LANL logs two glove box mishaps in the same week By Scott Wyland swyland@sfnewmexican.com Los Alamos National Laboratory workers tore protective gloves attached to the sealed compartments where radioactive materials are handled in two separate incidents in the same week, a government watchdog reported. Neither of the glove box breaches spread airborne radioactive contaminants, but they are part of an increasing number of glove box mishaps occurring as the lab moves toward manufacturing 30 plutonium warhead cores, or pits, per year by 2030. Both gloves were torn when they were pinched between metal components in the boxes, prompting a later discussion by managers on how to avoid such hazards in the future, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board said in its April 12 report. “It is expected that human and mechanical errors will occur, and that is why we are vigilant and ensure that there are multiple layers of protection to prevent workers from receiving dangerous intakes of material,” lab spokesman Steven Horak wrote in an email. “The glove and the glove box are only the first layer of protection.” In one incident, a worker was loosening a thumbscrew and the glove snagged between that mechanism and the component to which it was attached. In the second mishap, a worker was closing a spool door between two glove boxes and had to push harder on the door because of a misaligned latch. It shut suddenly, tearing a glove. In both instances, the workers called for radiological control teams. Technicians helped the workers remove the damaged gloves and then scanned the workers, finding no contamination had spread outside the compartments, the report said. The workers’ protective gear, the room’s air flow, radiation detection alarms, scans, and removing material that comes into contact with skin are some of the additional measures that keep workers from harm, Horak wrote in his email. But worker safety advocates say no mishaps involving radioactive substances should be treated as innocuous, even if employees aren’t contaminated during particular incidents. Workers still are put at risk when glove boxes are breached or contaminants end up on their protective gear or skin — so the more these mishaps occur, the more likely someone will suffer a serious health effect, a nuclear safety advocate told The New Mexican in January after a series of safety lapses. In response to the latest incidents, Scott Kovac, Nuclear Watch New Mexico’s operations director, said even a breach the lab deems less serious is enough to shut down an operation for a day or two and sometimes longer. “And it exposes workers to a higher risk level,” Kovac said. Last month, the safety board issued a report about how the lab could do more to detect radioactive leaks in glove boxes and prevent the release of radioactive contaminants. Attached to the report was a letter the board sent to Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm, summarizing its findings and recommendations. One of the deficiencies noted was the lab not tapping available technology that would aid crews in detecting leaks or worn gloves during inspections. After the most recent glove-box breaches, managers asked some safety personnel to look into the use of overgloves to reduce the chance of tears because of pinching, the report said. Lab director Thom Mason has said the actual number of safety lapses, including glove breaches, hasn’t increased, but rather more incidents are being reported to improve transparency. Managers at his request are reporting more incidents to the safety board than the lab did previously — including relatively minor ones they aren’t required by law to report — so the lab can learn from them and improve safety and training, Mason said. But Kovac argued that claiming to do more reporting than what’s required has questionable merit because the Energy Department sets the rules. As with all self-policing, it’s dubious, he added. “DOE regulates itself, basically,” Kovac said. “”To say they’re complying with the law means they are complying with their own law that they made up.” Published comments by Greg Mello
Thanks for keeping up with this, Scott. NNSA itself has said that LANL has ten times as many people working in that old facility as it was designed for. See: Risks for Sustainment of PF-4 at LANL, Report to Congress, Nov 2020. Built for R&D, it is gradually being re-tooled for production at a staggering cost, despite being the wrong facility for such work, in the wrong location, and in the wrong time (too soon to replace pits, which are all fine, and too late for the facility). There is no genuine mission need for it at all, beyond adding more warheads to silo-based missiles, beyond the staggering number (400, just on these missiles) deployed today. Heinrich and Udall thought, with help from cousins Lujan and Lujan Grisham, that spending billions on this would be THE new template for development in the region, ushering in a new era of plutonium-based prosperity. As of now, eight billion has already been spent, with no prosperity to show for it. |
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