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March 4, 2024 Bulletin 341: Pit seminar materials available; Russophobia seminar postponed; big jump in FY24 warhead spending as arms race takes hold; Ukraine losing war sparking panic in West Permalink for this bulletin (please forward). Simple home page. Detailed home page. Previously: Bulletin 340: "Year in Pits;" Zoom update & discussion on pits 2/27; rich opportunities in the land of nuclear (dis)enchantment; end the Ukraine carnage and genocide in Gaza, Feb 22, 2024
Dear friends and colleagues -- 1. On-line pit production seminar materials available On Tuesday 2/27/24 we provided an on-line update and discussion on plutonium warhead core ("pit") production, which included debunking some of the misconceptions plaguing public discourse on pits. In particular, we looked at some (not all) of the egregious errors and contradictions in the Asplund and von Hippel article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists last year as well as some important mistakes in the Scientific American (slides, video). We largely based the update portion of the seminar on "The Year in Pits, LASG letter to Congressional Colleagues," Jan 30, 2024, as we mentioned in the last Bulletin. Our own proposed policies can be found in the featured materials on our pit web page, e.g. "Toward a viable plutonium pit production plan: part 2," Jun 9, 2023. We have created a nearly-complete library of pertinent references there as well. No doubt in response to concerns within government over what could be a 6-year schedule delay at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) -- from 2026 to March 2032 -- LANL has been pushing a narrative that LANL might be able to make 30 pits by 2028! “We’re shooting for 2028,” [LANL Director Thom] Mason said. “There is a mission driver. We need to start making pits for this Sentinel ICBM” ("LANL's prototype plutonium bomb core passes key tests," Santa Fe New Mexican, with comment, Feb 19, 2024). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is not saying this. In February 2023, when I (Greg) asked NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby about the schedule for pit production, she said (54:28 to 56:19) that production of 30 ppy might occur by 2030, but these pits were unlikely to be all certifiable. Reliable production of 30 War Reserve (WR) pits per year (ppy), she said, requires completion of the "30 Reliable" subproject, currently slated for March 2032 (GAO-23-104402, p. 44). When I asked Administrator Hruby the same question last month, she failed to answer. The contradiction may be partially resolved in the forthcoming fiscal year (FY) 2025 congressional budget request, to be released sometime during the week of March 11. The actual schedule will be known only in hindsight, obviously! 2. Related: GAO on NNSA's research plan for plutonium and pit aging In "Nuclear Weapons: Information on the National Nuclear Security Administration's Research Plan for Plutonium and Pit Aging," (GAO-24-106740, 2/29/24), GAO provides an unclassified summary of GAO's classified review of the current age and estimated lifetimes of pits in the stockpile, the impact that these lifetime estimates may have on stockpile management and pit production, and related matters. GAO tells us that NNSA's research program on pit aging is expected to cost about $1 billion over 10 years, exclusive of capital costs. Exchange Monitor notes that just two of the needed machines and their supporting infrastructure are expected to cost $2.6 billion ("Plutonium pit-aging studies will cost NNSA at least $1B, not counting equipment, GAO says," Mar 1, 2024). GAO concludes by noting "NNSA officials and independent evaluations identified the need to continue to pursue plutonium pit production to mitigate risks associated with plutonium aging." This is similar to a conclusion of the JASON advisory group in 2019: "Finally, we urge that pit manufacturing be re-established as expeditiously as possible in parallel with the focused program to understand Pu aging, to mitigate against potential risks posed by Pu aging on the stockpile." 3. Russophobia seminar postponed We had planned on having a seminar tomorrow to discuss the critically-important problem of Russophobia in the arms control and disarmament arena. While we had two other willing discussants, this proved to be a "bridge too far" for me (Greg), given the rest of the work "on our plate" here. As we keep saying, it is irresponsible to talk about arms control, let alone disarmament, without a major effort to understand Russian perspectives. 4. Congress proposes 12% jump in NNSA Weapons Activities, two additional weapons The six-agency appropriations bill released yesterday funds NNSA and the rest of the Department of Energy (Conference Report). It is likely to pass in its current form; there is no legislative time for and little inclination for debate on NNSA Weapons Activities (WA). The bill funds WA at $19.1 billion (B), a 12% jump from FY23 levels. This is the second biggest percentage increase since 1982 (when WA jumped up 19%), is exceeded during that period only by the Trump/Biden 15% jump in 2021. The bill adds $142 million (M) over the request to the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPFF) project. This is the same amount that is authorized in the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). This is the second year in a row that Congress added significant funding over the amount requested for that project. The moral of the story is that NNSA, DoD, and Congress are not going to defund SRPPF, no matter what, including no matter who is elected president. NNSA has no other option for an adequate, enduring pit production facility, which will in any case take many years to construct. Choosing to not construct an enduring pit facility is tantamount to choosing unilateral nuclear disarmament. This is not going to happen. The folks in the arms control community who keep asking for pit production at LANL are doing nothing of value. They are instead merely endorsing the Sentinel warhead along with every other hawk in government and the two-pit-factory plan that is necessary to make those pits, just as Thom Mason says. You call that arms control? The bill adds $70 M to the request for the W80-4 program, for study of a warhead for the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile, Nuclear (SLCM-N). When passed and signed, this warhead will be part of NNSA's "Program of Record" for the first time. The bill also adds $52 M for a B61-13 high-yield precision-guided earth penetrating bomb, which also now will become part of the program of record as well. Here's the wider picture, from an NNSA presentation in January:
So when this bill is passed and signed, NNSA will have SEVEN warheads in process (in the "program of record"), up from 5 last year. 5. Ukraine is losing the war, as has been inevitable from the start, sparking dangerous panic in the West Please see our Ukraine page for recent updates, which are numerous and consequential, as well as our comments. Please forward that page to others who might be interested. We will speak of this further on another occasion. Greg and Trish for the Los Alamos Study Group community |
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