Bulletin 289: NNSA lukewarm about plan to produce plutonium pits at LANL; new NDAA requires reporting on changing costs, risks, pit requirements, and a real waste plan

December 23, 2021

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Previously: Bulletin 288: US nuclear weapons since 2020: continuity and change, Dec 7, 2021.

Even though we are desperate to communicate to you on wider matters on which so much depends, this Bulletin confines itself to addressing two developments in one narrow and somewhat technical but important issue: plutonium warhead core ("pit") production.

1. What's the big deal about pit production?
2. As of May of this year, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was only lukewarm about LANL's then-current pit production plan.
3. The FY22 NDAA sets the stage for cutting pit production expenditures

Dear friends --

Hello everybody. We hope you are all well and productive in your respective works and contemplations.

We are well here. There is good news, which we will parcel out in this and subsequent bulletins as fast as we can.

We know of no bad news. News that might be considered "bad" can also be seen from other perspectives. Manure in the barn is gold in the fields, but we do have to spread it. We find ourselves at a major hinge in history. Doors are swinging -- some opening, some closing. We suspect a lot of attitudes will change in the coming year.

Leaving that for now, this is the time of year when we must ask you to help fund next year's work if you can. To those who have already sent in contributions -- thank you so much. Look for another Bulletin ASAP with more about why the year ahead looks promising for nuclear disarmament and related matters, provided we "remain awake through a great revolution" (ML King) -- which assuredly we are in. We will be that much stronger with your solidarity and help.

1. What's the big deal about pit production?

Pit production is by far the largest program in the US nuclear warhead business, running to $32-$39 billion (B) over fiscal years 2019 to 2033. The current plan would spend over half of this at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

LANL is to make at least 30 pits per year (ppy) with 24/7 shifts in a remodeled older facility built for R&D only, which would begin full production in fiscal year 2026 (FY26).

Meanwhile at the Savannah River Site (SRS), a partially-built, large new facility will be modified and equipment installed to make at least 80 ppy (of up to two pit types concurrently, according to NNSA) with a single production shift. Production at SRS is expected to start in the FY32 to FY35 timeframe.

Until new pits are available in quantity, the US cannot field entirely new nuclear weapons. Neither will there be enough new, highly-accurate warheads to place up to three multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on US silo-based missiles as a so-called "upload hedge." Without new pits, the new "Ground Based Strategic Deterrent" (GBSD), assuming it is built, could deploy only half as many warheads as today's Minuteman III can, if the latter were fully-loaded.

To put it crudely, without new pits the US can't conduct an arms race. All currently-deployed weapons could continue to be fielded for at least the coming two decades, and upgraded warheads and bombs could still be built with existing pits. But without new pits, all-new warheads would be impossible.

The crash program to produce new pits at LANL on an industrial scale (as opposed to making a few pits on an R&D basis) has a more important purpose than "national security" however: corporate security, and not just for LANL. Without a crash program to deploy a new-design warhead (the W87-1) with all new components by 2030, the urgent "need" to rapidly expand the nuclear weapons workforce across the US would evaporate. Budgets could fall. The W87-1 deadline acts as a schedule "cork" at the end of this decade, keeping the pressure on production and deployment deadlines as well as hiring and construction over the balance of this decade. Ending LANL's emergency pit program would not compromise the "nuclear deterrent" in any way either now or later, but the budgetary, corporate, and political ramifications would be profound.

There are also local impacts -- political, cultural, social, environmental. In northern New Mexico those negative impacts would be immediate, severe, and transformative for the region.

With that introduction, here's the first of two good news items, which we can report thanks to Trish's program of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.

2. As of May of this year, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was only lukewarm about LANL's then-current pit production plan.

Summary:

• LANL's plan was described as "a work in progress." NNSA's internal Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation (CEPE) group, which authored the review under the direction of (then-) Acting NNSA Administrator Charles Verdon, "assesses that more work will need to be done to improve the current plan and mitigate risks."


• Staffing the huge new LANL pit production mission remains a major challenge.


• Neither LANL nor NNSA has a single integrated pit production plan for LANL, nor any systematic plan to manage risks. Instead there are numerous different projects and programs.


• Many (51!) large and small infrastructure projects are necessary for pit production, in addition to the "Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project" (LAP4). Operations at nine key facilities, not just one or two, are considered critical to pit production. LANL's plan does not describe the condition of these facilities or their equipment.


• A fully-secure wireless network "may" be needed at LANL's main plutonium facility to coordinate production. (This could prove a lot more challenging to install than, say, Google Home.)


• Pit production is "highly dependent on continuous removal of nuclear waste." The "most urgent risk" to LANL pit production is "the lack of a comprehensive, integrated, and enduring plan to address increasing transuranic (TRU) waste generation as pit production activities rise at LANL."


• NNSA remains uncertain about the future of its surplus plutonium disposition program at LANL, which could dramatically impact pit production.

The report is silent about another competing plutonium production mission, namely heat source production from Pu-238 and associated processing of this dangerous material. This mission which has recently been found to increase the estimated off-site dose to the nearest members of the public from a post-seismic fire to the range of 83-378 rem under worst-case conditions -- far greater than the 25 rem DOE operational guideline. We sent this information to the Santa Fe New Mexican a few days ago and this morning the paper published on the subject (albeit without explaining how this alarming factoid fits into a larger picture).

The take-home message for citizens, activists, Congress, and the Executive Branch from NNSA's lukewarm May review is that this brand-new mission for LANL, which the lab currently estimates will cost $18 B over this decade, is by no means a fait accompli. This is not at all news to us but it is news for many people -- including many members of Congress, NGOs, liberal foundations, and "experts."

Trying to conduct this mission at LANL is simply bad planning and engineering. It will eventually fail, a perspective shared and communicated to us by some congressional staff. As one put it (paraphrasing somewhat), "I just hope not too many people are hurt when the inevitable accidents happen."

We don't yet have the "LANL Pit Plan" NNSA reviewed, not even in redacted form. We did get the previous one, heavily redacted. We hope more journalists eventually become interested in what is going on. It's only the largest nuclear weapons project in the US.

Another "good news" seed in the winter policy field now follows, almost invisible beneath the snow. It's in the $778 B FY22 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), now on the President's desk awaiting signature (bill text). As you probably know, Congress added about $25 B (3.5%) to the administration's request for DoD spending in this bill. Congress also added $497 million (M) (3.2%) to Biden's NNSA request for nuclear Weapons Activities, about the same proportion.

In passing it is well to note that the $7,400 or so in overall defense spending per US household (see footnote 14 in the previous Bulletin, divide by 129 million households) is both appalling and a gigantic political opportunity.

3. The FY22 NDAA sets the stage for cutting pit production expenditures

Congress authorized exactly what the administration requested for pit production: $1.72 B (pp. 1874-1878), not including the other LANL projects necessary for pit production. In our tally, the bill authorized at least $1.155 B for LANL's pit program, along with other millions for LANL's other plutonium missions.

Almost everything else requested for NNSA was also unchanged from the administration's request, with minor tweaks and increases that net to +$497 M.

No FY22 funding bill has passed but NNSA -- uniquely in government -- has several billion dollars in unexpired prior-year funds (in other words, its own piggy-bank) which it can use to scale up FY22 programs, including pit production. The government as a whole is meanwhile running on a Continuing Resolution (CR) that expires on February 18. Under the CR, NNSA (and LANL) cannot start any new projects -- at least, above certain sizes -- until they are specifically appropriated. Like the armed services committees, the appropriations committees proposed FY22 pit funding exactly in line with the President's request. For details see the Energy and Water Development Subcommittee reports in this table.

Congress and DoD are nervous about these huge costs. They are also nervous about failure. NNSA and DoD were told in 2019 that restarting pit production would be very difficult and "eventual success...is far from certain."

With this in mind, the new NDAA sets the stage for possible future decisions to "rebalance" pit production expenditures. At the moment this is only a speck on the horizon, a seed in the ground.

It's in Section 3111, where we find a new requirement for NNSA to report each March to Congress starting when the two main projects for pit production at LANL and Savannah River Site (SRS) have begun detailed design -- apparently in March 2024 for LANL's project and March of 2025 for SRS.

The report must include (condensed, emphasis added):

• the number of war reserve plutonium pits planned to be produced during each year, including the associated warhead type;
• a description of risks and challenges to meeting the performance baseline for the covered projects;
• options available to the Administrator to balance scope, costs, and production requirements at the projects to decrease overall risk to the plutonium enterprise and enduring plutonium pit requirements; and
• an explanation of any changes to the production goals or requirements as compared to the previous year.
  

It is up to us to nurture this seed and guide it. There are at least 32 billion reasons Congress might want to know a lot sooner than 2024 whether taxpayer funds are being spent wisely.

Section 3111 also requires that DOE Environmental Management (EM) and NNSA jointly certify (by 2023 at LANL and 2024 at SRS, barring any delays in the respective projects) "that the operations, infrastructure, and workforce of [the two main pit production projects] are adequate to carry out the delivery and disposal of planned waste shipments relating to the plutonium enterprise."

NNSA's concerns generally start and end with its own programs and facilities. LANL has limited spare capacity for storing and shipping TRU waste, as NNSA already noted in 2017 (pp. A-13, A-14) even omitting consideration of legacy wastes. NNSA's newly-generated TRU waste has shipping priority over legacy TRU waste, which is separately managed not by the LANL operating contractor but rather by a DOE EM contractor. There is only so much TRU waste shipping capacity available for LANL.

We know of no funded, agreed plan to address legacy TRU waste at LANL, as we have often said. It's dangerous where it sits, generally without secondary containment when in fabric tents -- or if buried, quietly rusting in the moist near-surface ground. LANL's pit production program is a major barrier to improving safety at its Area G waste storage and disposal area.

That's it for now. "Stay calm, have courage, and wait for signs" (Craig Johnson)

Greg and Trish, for the Study Group