For immediate release October 9, 2020

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Safety Board finds LANL nuclear waste storage unsafe; safety bases of four nuclear facilities need revision

At least 2,000 containers of transuranic waste stored in fabric tents are unfit for WIPP

Contact: Greg Mello, 505-265-1200 (office) 505-577-8563 (cell)

Albuquerque and Santa Fe -- This week the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) posted their important letter of September 24, 2020 to Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Dan Brouillette with its accompanying technical report regarding "Potential Energetic Chemical Reaction Events Involving Transuranic Waste at Los Alamos National Laboratory."

The Technical Report (#46) is based on at least two years of DNFSB analyses and engagement with DOE on these same topics, in many areas much more.

In his letter, Acting Chairman Thomas Summers explained in direct terms that the safety bases at four nuclear facilities at LANL are inadequate because they do not properly take into account the potential for energetic chemical reactions in containers of transuranic (TRU) nuclear waste stored in or outside these facilities.

The facilities in question are the Plutonium Facility (PF-4), the Transuranic Waste Facility (TWF), and the Chemical and Metallurgical Research Facility (CMR), all operated by Triad National Security, and the Area G waste disposal and storage site, operated by N3B Los Alamos.

In violation of applicable law, the accident analyses used in these facilities are "not bounding, assume inappropriate initial conditions, and do not defensibly estimate the quantity of radioactive material that may be released due to an energetic chemical reaction." Because of this, "additional credited safety controls may be necessary to protect workers and the public."

At much of Area G and at two outdoor storage pads at PF-4, TRU waste is being stored "without any engineered controls beyond the waste container."

According to DNFSB, Triad is not doing adequate hazard analyses for chemical incompatibilities that could cause TRU deflagrations and burst drums.

Assumptions regarding the possible radionuclide release fraction from drums in accidents vary by a factor of 130 between the most stringent value used by Triad, and the value used by N3B at Area G for similar waste. Area G is located immediately adjacent to the Sacred Area of San Ildefonso Pueblo.

Applying the release fraction used by Triad in its PF-4 facility to a drum containing 80 Pu-239-equivalent curies (the maximum which can shipped to WIPP) bursting at Area G results in a 760 rem dose to collocated workers 100 meters distant and a 300 rem dose to the closest members of the public, which are any tribal members who happen to be visiting their tribe's Sacred Area.

TRU waste stored at TWF is administratively controlled to exclude potential "problem drums," but -- especially given the observed LANL-wide lack of adequate analysis for possible chemical incompatibilities -- DNFSB believes administrative controls are inadequate. The dose to the public from a hypothetical bursting drum at TWF like the one above would be about 33 rem, above DOE's 25-rem guideline for maximum public dose in a design-basis accident, and the dose to collocated workers is the same as a bursting drum at Area G, 760 rem. DOE's exposure limit for collocated workers in a hypothetical worst-case accident is 100 rem.

Yet even the most stringent release fraction used at LANL is less than the release fraction calculated from the February 14, 2014 WIPP accident by a factor of 3.

The DNFSB also reveals that about 1,500 above-ground containers at Area G have not undergone an evaluation to see if they meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria (WAC) due to chemical incompatibilities, and 2,000 containers already tested do NOT meet the WAC and will need further processing to do so. N3B is thus managing more than 2,000 potentially unstable above-ground TRU waste containers at Area G.

There are roughly 17,000 containers of TRU waste at Area G above and below-ground in temporary storage (DNFSB, 2/26/16 WSR).

DNFSB is concerned by the lack of any "defense in depth" for containers which might burst at Area G and at the two pads outdoors at PF-4, and notes that the brand-new TWF also lacks containment for any releases, though it does have a fire suppression system.

These revelations come at a time when LANL is gearing up to produce plutonium warhead cores ("pits"), a program which is expected to produce considerable TRU waste. DNFSB recently explained that LANL's waste handling systems are integral to the pit production mission.

Study Group director Greg Mello:

"These findings have important and in some cases expensive implications. LANL's operations are simply not adequately protecting the public from the kinds of exploding-drum accidents that have recently happened elsewhere in DOE's complex. The worst case -- the explosion in WIPP -- was due to a drum that had been recently processed at LANL.

"The possible public and worker doses are large. What is more shocking is that these conditions have persisted for many years -- decades really -- despite so many parties begging NNSA, DOE, LANL and lately N3B to fix them. NNSA and DOE have instead funded massive growth in LANL's weapons program.

"Given the expected production of new defense program waste once pit production begins, along with legal requirements to preferentially ship waste from Idaho National Laboratory and other sites, LANL's legacy TRU has no realistic prospect of leaving Los Alamos barring a very big change in DOE priorities.

"These findings imply an urgent need for new and/or remodeled TRU storage and processing facilities at LANL and an expanded program to use them. These will be expensive.

"As advised by DNFSB, Triad needs to apply the formality of the WIPP WAC where the wastes are generated, not just hand-off the waste to N3B and hope for the best. Once a drum is filled the cost of finding out exactly what is in that drum is high.

"Potential TRU storage capacity limitations have been previously noted by NNSA in relation to LANL pit production. [AoA, pp. A-13,14].

"There are in the meantime a number of immediate measures Triad and N3B can take to lower risk. DNFSB lists some. Triad and N3B have their work cut out for them. Our advice is to stop procrastinating and "git 'er done" for a change."

***ENDS***