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The administration’s pit production decision & its immediate aftermath

(A version of this post was published at the International Panel on Fissile Materials blog.)

[Analysis of Alternatives and related decision documents.]

On May 10, 2018, important decisions were made in the executive branch about where and how the US proposes to make plutonium warhead cores (“pits”), as well as how the US proposes to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium.

These decisions are linked. By the early 2030s, the Administration proposes to establish the main US pit production capability at the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, SC, centered in what has up to now been the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), currently under construction. The MOX program for surplus plutonium disposition is meanwhile being terminated, to be replaced with a “dilute and dispose” (D&D) program, with the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico as the final repository for this plutonium.

As of this writing, these decisions are facing challenges in Congress as well as from litigation by South Carolina.

Detailed background on the Administration’s decisions is just now available, including the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA’s) 2017 Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), the subsequent Engineering Assessment (EA) written for NNSA by the Parsons Corporation, and a Workforce Analysis. Review and comparison of these documents will be the subject of a subsequent post. Background analysis leading up to the pit production portion of this decision is available on this page and in the text below.

In the meantime, here’s a précis of what happened last month.

On May 10, Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, NNSA Administrator, and Ellen Lord, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, issued a joint statement recommending development of an industrial plutonium warhead core (“pit”) production capability at SRS, centered in the MFFF.

The recommended pit production strategy also involves substantial near-term “plutonium sustainment” investments at LANL, sufficient to create a 30 pit per year (ppy)[1] production capacity in Building PF-4 at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) by 2026, while simultaneously investing in a larger and more resilient capacity in a repurposed MFFF at SRS for the 2030s and afterwards. The one-page fact sheet provided shows no additional pit production buildings at either SRS or LANL.

Ms. Lord, in her capacity as Chair of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), certified that the joint pit production recommendation met the requirements of Section 3141 of the FY2018 NDAA, noting that there were “major construction and certification schedule risks inherent in the plan.” “It is essential,” she said, “that NNSA resource near-term surge pit production at [LANL’s] PF-4 to the fullest extent practicable” to “hedge against potential schedule risks in repurposing MFFF.”

The next “construction major milestone decision point” – for reconstruction and outfitting the former MFFF – is estimated to occur in 2021, Ms. Lord said.

Also on May 10, as mentioned, DOE Secretary Rick Perry, pursuant to sections of the fiscal year (FY) 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act, waived DOE’s obligation to continue MFFF construction by certifying that the life-cycle cost of the D&D option will be less than half of the MOX life-cycle cost.

The immediate response of LANL Director Terry Wallace, sent to all LANL employees, was positive. His subsequent guest editorial in the state’s main newspaper remained positive, and emphasized that aspect of the decision which allows LANL to develop some “surge” capability beyond 30 ppy. The response from Democrats in the New Mexico delegation was however negative, as was the reaction in South Carolina.

On May 14, NNSA issued a partial stop-work order to its MFFF construction contractor, effective immediately. A full stop-work order and WARN notice were expected to follow.

On May 22, South Carolina Attorney General Alan Wilson wrote Secretary Perry advising him of imminent litigation challenging the latter’s certification of the D&D option. South Carolina’s filed its lawsuit on May 25, with a hearing on a preliminary injunction against any MOX stop work order scheduled for today, June 1.

Even prior to the DOE/NNSA/DoD decisions, on May 2, South Carolina’s Governor McMaster, an important early supporter of Donald Trump’s long-shot presidential campaign, threatened to sue the DOE (again) if the MOX project was halted. (South Carolina sued DOE in 2014 over the attempted termination of MOX and sued again in 2016 over DOE’s failure to remove plutonium from South Carolina on the promised schedule.) McMaster’s letter concludes:

The DOE’s recent attempts to pacify South Carolina by dangling a possible “recommendation” to manufacture plutonium pits at the Savannah River Site (SRS) solves no current problem. A new project does not dispose of the 13 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium on site, and a “recommendation” provides no current jobs. It will take upwards of 10 years to produce plutonium pits, well after the current SRS MOX employees have been terminated. I will utilize all available options to protect South Carolina from becoming a permanent plutonium waste repository.

Meanwhile, sources tell us that New Mexico Governor Susan Martinez has threatened to withhold the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) waste permit modification necessary for the D&D option unless NNSA and DoD reconsider their May 10 choice and choose LANL for the industrial pit mission.

There have been significant developments in Congress as well.

On May 15 the House Armed Services Committee issued a report on the House’s draft National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2019 (H.R.5515), which questions recent changes in the pit production mandate.

…The committee continues to believe a pit production capability is a national security priority, but seeks clarification on whether and why the 2018 NPR [Nuclear Posture Review][2] has modified the pit production requirement [from at least “50-80” as stated in requirements from 2010, 2014, and 2015, to “80” ppy now]. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Energy and the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, to submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives by November 30, 2018, on the annual pit production requirement, including any associated timelines. Such report should include a detailed rationale and justification for any changes to the requirement, the drivers behind the requirement, and associated costs. Such report should also include a detailed assessment of the potential to reuse plutonium pits that are currently in the inventory of the United States. (p. 239)

As the leaked executive summary of the AoA indicates, is more to this difference than meets the eye. Whatever confidence level may have attached to the previous “at least” or “a minimum of” “50-80” ppy, the new “high confidence” requirement for “at least” 80 ppy means, or is interpreted by NNSA to mean, that a future pit production capability must deliver at least 80 WR ppy in 9 out of 10 production years. The average pit production rate would be higher than 80 ppy.

H.R. 5515 passed the House on May 24, but not before adopting a bipartisan amendment sponsored by all three New Mexico representatives to require a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) to assess the NNSA’s plutonium plans and report to Congress by April 15, halting  implementation of the pit decision in the meantime.[3]

The Senate Armed Services Committee completed its markup of parallel legislation the same day. As of this writing the bill and associated report are not available. As first noted by reporter Dan Leone of Exchange Monitor Publications (paywall), Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), who strongly opposes canceling the MOX mission, said in a Senate Appropriations Committee markup that the Senate NDAA language made him “a happy man.” (Audio of the spirited debate on MOX and pits begins at 52:20 with Sen. Graham’s remarks.)

Prior to that contentious debate Senator Udall of New Mexico successfully introduced two amendments during markup of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act which bear heavily on pit production plans. The first mandates a process to reconsider NNSA’s decision. From the final Committee report, p. 103:

Within available funds, NNSA is directed to contract with a third-party federally-Funded Research and Development Corporation to conduct an independent assessment of the NNSA’s decision to conduct pit production operations at two sites. NNSA shall identify and execute a contract with an independent FFRDC, not directly involved in plutonium pit production, not later than 60 days after enactment of this act. NNSA shall not proceed with conceptual design activities for the recently announced preferred alternative until an FFRDC is under contract. The assessment shall include an analysis of the four options evaluated in the recent Plutonium Pit Production Engineering Assessment [i.e. three options at LANL and one at SRS], all identified risks, engineering requirements, workforce development requirements, and other factors considered. The FFRDC shall submit its report to the Committees on Appropriations of both the Houses of Congress not later than 210 days after enactment of this act.

The second (from the same report, pp. 110-111) aims at impeding the D&D option for surplus plutonium disposal, necessary for NNSA’s preferred pit production plan.

The Department proposes to dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant [WIPP] in New Mexico. The Department is directed to work cooperatively with the State of New Mexico, recognizing the limits in the Land Withdrawal Act and New Mexico’s status as an independent regulator of the WIPP facility. Further, no later than February 1, 2019, the Department shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses of Congress, a plan for obtaining all necessary final state and Federal permits; acquiring independent scientific and technical review of dilute and dispose processes and waste forms to ensure compliance with waste acceptance criteria; defining any legislative changes necessary to accommodate this material and the existing WIPP waste inventory; and outlining any necessary design and construction modifications to the current facility, including cost and schedule impacts of any modifications needed to WIPP facilities or for developing additional repositories.

The Senate push-back against NNSA plans was widely reported in the regional press (here, here, and here).

Even more so than noted previously on this blog, pit production decisions are joined at the hip to decisions about surplus plutonium disposition. These in turn are entangled with decisions about disposal, whether at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), as planned, or perhaps elsewhere (e.g. deep boreholes). Storage capacity is meanwhile an issue at LANL and Pantex – and contentious at SRS.

Plutonium issues, taken together, now comprise a Gordian knot of tightly-coupled policies featuring high bureaucratic complexity, opacity (including but not limited to classified information), and strong, conflicting political interests. In his remarks on May 24, Senator Graham called them a “cluster.” There is as yet no political consensus supporting a path forward.

Given this, and the inherent problems and costs of building and operating plutonium facilities of any kind, plus the previously discussed lack of need for new pits for decades, decisions about pit production are clearly vulnerable to setbacks and reversals.

Further background on these decisions can be found in the following press releases and advisories:

and in these

  • Pit production recommendations & considerations, LASG memo to NNSA Administrator Lisa Gordon-Hagerty, Apr 6, 2018 (detailed, heavily-referenced). This memorandum did not encompass all the issues we thought significant. The geologic situation at LANL’s plutonium site is of particular interest.

The national press has taken an interest in this topic:

In March, the Study Group filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit to obtain the pit production AoA. We have now received that document (as well as others). The next blog post on this topic will address outstanding issues in these documents, as well as political and legal developments.

***ENDS***

[1] Pit production capacities stated in the text refer to accepted “War Reserve” (WR) pits only and do not include developmental pits, experimental units, rejected pits, etc. All capacities refer to single-shift operations. NNSA and DoD state required capacity in terms of the most demanding pit type, taken to be the W87 pit for the Minuteman III missile and Mark 21 reentry vehicle. After 2030, pit production is required to meet an 80 ppy goal in 9 out of 10 production years. The next blog post will discuss production requirements further.

[2] There may be a slight misstatement here: the 2017 Pit Production Analysis of Alternatives [AoA] process was begun under President Obama in the first half of 2016 and completed in September 2017 under President Trump. The 2018 NPR was completed well after this. The classified pit production requirements were however updated in June of 2017. If the “80” ppy requirement, with its consequential “high confidence” requirement (see text) was not present in the original AoA mandate, it may have been added in June 2017.

[3] While the exact language of this amendment (which passed the House en bloc) is not available as of this writing, it is reportedly similar to an appropriations amendment successfully introduced the same day (see text) by New Mexico Senator Tom Udall.