{"id":623,"date":"2019-02-19T12:12:32","date_gmt":"2019-02-19T19:12:32","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/?p=623"},"modified":"2019-02-19T12:12:42","modified_gmt":"2019-02-19T19:12:42","slug":"us-plutonium-pit-production-plans-fail-to-satisfy-congress-further-studies-underway","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/2019\/02\/19\/us-plutonium-pit-production-plans-fail-to-satisfy-congress-further-studies-underway\/","title":{"rendered":"US plutonium pit production plans fail to satisfy Congress; further studies underway"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><em>(This post was previously published at the <a href=\"http:\/\/fissilematerials.org\/blog\/2018\/11\/us_plutonium_pit_producti_1.html\">International Panel on Fissile Materials here<\/a>.)<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The US Department of Energy (DOE)&#8217;s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) recommended <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/LGH-NNSA_D&amp;D_10May2018.pdf\">strategy<\/a> for resuming industrial-scale production of plutonium pits for nuclear weapons remains uncertain &#8211; more so than <a href=\"http:\/\/fissilematerials.org\/blog\/2018\/06\/us_plutonium_pit_producti.html\">6 months ago<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Congressional defense committees did not fully accept the NNSA-Department of Defense (DoD) <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/JointStmtLord-GordonHagerty_PitProd_10May2018.html\">strategy<\/a>\n and wrote new requirements. Appropriations committees questioned NNSA&#8217;s\n plan to use pits from the first decade&#8217;s production in a new warhead. \nThe Senate required an unclassified review of pit lifetimes. At least \nfive new studies bearing on pit production are underway or pending, with\n completion dates ranging to early 2020. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NNSA&#8217;s 2017 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitAoA_Oct2017_redacted.pdf\">Plutonium Pit Production Analysis of Alternatives<\/a> (AoA) and its 2018 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitAoA_Oct2017_redacted.pdf\">Plutonium Pit Production Engineering Assessment<\/a>\n (EA) both warned that construction and operation of an 80 pit-per-year \n(ppy) capability by 2030 would be difficult. Congress has yet to grapple\n with the engineering issues raised in those two reports. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Pit production in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NDAA-FY2019_Sect3120-PlutoniumPitProduction.html\">Section 3120<\/a> of the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gpo.gov\/fdsys\/pkg\/BILLS-115hr5515enr\/pdf\/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf\">FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act<\/a>\n (NDAA), added to the bill in a floor amendment (pp. 12, 232) sponsored \nby the combined New Mexico delegation, modified and  delayed NNSA&#8217;s \nindustrial-scale pit strategy by:   <\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\"><li>Making Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) the &#8220;Plutonium Science \nand Production Center of Excellence&#8221; (emphasis added) for the US. The \nlatter is a new and challenging mission for LANL, which has struggled to\n keep its limited pit capabilities operating.   <\/li><li>Requiring NNSA to &#8220;implement surge efforts [at LANL] to exceed 30 \nppy to meet Nuclear Posture Review [NPR] and [unstated] national \npolicy.&#8221; NNSA&#8217;s AoA and EA warn in strong terms of the risks to other \nplutonium programs sharing the same LANL facility that are inherent in \nattempting to push LANL production beyond 30 ppy, for example with \nmultiple labor shifts, in the absence of new facilities.   <\/li><li>Requiring a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gpo.gov\/fdsys\/pkg\/BILLS-115hr5515enr\/pdf\/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf\">new study on pit production strategies<\/a>\n (p. 658), the third in as many years, to be managed by the Pentagon \n(instead of NNSA, though in coordination) and conducted by a federally \nfunded research and development center (FFRDC). No investment in lasting\n production scaled to the current stockpile can occur until the results \nof this study have been reviewed by Congress and the Administration and \nsubsequently incorporated into plans and budgets.<\/li><li>The <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ida.org\/\">Institute for Defense Analyses<\/a>\n (IDA) has been chosen to do this review (as well as a parallel review \nfor NNSA required by the Senate Energy and Water Development (EWD) \nAppropriations <a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/115\/crpt\/srpt258\/CRPT-115srpt258.pdf\">Report<\/a>;\n see p. 103). The review must assess the risks and benefits of the four \nEA options, as well as review the prior AoA. It must assess NNSA&#8217;s \nproposed methods to reduce risks. It must include review of a strategy \nto manufacture &#8220;up to 80 pits per year at Los Alamos National Laboratory\n through the use of multiple labor shifts and additional equipment at \nPF-4 [Plutonium Facility Building 4 in Technical Area 55] until modular \nfacilities are completed to provide a long-term, single shift capacity.&#8221;\n NNSA&#8217;s two studies did not support either a surge or modular LANL \nfacilities (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/PitProductionAoAExecSummOct2017.pdf\">AoA Executive Summary<\/a> p. 2; <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitEA_results_14May2018_briefing-slides.pdf\">EA Congressional Briefing<\/a>, slide 12). <\/li><li>Requiring NNSA to assess possible conflict between industrial pit production and LANL&#8217;s other plutonium missions, including <a href=\"https:\/\/s3.amazonaws.com\/ucs-documents\/global-security\/dilute-and-dispose-independent-cost-estimate-4-18.pdf\">processing of 26 metric tons of surplus pits<\/a> to produce plutonium dioxide for disposal. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is to review NNSA&#8217;s assessment. <\/li><li>Requiring NNSA to produce two detailed plans for pit production at \nLANL, one for production of 30 ppy by 2026, the other for &#8220;designing and\n carrying out production of plutonium pits 31-80&#8221; by 2030 in case the \nMixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) at the Savannah River\n Site (SRS) in South Carolina, is not &#8220;operational and producing pits&#8221; \nby then, a challenging deadline, especially at LANL (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/PitProductionAoAExecSummOct2017.pdf\">AoA Executive Summary<\/a> p. 2; <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitEA_results_14May2018_briefing-slides.pdf\">EA Congressional Briefing<\/a>, slides 8-9); and by<\/li><li>Requiring the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) to annually certify that\n the plan to produce 80 ppy by 2030 is &#8220;on track,&#8221; and requiring NNSA to\n produce &#8220;either a concurrent backup plan or a recovery plan&#8221; to get \nback on schedule if certification is not forthcoming. <\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>New study on plutonium aging and the lifetime of plutonium pits<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The FY2019 Senate EWD <a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/115\/crpt\/srpt258\/CRPT-115srpt258.pdf\">Report<\/a> (p. 104) requires NNSA to contract with the JASON defense analysis group for another study, this one to assess<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\"><p>&#8230; plutonium aging and the lifetime of plutonium pits in nuclear \nweapons&#8230;. Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this\n act [i.e. by March 2020], the Administrator shall submit to Congress a \nreport on the findings&#8230;[including] recommendations&#8230;for improving the\n knowledge, understanding, and application of the fundamental and \napplied sciences related to the study of plutonium aging and pit \nlifetimes, an estimate of minimum and likely lifetimes for pits in \ncurrent warheads, and the feasibility of reusing pits in modified \nnuclear weapons. The report shall be submitted in unclassified form but \nmay include a classified annex.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>Appropriations committee reports, while not statutory law, are treated <a href=\"https:\/\/fas.org\/sgp\/crs\/misc\/R44124.pdf\">&#8220;almost as seriously&#8221;<\/a>\n (p. 1). In cases where one committee&#8217;s report language is acceptable to\n both committees, the conference report may be silent &#8220;due to an \nexpectation that the agency will follow the original directive.&#8221; (p. 5) \nSuch is the case here. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This will be the first unclassified assessment of pit lifetimes since the 2008 joint DoD-DOE <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defense.gov\/Portals\/1\/Documents\/pubs\/nuclearweaponspolicy.pdf\">appraisal<\/a> that stated that the minimum pit lifetime was &#8220;85-100 years&#8221; from manufacture. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>According to congressional sources, NNSA is meanwhile nearing \ncompletion of a classified in-house study of pit aging, conducted by \nNNSA&#8217;s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2018\/09\/24\/2018-20700\/defense-programs-advisory-committee\">Defense Programs Advisory Committee<\/a> (DPAC). <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Pits, interoperable warheads and Life Extension Programs<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The near-term requirement for new pits is also being questioned \nindirectly, by questioning the only warhead that needs them. NNSA&#8217;s \nFY2019 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/budget\/FY2019\/SSMP_FY2019_Oct2018.pdf\">Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan<\/a>\n (SSMP) of October 2018 does not include interoperable warheads (IWs) \nexcept as studies (pp. 2-13, 14), continuing the Trump Administration&#8217;s <a href=\"https:\/\/media.defense.gov\/2018\/Feb\/02\/2001872886\/-1\/-1\/1\/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF\">Nuclear Posture Review<\/a> policy (p. 61) of terminating the Obama Administration&#8217;s IW1 program in favor of a W78 Life Extension Program (LEP). <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>IW1 was NNSA&#8217;s <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/PitChart2015.png\">only<\/a> pre-2040 warhead program that required new pits. IW1 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/budget\/FY2018\/FY2018_SSMP_Nov2017.pdf\">began in FY2013-14<\/a> (p. 8-36) but has been on hold since then, in part due to strong Navy disinterest. The proposed W78 LEP would, like IW1, use <a href=\"https:\/\/www.energy.gov\/nnsa\/downloads\/stockpile-stewardship-and-management-plan-ssmp\">new pits<\/a>\n (p. 2-13) to accommodate insensitive high explosive (IHE). A &#8220;W78 LEP&#8221; \nwith &#8220;all newly manufactured components&#8221; is simply the Air Force portion\n of the IW1. Sources say it may soon be called the &#8220;W87-1.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Like the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/documents\/JASON-3+2-ExecSum_Jan2015.pdf\">IW1<\/a>\n (p. 10), the new-pit W78 LEP would be based on the W87 and use a \n&#8220;W87-like&#8221; pit. The W87 is the only ballistic-missile warhead with IHE, \nand the Plutonium Sustainment program has been solely <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/budget\/FY2018\/FY2018_SSMP_Nov2017.pdf\">focused<\/a>\n (p. 2-30) on producing &#8220;W87-like&#8221; pits in the 2020s. The new-pit W78 \nLEP plan assumes adequate availability of such pits for first W78 \nproduction in <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/budget\/FY2019\/SSMP_FY2019_Oct2018.pdf\">FY2030<\/a> (p. 4-42). <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The final EWD Appropriations bill largely followed the earlier lead of the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/115\/crpt\/hrpt697\/CRPT-115hrpt697.pdf\">House<\/a> (p. 109) in questioning any such program (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.gpo.gov\/fdsys\/pkg\/CRPT-115hrpt929\/pdf\/CRPT-115hrpt929.pdf\">Conference Report<\/a>, p. 165):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\"><p>[T]he NNSA is directed to provide to the Committees on \nAppropriations of both Houses of Congress, not later than 60 days after \nthe enactment of this Act and prior to commencement of phase 6.2, a \nreport that provides the rationale for an insensitive-high explosive \n(IHE)-based system, an updated estimate of the cost and schedule for \nwarhead development and production, and a rough order of magnitude cost \nand schedule comparison of the differences between the requested IW and a\n W76 LEP-like refurbishment of the W78 [i.e. a W78 LEP without IHE and a\n new pit]. Further, the NNSA shall initiate an independent review by the\n Office of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE) of the analysis\n of alternatives process conducted as part of the life extension study \nof the W78 to assess objectivity, thoroughness, and adherence to the \nGovernment Accountability Office recommended best practices, in \naccordance with current NNSA policy. <\/p><p>Not later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the NNSA \nshall provide to the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses of \nCongress a report that includes the following: (1) the results of the \nCEPE review; (2) a cost and schedule estimate to refurbish the W78 \nwarhead in a manner similar to the W76 LEP; (3) a cost estimate for any \nneeded upgrades to Department of Defense facilities to fully satisfy \nsafety requirements for handling conventional high explosives; (4) \nimpacts to the IW\/W78 LEP if pit production targets are not met; and (5)\n the certification strategy for the IW\/W78 LEP that addresses issues \nraised by the JASONs group in its review of certification risks for an \nIW with IHE and remanufactured pits.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p>The &#8220;issues raised by the JASONs&#8221; <a href=\"http:\/\/lasg.org\/documents\/JASON-3+2-ExecSum_Jan2015.pdf\">included<\/a>\n warnings that: a) warhead modifications to incorporate IHE &#8220;may force a\n reduction in design yield margins&#8221; (p. 6), and b) certification of the \nnuclear explosive package (NEP) as well as of the reentry vehicle [RV] \ncould be difficult. Sources suggest that dozens of flight tests could be\n required to determine the accuracy of the modified RV.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Given the technical risks, schedule challenges, and <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/budget\/FY2019\/SSMP_FY2019_Oct2018.pdf\">great expense<\/a>\n (estimated by NNSA at $19.5 billion, including $4.4 billion in DoD \ncosts, plus pit production) (p. 4-42), and the risk to NNSA&#8217;s plutonium \nfacilities and programs entailed by &#8220;surge&#8221; production in old \nfacilities, the W78 &#8220;new pit option&#8221; may not survive. Of note, the \nmajority of warheads in the US arsenal &#8211; those deployed by the Navy &#8211; \nwill continue to use conventional high explosive for at least the next \n25 years. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Another option is to retire the W78. As the <a href=\"http:\/\/lasg.org\/documents\/JASON-3+2-ExecSum_Jan2015.pdf\">JASONs note<\/a>\n (p. 5), &#8220;multiple diverse designs that meet the same requirements \nprovide little benefit over a single high-confidence design,&#8221; in this \ncase the existing W87. Another option is to retire some or all US \nground-based ballistic missiles. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is completing a review of the IW1\/W78 LEP program pursuant to July 2017 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/115\/crpt\/srpt125\/CRPT-115srpt125.pdf\">requirement<\/a>\n (p. 360). GAO will issue a report this fall reviewing NNSA&#8217;s IW1\/W78 \nLEP planning and management, including infrastructure, equipment, and \npersonnel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Funding and setting pit production requirements<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Congress did provide ample funding for pit production. The final EWD \nbill funds the &#8220;Plutonium Sustainment&#8221; budget line at the requested \nlevel ($361 million), a 71% increase over FY2018 spending and the first \nstep in what the administration <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/budget\/FY2019\/DOE_FY2019_Vol1.pdf\">proposes<\/a> (pp. 60, 63) to be a dramatic ramp-up to $1.2 billion per year by 2023. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Within this budget, the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gpo.gov\/fdsys\/pkg\/CRPT-115hrpt929\/pdf\/CRPT-115hrpt929.pdf\">Conference directs NNSA<\/a>\n to break out a &#8220;Plutonium Pit Production Project,&#8221; (pp. 165-166, 178), \nand funds this new project for FY2019 at $75 million. This structure \naims at greater accountability for what is already a large program. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The &#8220;mission need&#8221; &#8211; &#8220;Critical Decision Zero&#8221; (CD-0) in Department of\n Energy (DOE) parlance &#8211; for &#8220;50-80&#8221; ppy pit production was approved on \n25 November 2015. In June 2017, the Mission Need Statement (MNS) and \nProgram Requirements Document (PRD) prepared in support of CD-0 approval\n were <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitAoA_Oct2017_redacted.pdf\">&#8220;updated&#8221;<\/a> (p.3) to reflect a new requirement of at least 80 ppy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Pit production desires have <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/Medalia_history_stmts_pit_prod_3Apr2014.pdf\">changed<\/a> several times over the past 15 years. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Also in June 2017, perhaps in the CD-0, the NNSA Program Secretarial \nOfficer &#8211; in this case, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs &#8211; \nformally <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitAoA_Oct2017_redacted.pdf\">determined<\/a>\n (p. 76) that continuing to rely on PF-4 for enduring pit production \ncapability presented &#8220;unacceptably high mission risk&#8221; for two reasons: \na) efforts to install equipment in PF-4 beyond what is already planned \nunder the Plutonium Sustainment program present unacceptably high risks \nto achieving 30 ppy production by 2026; and b) PF-4 is much smaller than\n is required for stockpile pit production, even if missions such as \nplutonium dioxide production and plutonium-238 manufacturing were \nsomehow relocated. Both the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitAoA_Oct2017_redacted.pdf\">AoA<\/a> (p. 36, footnote 13; pp. 47-48) and <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitAoA_Oct2017_redacted.pdf\">EA<\/a> (p. 2-54) emphasize the age and operational fragility of PF-4. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>CD-1 (&#8220;Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range&#8221;), which requires <a href=\"https:\/\/www.directives.doe.gov\/directives-documents\/400-series\/0413.3-BOrder-B-chg5-minchg\/@@images\/file\">many prior studies<\/a> (pp. A-6 through A-8), is not expected <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitEA_Rev2_20April2018-redacted.pdf\">until December 2019<\/a>\n (p. 3-17), assuming NNSA had made a decision as to its overall pit \nproduction strategy by the end of FY2018. But NNSA did not. The agency \nmade a <em>recommendation<\/em> in May, and Congress intervened. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Senate Appropriations Committee <a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/115\/crpt\/srpt258\/CRPT-115srpt258.pdf\">barred<\/a>\n (p. 103) NNSA from beginning conceptual design to implement its \ntwo-site pit production strategy at Los Alamos and Savannah River until \nan FFRDC was under contract to review the pit strategy. That review \ncontract began no earlier than September 21, when the bill containing \nEWD appropriations became law. The IDA team conducting the pit strategy \nreview for DoD told the author in November 2018 they were also doing the\n review for NNSA. The review for NNSA is due <a href=\"https:\/\/www.congress.gov\/115\/crpt\/srpt258\/CRPT-115srpt258.pdf\">210 days after enactment<\/a> (p. 103), i.e. April 19, 2019, four days after the similar DoD review <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NDAA-FY2019_Sect3120-PlutoniumPitProduction.html\">is due on The Hill<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Unless for some reason these reports are delivered early, NNSA cannot\n make an alternative selection for pit production until sometime after \nApril 2019. Congress will use the reports it requested, along with other\n information, to fashion FY2020 authorizations and appropriations. The \nfuture of the IW1\/W78 LEP\/W87-1 warhead, as well as anticipation of an \nupdated JASON review on pit aging, may influence congressional and \nsubsequent NNSA decisions &#8211; including regarding mission need. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Environmental impact statement<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>NNSA must also vet the environmental impacts of all reasonable pit production alternatives under the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.energy.gov\/sites\/prod\/files\/nepapub\/nepa_documents\/RedDont\/Req-NEPA.pdf\">National Environmental Policy Act<\/a> (NEPA) prior to undertaking actions that prejudice the agency&#8217;s decision or irreversibly commit resources (general <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/CRS_Pit_Prod_21Feb2014.pdf\">overview<\/a> in this context, p. 28). The Los Alamos Study Group (LASG) <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/LASG_pit-memo-LGH-V1_6Apr2018.pdf\">wrote<\/a>\n NNSA in April 2018 pointing out that any proposed NNSA decision to \nproduce pits at any site besides LANL, and at LANL at a rate exceeding \n20 ppy, would contravene prior decisions and exceed the parameters of \nprior analysis, requiring an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Any \ncontemplated decision to produce more than 50 ppy at LANL, or a \ncontemplated decision to produce pits at any site other than LANL, would\n require a Programmatic EIS (PEIS). <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Subsequently three other organizations &#8211; Tri-Valley CAREs (TVC), \nNuclear Watch of New Mexico (NWNM), and Savannah River Site Watch (SRSW)\n &#8211; <a href=\"http:\/\/www.srswatch.org\/uploads\/2\/7\/5\/8\/27584045\/letter_nnsa-pit-nepa-ltr-10-31-18-1.pdf\">wrote<\/a>\n NNSA and congressional parties making similar and further points, in \nparticular pointing to a legal settlement (in which LASG and TVC were \nparties) in which DOE agreed to produce a Supplemental PEIS (SPEIS) \nprior to proceeding to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.energy.gov\/sites\/prod\/files\/EIS-0236-S2-DEIS-Summary-2003.pdf\">&#8220;detailed engineering design&#8221;<\/a> (p. S-2) for any proposal to produce pits at a rate greater than 50 ppy under &#8220;routine&#8221; (single-shift) circumstances. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitAoA_Oct2017_redacted.pdf\">That is the case<\/a> (pp. 3, 13) for the present proposal. NNSA began such an SPEIS in 2003 but never completed it. The EA critical path analyses (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitEA_Rev2_20April2018-redacted.pdf\">appendices I-L<\/a>) would begin &#8220;detailed engineering design&#8221; as soon as FY2019. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Pits, the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility and LANL<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In line with the results of the AoA and EA analyses, NNSA&#8217;s May 10 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/LGH-NNSA_D&amp;D_10May2018.pdf\">recommendation<\/a> was that the bulk of post-2029 pit production should occur at a repurposed MFFF. In that regard, appropriations conferees <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gpo.gov\/fdsys\/pkg\/CRPT-115hrpt929\/pdf\/CRPT-115hrpt929.pdf\">slashed<\/a>\n (p. 181) FY2019 MFFF construction funding by more than one-third from \nFY2018, from $335 million to $220 million. The latter was the amount \nrequested by the administration to continue <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/budget\/FY2019\/DOE_FY2019_Vol1.pdf\">orderly project termination<\/a> (p. 524), to conclude in FY2021. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On October 9, NNSA&#8217;s plan to terminate the MOX plant was <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aikenstandard.com\/news\/federal-appeals-court-sides-with-doe-lifts-pro-mox-injunction\/article_da63018e-cbe5-11e8-92ea-dbf56ba85ab4.html\">upheld<\/a> by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.augustachronicle.com\/business\/20181116\/remaining-layoff-schedule-for-mox-workers-announced\">At least 600 MOX employees<\/a>,\n about one-third of the workforce, will be laid off on 7 January 2019, \nwith the rest to follow on an as-yet-unspecified schedule. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>For all their differences, both the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/PlutoniumPitProductionAoA_Nov2017_9pg.pdf\">AoA<\/a> (p. 9) and the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitEA_results_14May2018_briefing-slides.pdf\">EA<\/a>\n (p. 8) found that refurbishing MFFF was NNSA&#8217;s least capital-cost, \nfastest, and in the EA, least-risk option for stockpile pit production \nby 2030 and thereafter. Neither recommended building underground \nproduction &#8220;modules&#8221; at LANL, the strategy <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/AoA_UdallHeinrichLujan_ltr_18Dec2017.pdf\">endorsed<\/a>\n by the NWC in 2014 and retained for special study in the new NDAA \ndespite these two analyses, as noted above. Neither study recommended \nbuilding any new facilities at LANL that would be dependent on PF-4. \nBoth acknowledged in different ways that PF-4 was fragile, with a \nlimited life. The EA <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitEA_results_14May2018_briefing-slides.pdf\">recommendation<\/a> did not include any LANL construction (p. 12). <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The dates projected for an operational 50 or 80 ppy facility (adding a year for the new studies), are 2030-2037 (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/PlutoniumPitProductionAoA_Nov2017_9pg.pdf\">AoA<\/a>, p. 9) and 2032-2036 (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitEA_results_14May2018_briefing-slides.pdf\">EA<\/a>, p. 8). <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitAoA_Oct2017_redacted.pdf\">AoA<\/a>,\n attempts to achieve multi-shift production at LANL were deemed too \nrisky to retain for further analysis (text above; p. 76). The <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lasg.org\/MPF2\/documents\/NNSA_PuPitEA_results_14May2018_briefing-slides.pdf\">EA<\/a>\n (p. 8, summary; pp. 4-22, 23, details) gave the alternative requiring \nmulti-shift operations in PF-4 the highest risk, in part for that \nreason. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Taking these results on board, it seems NNSA has no viable options \nfor significant stockpile pit production in the 2020s, and almost \ncertainly cannot meet its 2030 deadline for an operational 80 ppy \ncapability.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>(This post was previously published at the International Panel on Fissile Materials here.) The US Department of Energy (DOE)&#8217;s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) recommended strategy for resuming industrial-scale production of plutonium pits for nuclear weapons remains uncertain &#8211; more so than 6 months ago. Congressional defense committees did not fully accept the NNSA-Department of&hellip;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/2019\/02\/19\/us-plutonium-pit-production-plans-fail-to-satisfy-congress-further-studies-underway\/\" rel=\"bookmark\">Read More &raquo;<span class=\"screen-reader-text\">US plutonium pit production plans fail to satisfy Congress; further studies underway<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","neve_meta_reading_time":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[12],"tags":[30,26,28,4,27,31,29,25,20],"class_list":["post-623","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-commentary","tag-analysis-of-alternatives","tag-department-of-defense","tag-doe","tag-los-alamos-study-group","tag-national-nuclear-security-administration","tag-new-mexico","tag-nnsa","tag-nuclear-weapons","tag-plutonium"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p2ZtEt-a3","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/623","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=623"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/623\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":624,"href":"https:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/623\/revisions\/624"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=623"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=623"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=623"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}