{"id":959,"date":"2020-02-01T17:53:33","date_gmt":"2020-02-02T00:53:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/?p=959"},"modified":"2020-02-04T16:39:20","modified_gmt":"2020-02-04T23:39:20","slug":"u-s-plutonium-pit-production-plans-advance-with-new-requirements","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lasg.org\/wordpress\/2020\/02\/01\/u-s-plutonium-pit-production-plans-advance-with-new-requirements\/","title":{"rendered":"U.S. plutonium pit production plans advance, with new requirements"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Published on the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) blog<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

December 23, 2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n

by Greg Mello<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fiscal year (FY) 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, S. 1790<\/a>) and appropriations for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) programs (H.R. 1865<\/a>, in Division C<\/a>) fully authorized and funded (e-p. 101<\/a>)\n the Trump Administration’s $712.44 million request for plutonium \nwarhead core (“pit”) production (“Plutonium Sustainment”) at the Los \nAlamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Savannah River Site (SRS). New\n requirements were added, however. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The FY2020 NDAA gave statutory force to the Administration’s \nrequirement to produce, “during 2030, not less than 80 war reserve \nplutonium pits” (\u00a73116, pp. 754-5<\/a>). A prior requirement<\/a> to demonstrate, for 90 days, an 80 pit per year (ppy) production rate by 2027 was stricken. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Congress also imposed new reporting and management requirements. Appropriation committees now require (e-p. 86<\/a>) quarterly progress briefings on LANL’s progress in achieving an initial capacity of 10 ppy (required by 2024<\/a>),\n on the two sites’ projects to acquire capacity beyond 10 ppy, and on \nhow lessons learned from the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) project \nare being applied to plutonium work. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appropriators also placed (e-p. 86<\/a>)\n the acquisition of pit production capacity at both LANL and SRS under \nthe Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) project management rules (DOE Order 413.3B<\/a>).\n This requires external reviews of cost, safety, and security; analysis \nof project alternatives and environmental impact before construction can\n begin (e-pp. 30-34<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Congress expressed again its concerns about the sole proposed warhead\n which would use new pits, the W87-1. That warhead is scheduled to begin\n production and deployment in 2030 (e-pp. 79-81<\/a>)\n on the proposed Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), which would \nreplace the current Minuteman III land-based ballistic missiles. An \nannual report on GBSD and W87-1 progress – including acquisition and \noperation of pit production capacity – is required (\u00a731671, pp. 578-9<\/a>), beginning in February 2020. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Appropriators also require (e-p. 85<\/a>)\n a report from NNSA on W87-1 major design decisions, their costs, major \nrisks to the program risks associated contingency plans – including the \nmajor risk that pit production will not meet the required schedule. \nSenate appropriators in 2018 required (p. 104<\/a>)\n an assessment by the JASON group of the feasibility of reusing pits in \nmodified nuclear weapons, the minimum and likely lifetimes of plutonium \npits in nuclear weapons, and plutonium aging. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Preparations at the two production sites<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sources say roughly $500 M of FY2020’s $712 M for pit production \npreparations will be spent at LANL, with $205 M earmarked for SRS. \nNNSA’s FY2020 budget request includes (p. 122<\/a>) $410 M for pre- Critical Decision (CD)-1<\/a>\n (“approve alternative selection, cost range”) activities at the \nSavannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF), as the repurposed \nMixed Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) is now known. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to Kelly Cummins, NNSA’s Program Executive Officer for \nStrategic Materials, to reach the planned 30 ppy by 2026, LANL will need\n to operate its PF-4 plutonium facility with multiple shifts, and LANL \nwill be hiring an additional 1,000 to 1,500 plutonium-related staff to \ndo so. LANL Chief Operating Officer Kelly Beierschmidt said<\/a>\n LANL expects to hire 1,400 additional plutonium-related staff over the \nnext five years. At least for now, NNSA’s hopes for expanded pit \nproduction at LANL rely on multiple shifts rather than additional \nnuclear facilities. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Safety issues at PF-4 dog NNSA’s pit plans for LANL, however. Despite\n hundreds of millions of dollars in repairs and seismic and safety \nupgrades, LANL’s 41-year-old PF-4 facility lacks a completed dynamic \nseismic analysis and any active “safety-class” (i.e. survivable) systems\n to protect the public and co-located workers from exposures in the \nevent of an earthquake and fire. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conflicts with other plutonium programs<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In October, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report<\/a>\n suggested apparent contradictions between NNSA’s surplus plutonium \ndisposition (SPD) program and pit production programs. As summarized in a\n Los Alamos Study Group review<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n