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Government watchdog says LANL could be doing more to prevent glove box contaminant releases

By Scott Wyland swyland@sfnewmexican.com
Apr 17, 2024

Los Alamos National Laboratory is not doing all it can to detect radioactive leaks in glove boxes and prevent the release of airborne contaminants, a federal watchdog said in a review it conducted of the equipment and safety programs after a series of mishaps.

The equipment, made up of sealed compartments and attached protective gloves, aids workers in handling radioactive materials and is deemed essential in the lab ramping up production of plutonium cores, or pits, that trigger nuclear warheads.

Although the lab is addressing problems previously identified with glove box operations — worn gloves not changed soon enough, inadequate staffing and training, leaky ports not sealed — a team found several other deficiencies that should be fixed to reduce hazards, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board wrote in a 13-page report.

“The [safety board’s] staff team believes additional measures may be warranted to ensure facility-worker safety related to glovebox operations,” the board wrote.

Safety board Chairwoman Joyce L. Connery sent a letter to Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm summarizing the findings and asking that the U.S. Energy Department respond within 120 days.

Board officials listed 10 glove box incidents from December 2022 to November 2023 that spurred the review.

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The report also notes two serious earlier incidents.

A breached glove box in June 2020 exposed a half-dozen workers to airborne plutonium contaminants, with one person requiring two chelation treatments. Chelation is used to remove heavy metals from the body.

In January 2022, seals failed on an unused glove box port, releasing weapons-grade plutonium that contaminated four workers, one of whom had to receive chelation treatment.

In an email, Millicent Mike, a spokeswoman for the National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees the lab’s weapons program, wrote her agency is aware of the board’s letter to Granholm but couldn’t say more.

“We are unable to comment on specifics ahead of an official response to be made at the requested briefing,” Mike wrote. “As always, we will continue to prioritize the safety of our employees.”

In an email, an anti-nuclear watchdog argued the 10 incidents the board lists in the report were “potentially dangerous.”

“The discouraging overall trend is the accelerating frequency of these events as LANL ramps up expanded plutonium pit production,” wrote Jay Coghlan, executive director of Nuclear Watch New Mexico. “The Lab feeds the public with empty assurances of safety. However, this trend deserves meaningful course correction before, and not after, LANL begins production.”

One of the board’s criticisms was about workers being allowed to operate a glove box with a faulty gauge that measures whether the compartment has negative air pressure, meaning lower than the pressure in the room.

Negative pressure helps contain the contaminants because it draws air into the box. That in turn reduces the contaminants released through a leak.

Engineers told the board’s team the gauges aren’t necessary to ensure containment because there are other ways to check negative pressure and determine a glove box is working as it should.

Operators are trained to report malfunctioning gauges to the system engineers, but with permission they can keep working in a glove box with a defective gauge, the report said, indicating this practice raised some concerns.

The team noted the gauges are one of the most reliable methods to verify the negative pressure that keeps contaminants confined, the report said.

“Working in a glovebox without a functioning pressure gauge would leave workers without the best safety method for determining the glovebox is operable and performing its confinement function,” it said.

The team observed the gauges are of an older, simple design. They have no color coding or other visual cues to let operators know of significant pressure changes, and they are not placed in the workers’ line of sight.

Another shortcoming are glove box inspections, which now are done visually without using tools that could detect tiny leaks in equipment and accessories, the report said.

The swipes radiological technicians use to take samples of contaminants and workers use to check equipment before and after a task also could be applied during inspections, it said.

A device known as a durometer could test the condition of gloves and seals, while systems such as oxygen analyzers could detect flaws and degradation before they worsen into “contamination events,” the report said.

Other best practices include submerging new gloves in water to test for punctures and using ultrasonic testing to detect any leaks in the compartment, it said.

The lab also has failed to impart to other facilities the lessons it has learned from various incidents, including how to correct the problems and avoid them in the future, the report said, adding that information sharing is vital in Energy Department’s national complex.


Greg Mello, published comments:

Thank you Scott, for this and previous stories. You have a big portfolio of responsibilities. The DNFSB letter validates the importance of the stories you have done on safety incidents at LANL's plutonium facility, as they have come up. The overall safety posture, and the causes, are harder to write about because NNSA and LANL always say everything is great, and there is no external regulator or licensing authority to say otherwise with equal on-the-ground authority. As you note the DNFSB is an advisory body only. It is in my opinion and that of many others greatly understaffed. It is hard for them to recruit qualified staff, but the chronic staffing shortage is also by congressional design. The DNFSB is also under a lot of political pressure to not stand in the way of nuclear production. Right now they do not even have an operating quorum, which tells you something about the Senate which confirms their board members, and about the New Mexico senators and their commitment to safety. DNFSB has ONE full-time staff member at LANL, though others help from afar.

All that said, the report in question deals with micro-level issues. This is necessary but insufficient. Political and DNFSB staffing factors prevent a deeper treatment, which could get into root causes, which this report does not. Doing so would be perceived on Capitol Hill as meddling in policy, perhaps even as un-American. I kid you not.

The report mentions the insufficiency of federal staff involved in assuring safety at LANL. This too is a chronic problem. Local NNSA staff should be greatly increased, let us say doubled. During the Manhattan Project, Site Y (now LANL) was about one-half federal employees, mostly Army. The ratio of federal to non-federal workers in the NNSA archipelago is much too low overall. Contractors (who contribute to campaigns) rule, not feds. The "contractor assurance system" (CAS) model is used in order to minimize federal presence and responsibilities. The local NNSA manager and the highest federal safety official in Los Alamos is Mr. Ted Wyka. He is also the official tasked with turning LANL into an operating factory as fast as possible. You see the problem. Like DNFSB Wyka also finds it difficult to hire and train qualified federal safety officials to work beneath him, but in my opinion neither he nor the LANL director have made the very best macro-level decisions about LANL safety. It's "The Mission" that is dominant.

The problem is that PF-4 cannot be made safe. It is a) crowded with people having different chains of command and work cultures, and b) in operation 24/7, which is inherently less safe. It is also subject to a flux of less-trained people, and has legacy safety problems which Wyka and Mason have agreed to postpone and/or slow-walk fixing in order to begin production faster. It is also old. There are both DoD and congressional production pressures as well as implicit pressure from the NM delegation, which insisted on the production mission here in the first place.

In what Jay says, we see as usual no opposition to the pit mission, or acknowledgement that it is inherently unsafe in LANL's legacy facilities. In 2021 Coghlan wrote "What I do have some confidence in is that LANL is always going to screw up and cost too much, inherently keeping pit production limited there. Which beats the hell out of unconstrained pit production at the Savannah River Site." In other words, Jay wants LANL to do pit production because LANL is bad at pit production. The principle kind of "screw ups" involve accidents, the subject of this DNFSB report and article. Coghlan's group is working to make LANL the only pit factory as he says here, but because of the "inherent" problems, all this does is support having two new pit factories instead of one safer one in South Carolina.

The Dept. of Labor has paid over $1.82 billion in worker medical and death benefits at LANL. According to DOL, over 1,600 workers have died due to their LANL work.


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