US Shouldn’t Pour More Money Into Missile Silos Costs to replace the land-based ICBM fleet have skyrocketed. Congress should ask some hard questions before approving more funding. August 8, 2024 Ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles are arguably the weakest leg of America’s so-called nuclear triad. Now, estimated costs to modernize the arsenal have ballooned more than 80% to $141 billion and counting. Congress needs to ask some serious questions before approving that spending. Since 2017, legislators have mandated that the Pentagon deploy no fewer than 400 land-based ICBMs. And defense officials reasoned it would be cheaper to replace the aging Minuteman III fleet than to extend its life to 2075. Acquisition costs were projected at $77.7 billion in 2020 when the program to field a new ICBM, dubbed the LGM-35A Sentinel, was formally approved. It hasn’t gone well. Costs for refurbished silos, expanded launch facilities, new command and control centers, and thousands of miles of fiber-optic cabling were wildly underestimated. And the Department of Defense awarded the entire program to a single contractor, Northrop Grumman Corp., which subsequently suffered problems with management, staffing, supply chains and IT infrastructure. The Pentagon says it is scaling back plans for ground facilities (otherwise, the bill would be closer to $160 billion). Some of the spending may be opened up to competitive bidding. Approval to move on to the engineering and manufacturing phase will be withheld for 18 to 24 months until costs can be better managed. Still, Air Force officials insist Sentinel is essential to national security, is cheaper than possible alternatives and therefore must continue. These claims are questionable. Certainly, China’s unprecedented nuclear buildup and close embrace of Russia have increased worries about the strength of the US nuclear deterrent. But details of Sentinel’s technical advantages (like the Pentagon’s cost comparisons) are secret. More fundamentally, Minutemen and Sentinels alike suffer two big drawbacks. First, land-based ICBMs present fixed and thus vulnerable targets. That means they either need to be launched at the first sign of an attack — a harrowing decision for any president — or be used as a sponge to soak up hundreds of enemy warheads that might otherwise be targeted at New York or Washington. If, as expected, China and Russia develop conventional missiles accurate and powerful enough to destroy US silos, they won’t even be able to serve the latter purpose. And second, US ICBMs have to overfly Russia in order to reach China. That risks a nuclear response from Moscow as well as Beijing. Money isn’t unlimited. Even before the latest cost overruns, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that nuclear modernization would drain almost 11% of the Pentagon’s acquisition budget over the next decade. While the Air Force has not specified which programs might need to be cut to make room for Sentinel, officials have already paused development of a sixth-generation fighter jet. Budgets for refueling tankers, hypersonic weapons and some space initiatives could also be squeezed. If cuts weaken US conventional deterrence, they risk opening the door to a conflict — say, over Taiwan — that could escalate dangerously. No program deserves a blank check. Congress should use this moment to evaluate Sentinel afresh, starting by revoking the 400 ICBM mandate. An independent study should examine alternatives, including some combination of a smaller land-based force, with more resources devoted to bombers and virtually undetectable ballistic-missile submarines, and further extending the Minuteman III fleet. Technology is changing warfare rapidly. The US can ill afford to put billions of defense-spending dollars on autopilot. Pausing to rethink how it deploys its deadliest weapons could save lives as well as money. |
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