by 2% each year.

Thus the Administration proposes, after one more big annual increase, to more or less level off warhead spending in constant-dollar terms.

Study Group director Greg Mello: "In many ways this is a strange budget request. To ask for a spending increase next year of about 10% in real terms, and hire thousands of people as is happening across the country for a big agenda of new warheads and production plants -- and then to suddenly bring purchasing power to a plateau, is less than fully credible. It looks like the idea is to get congressional buy-in by low-balling out-year spending. This is normal DOE behavior. While we are pleased that the administration wants to look fiscally responsible for the four years after 2020, we don't believe spending on so many big new projects can be easily capped. It is better to delay poorly planned projects, and abandon the ones not needed. In this budget there are plenty in both categories, not to mention the ongoing porcine behavior of the weapons labs, which nobody seems able to stop.

"We fear that the programs outlined in this budget will lead NNSA to request another 8-10% real increase for 2021, and then again the year after that and so on, as costs escape control and "overlooked" or "previously undefined" scope is added to projects.

"It's like an alcoholic saying 'just one more drink -- I'll be sober after that!'

"Congress would be wise to avoid signing off on some of these pigs in pokes, asking instead for better planning, far more clarity, and some delays. Here are just a few examples:

• How can the Kansas City National Security Complex (aka the Kansas City Plant, KCP) effectively manage a 32% budget increase in a single year? KCP is slated for an equally if not greater decline in workload by mid-decade. So why not stretch out the production schedule across the complex and slow down, while, say, taking care of some of the 2,000 or so unused NNSA buildings that are fiscal and environmental millstones? The warhead production schedule is in our view arbitrary, subject to future decisions of the Nuclear Weapons Council, the President, and Congress. It is possible (see below), that up to three new warhead projects could be added in the 2020s, which would preclude any decline in production workload.
  

• Why does the Savannah River Site (SRS) need $410 million (M) for conceptual planning, to be spent in a single year, for the new Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) Project? How will these funds be spent?
  

• What exactly is the Plutonium Pit Production (P3) Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the project that will supposedly provide a 30 pit per year (ppy) production capability at LANL ? It is nowhere fully described, despite congressional direction to do so.
  

• Why were the costs over the past three years of two P3 components -- part of the ongoing upgrades at LANL's main plutonium facility, and part of the upgrades at the new Radiological Laboratory, Utility, and Office Building (RLUOB) -- scrubbed from their previous reporting location? Orwell would be proud: “Those who control the present, control the past and those who control the past control the future.” RLUOB, at a final cost of $1.4 billion (B) if it is ever finished, will be, despite its diminutive size, by far the most expensive building in New Mexico history. It was never designed as a nuclear facility and does not meet DOE's structural requirements. The history of this misrepresented and mismanaged project, like others represented in this budget by only a name or a line or two in a table, is disappearing from casual view and from the view of busy members and staff in congress.
  

• The "Plutonium Sustainment" budget line is grew from $210 M in FY18 to $361 M in FY19. For FY20 NNSA wants it to double to $712 M, and then to double again to $1.2-1.5 billion (B) per year by FY22-24. Despite clear congressional direction and detailed DOE project management orders, Congress still has no clear idea what precisely this huge river of money is to be spent on. No picture at all is provided in this budget request.
  

• Where is the project data sheet for the $175 M Albuquerque Complex? Like many others, it's not included. Why was $190 M in overhead ("Other Project Costs") for this project funded under "federal salaries and expenses" budget line in FY2015?
  

• The Material Staging Facility at Pantex is supposed to be a $1.4 B plutonium storage facility, a breathtaking sum for a glorified bunker. The project began in FY18 but no funds are requested for FY20 -- or for FY21, FY22, or FY23. Then suddenly in FY24, $371 M will be needed. That is surely no way to run a railroad. Elsewhere, NNSA is beginning a Dilute and Dispose (D&D) project for surplus plutonium, most of which is now stored at Pantex in the form of pits. If NNSA is going to dispose of most of Pantex's inventory -- and it is; we think there are much better, cheaper, safer, more secure, and faster ways to do that than D&D -- why is this new facility even needed in the first place?
  

"These are just a few examples what appear to be poor and incomplete planning in this proposed budget.

"We see the lack of clarity regarding NNSA's pit production program as 'a glass half full.' On the one hand, NNSA admits they are unclear as to what they are doing. They say they will know next year! On the other hand they are still learning. Learning is good. We know from conversations on Capitol Hill that part of what they are learning is just how hard it is to conduct industrial missions at LANL's plutonium technical area (TA-55). So to the extent NNSA is coming to grips with reality -- as opposed to bowing to the sales job they have been getting from LANL -- we can be mildly pleased.

"The present hiatus is an ideal time for environmental analysis of pit production expansion at both LANL and SRS under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Where is that analysis? It is entirely missing. We believe it is legally required. NNSA is engaging in risky NEPA behavior."

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In order to provide some further context we attach here a short precis of the some of the changes we have seen over the past year in US nuclear weapons modernization, from a draft for publication elsewhere. Comments are welcome.

US Nuclear Modernization Update

25 March 2019
(This summary updates the “United States” chapter in http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/publications-and-research/publications/12371-assuring-destruction-forever-2018-edition, mirrored in expanded form at http://www.lasg.org/BAN/US_modernization_RCW_Apr2018.pdf, 9 Apr 2018.)

As far as can be discerned given classification barriers, US nuclear weapon modernization is largely proceeding as planned, with what appear to be minor delays so far. In addition to Obama’s extensive modernization program, the Trump Administration now seeks at least two additional nuclear weapon capabilities. The first is a low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead (the W76-2). The W76-2 began formal production in February and will be completed this fiscal year [6,12]; funds for its deployment could still however be blocked by Congress. The second is a sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM), which is undergoing an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and has no defined schedule as yet [12]. The Navy may resist this weapon [13].

Tests of two intermediate-range missiles – a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) and an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) – are expected in August and November of this year respectively. GLCM deployment reportedly could occur as soon as 18 months if based on the existing Tomahawk system; IRBM deployment would require at least five years [14]. The choice and status of warheads for these proposed missiles is not known. Twelve years ago, the US possessed more than 2,000 intact W80-0 and W80-1 cruise missile warheads [10]; the Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) cruise missile warhead (W80-4) will be a variant of these designs. Any SLCM, if pursued, may use a similar warhead [4,6], and so may any GLCM.

In yet another change, the B83-1 high-yield gravity bomb is now being retained “until a suitable replacement is identified” [12].

Meanwhile the warhead labs, test facilities, and warhead production sites now have parallel operations underway, often in aging legacy facilities which themselves are undergoing extensive modernization (or not), a new and challenging management development that will intensify dramatically in the early 2020s even without the proposed additional weapons. Across the warhead complex, thousands of new technicians are being hired. Some production lines at the Kansas City Plant, where a half million additional square feet of space is being leased, are working around the clock [13].

New scope has been added to (or filled into) existing modernization programs, notably in nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3), in the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program (including a new reentry vehicle, the Mark21A), in plutonium warhead core (“pit”) production (now at two proposed sites instead of one), in maintenance of existing warheads, and for strategic bombers (new engines for the existing B52s) [4, 12, 15].

Projected warhead and delivery system schedules appear more or less unchanged from last year, though the provision of new plutonium warhead core (“pit”) production capacity has been delayed 1-2 years for additional studies [11]. Completion of the full scope of NC3 upgrades for silo-based missiles, a high priority for Congress, is now expected only by 2037 [5]. The W76-1 Life Extension Program (LEP), which uses a new fuze to enable greater accuracy and an implied expanded target set for these submarine-launched warheads [8] – and makes the low-yield W76-2 warhead feasible -- was completed in late 2019. The new fuze technology will be added to higher-yield W88 submarine-launched warheads during maintenance operations starting in 2020. It has been procured for existing Minuteman missiles; installation is advanced or complete[5].

Current-year costs and estimated future costs have both risen significantly. In this fiscal year (FY2019), overall nuclear weapons expenditures have risen to about $34 billion (B) per year [4], up 13% from FY2018. Nuclear weapons now comprise about 4% of $892 B in overall US defense account spending, a figure expected to rise to 6-7% by the late 2020s [4,2]. Congress’ estimates for nuclear weapons outlays over the coming decade ($494 B) are 24% higher than they were 2 years ago ($400 B) [4], not only because the decade ahead now includes more production but also because costs have risen and more modernization elements are included. If production of a SLCM or either of the two proposed intermediate-range missiles are funded they will add to these totals.

The expected overall 30-year cost of US nuclear weapons now exceeds $2 trillion, if Department of Energy (DOE) estimates of its environmental liabilities and updated weapon costs are used [1,3,4,7, 12], without however including the proposed intermediate-range missiles and their warheads. This year’s DOE budget request for nuclear warheads is 12% greater than FY2019’s in constant dollars – the 7^th year of cost escalation in this work and another all-time US warhead spending record [12]. Late 2018 DOE warhead cost estimates imply 25-year costs roughly $45 B greater than estimated in 2017 [13]. Rapidly-rising deficits and interest payments, and possible implementation of spending limits under the Budget Control Act, or other deficit-limiting initiatives, add to fiscal uncertainty and program competition.

The Trump Administration replaced the Obama “interoperable” warhead (IW) program with an Air Force-only warhead (the W87-1) for GBSD. The W87-1, which like IW would provide multiple-warhead upload capability, requires all new components including the Mark 21A reentry vehicle, and would use new pits, which requires operational pit facilities of sufficient capacity. Acquisition of the B61-12 gravity bomb, the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, the LRSO with its W80-4 warhead, and the B21 “Raider” bomber fleet are for the moment more or less on schedule, as far as can be seen. [5, 12]

Sources:

1.  Alvarez, Robert, “Yesterday is tomorrow: estimating the full cost of a nuclear buildup,” 3 Nov 2017, /Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists/, https://thebulletin.org/yesterday-tomorrow-estimating-full-cost-nuclear-buildup11264.
2.  Amadeo, Kimberly, “US Military Budget, Its Components, Challenges, and Growth; Why Military Spending Is More Than You Think It Is,” updated 12 Nov 2018, https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-military-budget-components-challenges-growth-3306320.
3.  Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2017 to 2026,” 14 Feb 2017, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52401.
4.  CBO, “Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2019 to 2028,” 24 Jan 2019, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/54914.
5.  Congressional Research Service (CRS), “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues,” updated 21 Nov 2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33640.pdf.
6.  DOE, FY 2020 /Congressional Budget Request Vol. 1, National Nuclear Security Administration/, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/03/f61/doe-fy2020-budget-volume-1.pdf=
7.  Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Program-Wide Strategy and Better Reporting Needed to Address Growing Environmental Cleanup Liability,” GAO-19-28: 29 Jan 2019, https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-19-28.
8.  Kristensen, Hans, McKinzie, Matt, and Postol, Theodore, “How US nuclear force modernization is undermining strategic stability: The burst-height compensating super-fuze,” March 2017, https://thebulletin.org/2017/03/how-us-nuclear-force-modernization-is-undermining-strategic-stability-the-burst-height-compensating-super-fuze/.
9.  Los Alamos Study Group, “Trump requests a 12% increase in nuclear warhead spending, with wide variation between sites,” 20 Mar 2019, http://www.lasg.org/press/2019/press_release_20Mar2019.html.
10. Mello, Greg, “U.S. plutonium pit population estimates,” March 2010, based on Kristensen and Norris work now behind paywall, http://www.lasg.org/MPF2/Mello_pit_recommendations_p19_Mar2010.pdf.
11.  Mello, Greg, “US plutonium pit production plans fail to satisfy Congress; further studies underway,” Nov 2018, http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2018/11/us_plutonium_pit_producti_1.html.
12.  National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), “Fiscal Year 2019 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan–Biennial Plan Summary**,” *Oct 2018, http://www.lasg.org/budget/FY2019/SSMP_FY2019_Oct2018.pdf.
13.  Personal communications, congressional staff, February 2019.
14. Reif, Kingston, and Taheran, Shervin, “U.S. Plans Flight Tests of INF-Treaty Range Missiles,” 20 Mar 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2019-03-20/us-russian-nuclear-arms-control-watch-march-20-2019.
15.  U.S. Air Force, “Acquisition Annual Report 2017,” https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/1/annual_report_web.pdf.

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