LANL reports glove box breach, tritium drift weeks apart
By Scott Wyland swyland@sfnewmexican.com
Nov 1, 2023
A Los Alamos National Laboratory worker recently punctured a glove used to handle radioactive material in a sealed compartment, and wind blew airborne tritium into the liquid waste treatment facility a few weeks earlier, a federal watchdog reported.
The worker punctured the glove while handling a sharp measuring caliper instead of an electronic device that’s normally used for the task but was disabled, according to an October report by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
The breach contaminated a protective glove the worker was wearing but not the skin, and it didn’t cause an airborne radioactive release, the report said.
This is the second glove box breach in as many months and among a half-dozen the safety board has reported this year.
Although this year’s breaches have been deemed minor, anti-nuclear activists contend the increasing number of glove box mishaps are part of a trend that will continue as the lab processes more plutonium, partly in pursuit of making the bowling ball-sized cores, or pits, that detonate warheads.
“It’s reasonable to assume it will accelerate with expanded [pit] production,” said Jay Coghlan, executive director of Nuclear Watch New Mexico.
But a lab spokesman insisted safety is put first, regardless of the work pace.
“We never prioritize production ahead of safety,” lab spokesman Steven Horak wrote in an email. “The lab’s focus on safety is central to how we conduct operations. It does not inhibit production but rather enables it.”
Decision-making on production is conservative, Horak wrote. When abnormal incidents occur, the lessons learned are shared within the laboratory and the larger nuclear complex, he added.
The federal agency in charge of the country’s nuclear weapons had set the goal of having the lab produce 30 pits by 2026 to modernize the arsenal and equip at least two new warheads. The Savannah River Site in South Carolina is slated to make an additional 50 pits by the mid-2030s.
The timeline for the lab’s pit production has been extended due to setbacks during the pandemic and delays in availability of necessary equipment.
Lab Director Thom Mason hopes to reach the goal by 2028, though the Government Accountability Office, a congressional watchdog, estimated in an August report it could be the early 2030s before the lab can achieve reliable pit production.
Officials who oversee plutonium operations seek to replace or upgrade aging glove boxes, making these compartments more seismically sound and less prone to mishaps. But during a recent tour of the facility known as PF-4, one manager said the company that makes the glove boxes has two years of back orders.
In September, a glove box, used to handle heat-source plutonium, contaminated a worker’s protective bootie and produced a corrosive residue under the compartment. Workers taped the underside of the glove box to prevent further corrosion and put it out of service.
Earlier this year, five glove-box breaches occurred in a four-week period. Although they were considered minor, it was highly unusual for this many to happen in such a short time.
The last serious incident with these compartments occurred in 2022. A faulty seal caused a radioactive leak that contaminated three workers, requiring one of the employees to undergo chelation therapy, which purges heavy metals from the blood and is used in some cases of radiation exposure.
In the latest incident, the safety inspector noted a depleted supply of respirator masks in the cabinet near the affected work station created a challenge in equipping workers.
Corrective actions should include ensuring there’s an ample supply of masks and considering a different type of caliper than the one that punctured the glove, the report said.
The board’s October report also noted that airborne tritium emitted during work activities at the plutonium facility reentered the building because of atmospheric conditions.
Tritium is a radioactive hydrogen isotope that is found, both in natural and human-made forms, in water, soil and the atmosphere. It is generally only harmful when ingested in high doses in food and water, and it can increase the risk of cancer in some people, according to the Health Physics Society.
Tritium vapors emitted through an exhaust stack were caught in moist air during a rainy week, and a wind blew them back into the building through an air intake, Horak wrote.
These vapors condensed on some driers, were collected and then disposed of, he added.
“While the tritium releases this year have been slightly higher than normally expected levels from this stack,” Horak wrote, “the emissions are well below regulatory limits and well below any level that would have any health concerns.”
The first sign of unusual tritium migration was in August when the radioactive liquid waste treatment facility detected elevated tritium levels in some liquids, the report said.
Investigators determined the tritium came from the plutonium facility.
Tritium activities are suspended while personnel gather information about the event, the report said.
The lab plans to vent four barrels of tritium-laced legacy waste, releasing radioactive vapors into the air. The plan prompted an outcry from activists and area residents.
The lab first announced its intention to vent the barrels 3½ years ago and has kept postponing the release.
“The planned venting of headspace gas … is awaiting the necessary regulatory approvals and warmer temperatures,” Horak wrote.
Greg Mello published comment:
Many small safety problems occur at LANL, of which a few make it into the reporting systems available. There is no independent safety regulation, just glimpses. The glovebox events reported here are not serious events in themselves, as the article correctly states, but there will be many more to come, and eventually one or more serious safety problems, or accidents, will occur that will bring an end to LANL's pit production plans, centered in a plutonium facility which will soon be 50 years old, built for other purposes in another era. Coghlan uses the word "expanded" to refer to LANL's pit production; since there is no pit production and won't be until 2025, when the first actual pit for the stockpile is slated to be built, "expansion" is not the right word. This is rather crucial since most members of Congress mistakenly believe LANL can, if not right now then very soon, make a significant number of pits for the stockpile. LANL is preparing for a mission -- industrial pit production -- it has not had since 1949, but it's not "there" yet and as the article states, citing GAO (which is simply repeating what NNSA says), won't be until the early 2030s, when preparatory remodeling will be done. In a serious omission, the article fails to clarify that Coghlan continues to advocate for LANL to be the nation's only pit factory, ensuring the "expansion" he claims to oppose. Another omission is the reality that any uptake of radioactive material increases the risk of cancer. There is no safe threshold for tritium uptake. What limits there are for workers are simply compromises between what can be achieved in the industry and zero, which would be preferable from the health perspective.
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