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A gigantic new ICBM will take U.S. nuclear missiles out of the Cold War-era but add 21st-century risks

By Tara Copp, The Associated Press
December 10, 2023

F.E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyo. (AP) — The control stations for America’s nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles have a sort of 1980s retro look, with computing panels in sea foam green, bad lighting and chunky control switches, including a critical one that says “launch.”

Those underground capsules are about to be demolished, and the missile silos they control will be overhauled. A new nuclear missile is coming, a gigantic ICBM called the Sentinel. It’s the largest cultural shift in the land leg of the Air Force’s nuclear missile mission in 60 years.

But there are questions as to whether some of the Cold War-era aspects of the Minuteman missiles the Sentinel will replace should be changed.

Making the silo-launched missile more modern, with complex software and 21st-century connectivity across a vast network, may also mean it’s more vulnerable. The Sentinel will need to be well protected from cyberattacks, while its technology will have to cope with frigid winter temperatures in the Western states where the silos are located.

The $96 billion Sentinel overhaul involves 450 silos across five states, their control centers, three nuclear missile bases and several testing facilities. The project is so ambitious it has raised questions as to whether the Air Force can get it all done at once.

An overhaul is needed.

The silos lose power. Their 60-year old mechanical parts break down often. Air Force crews guard them using helicopters that can be traced back to the Vietnam War. Commanders hope the modernization of the Sentinel — and of the trucks, gear and living quarters — will help attract and retain technology-minded service members who are now asked to keep an old system running.

Nuclear modernization was delayed for years because the United States deferred spending on new missiles, bombers and submarines in order to support the post 9/11 wars overseas. Now everything is getting modernized at once.

The Sentinel work is one leg of a

$750 billion overhaul of almost every component of U.S. nuclear defenses — including new stealth bombers, submarines and ICBMs — in the country’s largest nuclear weapons program since the Manhattan Project.

For the Pentagon, there are expectations the modern Sentinel will meet threats from rapidly evolving Chinese and Russian missile systems. The Sentinel is expected to stay in service through 2075, so designers are taking an approach that will make it easier to upgrade with new technologies in the coming years. But that’s not without risk.

“Sentinel is a software-intensive program with a compressed schedule,” the Government Accountability Office reported this summer. “Software development is a high risk due to its scale and complexity and unique requirements of the nuclear deterrence mission.”

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has acknowledged the challenges the program is facing.

“It’s been a long time since we did an ICBM,” Kendall said in November at a Center for New American Security event in Washington. It’s “the biggest thing, in some ways, that the Air Force has ever taken on.”

“Sentinel, I think quite honestly, is struggling a little bit,” he said.

By far, the biggest cultural shift the Sentinel will bring is the connectivity for all those who secure, maintain, operate and support the system. The overhaul touches almost everything, even including new equipment for military chefs who cook for the missile teams. The changes could improve efficiency and quality of life on the bases but may also create vulnerabilities the analog Minuteman missiles have never faced.

Since the first silo-based Minuteman went on alert at Montana’s Malmstrom Air Force Base on Oct. 27, 1962 — the day Cuba shot down a U-2 spy plane at the height of the Cuban missile crisis — the missile has “talked” to its operators through thousands of miles of hard-wiring in cables buried underground.

Those Hardened Intersite Cable Systems, or HICS, cables carry messages back and forth from the missile to the missileer, who receives those messages through a relatively new part of the capsule — a firing control console called REACT, for Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting, that was installed in the mid-1990s.

It’s a secure, closed communication loop, one that brings its own headaches. Any time the Air Force wants to test one of the missiles, it has to dig up the cables and splice them to isolate that test missile’s wiring from the rest. Over decades of testing, there are now hundreds of splices in those critical loops.

But it’s also one of the Minuteman’s best features. You would need a shovel — and a lot more — to try to hack the system. Even when missile crews update targeting codes, it is a mechanical, manual process.

Minuteman is “a very cyber-resilient platform,” said Col. Charles Clegg, the Sentinel system program manager.

Clegg said cybersecurity for the software-driven Sentinel has been a top focus of the program, one that has all of their attention.

“Like Minuteman, Sentinel will still operate within a closed network. However, to provide defense in depth, we will have additional security measures at the boundary and inside the network, enabling our weapon system to operate effectively in a cyber-contested environment,” Clegg said.

Those who maintain the Minuteman III have tried over the years to bring in new technology to make maintenance more efficient, but they have found that sometimes the old manual way of tracking things — sometimes literally with a binder and pen — is better, especially in frigid temperatures.

Nuclear missile fields are located in Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota and Wyoming. Those missiles need maintenance even in the winter, and crews spend hours outside in sub-zero field conditions,

“An iPad won’t survive a Montana winter” at the launch sites, where maintenance crews have worked outdoors in temperatures of minus 20 degrees or even minus 40 degrees, said Chief Master Sgt. Virgil Castro, the 741st missile maintenance squadron’s senior enlisted leader.

Also, when maintenance crews at Malmstrom tested some radio frequency identification, or RFID, technology — think of how seaports track items inside cargo containers — it created security vulnerabilities.

“Today, everything is connected to the internet of things. And you might have a back door in there you don’t even know” said Lt. Col. Todd Yehle, the 741st maintenance squadron commander. “With the old analog systems, you’re not hacking those systems.”

What it means is that even though technology could automate the whole operations process, one critical aspect of missile launch will remain the same. If the day comes that another nuclear weapon must be fired, it will still be teams of missileers validating the orders and activating a launch.

“It’s the human in the loop,” said Col. Johnny Galbert, commander of the 90th Missile Wing at F.E. Warren. “I think what it comes down to is we want to rely on our airmen, our young officers out there, to make that decision, to be able to interpret what higher headquarters is telling them or directing them to do.”


Greg Mello, published comments:

This is the missile for which LANL (and LANL alone until 2036 if not longer) is supposed to make plutonium pits, for new warheads. The new warheads ("W87-1s") will be added to, not replace, the existing deployment level for highly accurate warheads. An older, less accurate, warhead ("W78s") will be retired, as the older Minuteman missiles on which it is deployed (about half of the present 400) are gradually retired over the 2030s as they are replaced by the new missile.

There are, right now, more than 500 highly-accurate modern warheads ("W87-0s") available for Sentinel, made with the safer kind of high explosives that can be and will be deployed on the new missiles, more than enough to replicate the existing deployment level, even if an additional 50 silos (now in "warm standby") and missiles were added to current deployments. In fact all those existing warheads are getting a new "smart" fuzing system developed by Sandia National Laboratories which will make them even more deadly to "enemy" targets, starting this year.

Greater accuracy is a "force multiplier," allowing the same number of targets to be attacked with fewer missiles and warheads with the same high probability of destruction. In other words, it's about fighting and winning a nuclear war, aka madness.

What LANL pit production does is to enable production of W87-1 warheads about 5 years earlier, adding new warheads faster and in larger quantities, than would otherwise be the case, while also providing the ability to make multiple kinds of pits at the same time (for OTHER new warheads), because, starting in 2036 the U.S. will have -- if LANL is allowed to continue -- TWO factories for pits.

All this is to say that LANL pit production is not about replacing old pits, but jump-starting a nuclear arms race against both Russia and China, as the recent Congressional Commission on U.S. Strategic Posture just recommended. In my opinion (the Commission disagrees), to the extent physically and economically possible this is already U.S. policy. For any nuclear hawks out there reading this, I believe this is a race the U.S. has already lost. All it does is to stimulate Russia and now especially China to build more missiles and adopt riskier policies themselves.

Meanwhile this giant, dirty mission, with more than 4,000 production and support workers expected (per LANL) and a 24/7 production schedule will

  • ravage the town of Los Alamos,

  • bid up housing in Santa Fe and elsewhere,

  • clog our roads,

  • generate a small mountain of nuclear waste,

  • cause LANL to open a new nuclear waste dump on site (again, per LANL's own strategic "agenda"),

  • contaminate more workers, and

  • suck in more skilled workers and administrative talent the region so desperately needs.

  • There will be no economic development, just ugly sprawl and continued (or worse) inequality.

    Poor Santa Fe -- so far from God and so close to Los Alamos. All is not lost however. LANL has tried to start up this mission before, and has failed four times. But never before has it been so lavishly funded, or boldly and desperately conceived, putting more than 1,000 workers into a facility designed 50 years ago for 100 (per NNSA report to Congress), on a 24/7 basis, handling tons of plutonium on an assembly line.

    Believe it or not, just as I am typing this my email is reporting that there was a fire in a glovebox in that building. Readers might be surprised to know that LANL's main plutonium building does not have a fire alarm system that meets even commercial fire codes, per NNSA. Neither does the building have a reliable source of water for fire suppression. Since there is no external safety regulation, situations like this persist for decades on end. All for a stupid, futile quest to get "ahead" of Russia and China, while our infrastructure rots, social problems mount, and implacable drought is telling us we must have far different priorities.

    P.S. The missile is not "gigantic." The budget is.

    PPS We have a piece of silo communications cable at the office. We'll bring it to lunch on Wednesday. As of a few years ago, the U.S. had no capability to make such cable. China does.


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