Press backgrounder June 29, 2021
[Incomplete but accidently sent anyway]

NNSA approves plutonium warhead core ("pit") factory in South Carolina

Contact: Greg Mello, 505-577-8563 cell
Permalink * Prior press releases

Albuquerque, NM -- Yesterday the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) approved Critical Decision 1 (CD-1) for the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF), located at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina.

CD-1 marks the end of the project definition and conceptual design stage and the beginning of preliminary facility design, which for SRPPF is slated to run until some time in fiscal year (FY) 2024, when CD-2/3 (concurrent final design and construction) is slated to begin.

SRPPF is currently expected to cost $6.9 - $11.1 billion (B) and to be complete in the 2032-2035 timeframe -- meaning that SRPPF is expected to be producing 50 plutonium warhead cores ("pits") per year (ppy) within that date range. (See June 24, 2021 testimony of Acting NNSA Administrator Charles Verdon to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee [SASC/SF] at 1:39).

SRPPF began in FY19; full production by 2035 would mean a 16-year overall project duration, comparable to the "at least 16" years predicted by the Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA) in 2019 (p. vi), to the 2034 date predicted by NNSA in 2017 ("2033" plus one year for startup delay; see p. 2), to the "17" years predicted by NNSA in 2003 (slide 9), and to the "14" years predicted by the Department of Energy (DOE) Defense Programs Advisory Group (DPAG) in 1998 (p. 4). Full SRPPF production by 2030 -- i.e. ≥80 ppy overall by 2030 -- was never realistic.

NNSA is requesting $475 million (M) for SRPPF for FY22, up from $352 M enacted in the current year (p. 201). Approximately $120 M is earmarked in FY22 for preliminary site preparation, utilities, and related work (pp. 217, 219).

In addition to funds for SRPPF, NNSA is requesting $128 M for the Plutonium Modernization program for SRS (p. 125).

In addition to SRPPF, NNSA is building a smaller pit factory at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) at comparable cost, to begin production in the mid-2020s

NNSA is also expanding LANL's plutonium processing and pit manufacturing capacity. This is being done via a number of different capital projects and programs in addition to the $2.7 - $3.9 B Los Alamos Plutonium Pit Production Project (LAP4). Overall LAP4 completion is expected in the 2027-2028 timeframe (see also pp. 203ff here).

As noted in our April 28 and June 1 press releases, SRPPF costs are not comparable to LAP4 costs. The latter includes only a small fraction of the cost of expanding pit production capacity at LANL.  In addition to LAP4, "LANL has completed seven line-item projects and has three more (CMRR, TRP III, and TLW) in progress to enable pit production and the other enduring plutonium missions at LANL" (p. 19 in LANL's September 2019 "Plan to Produce 30 Pits per Year"). (These projects are the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement project, the TA-55 Reinvestment Project Phase III project, and the Transuranic Liquid Waste Facility, respectively.)

In addition to these ten line-item projects, LANL is pursuing many smaller construction projects funded in a diversity of ways (p. 25) to "establish, upgrade, and maintain the physical infrastructure across LANL to meet the expanded pit production mission" (p. 10).

In addition to all these different kinds of capital projects, LANL is using "institutional funding" to pay for "leased space prior to permanent facilities being completed" (see March 8 press release, LANL's May 6 announcement of 49,000 sq. ft. of additional leased space and request for 100,000 sq. ft. more).  LANL utility upgrades in this "corridor" (and site-wide) are also "covered outside the project" (p. B-7).

To build and staff LANL's expanding pit factory, NNSA is requesting a hefty $660 M in program funding for "Plutonium Modernization" at LANL, in addition to $350 M for the LAP4 capital project, plus additional line items and other smaller capital projects.

While we have not attempted a full tally of all of LANL's known, budgeted pit production costs, we estimate LANL's pit production start-up costs through FY26 at $11 B (see October 1, 2020 at slide 23, based on NNSA's FY21 budget request, and the more recent June 1, 2020 estimate based on NNSA's FY22 request and its announced cost increase for LAPF).

While it is difficult, not to say improper, to compare the capital costs of projects that differ greatly in scope, duration, and longevity, Dr. Verdon was broadly right on June 24 when he said that SRS and LANL capital costs were, despite so many differences, "comparable" (30...).

LANL's known, budgeted costs are not the only reasonably anticipated costs of pit production at LANL. LANL's main plutonium facility (PF-4) may be expanded (pp. B-8,9), augmented with other nuclear production facilities, or replaced. The second option came up in recent congressional hearings (SASC/SF, May 19, response by Verdon; SASC, May 27, response by Hruby; HASC/SF, June 10, response by Verdon; SASC/SF, question by SASC Chair Reed at ).

Absent deep cuts, SRPPF is needed to support the U.S. arsenal

As we noted on June 1, in the absence of deep cuts to the U.S. nuclear stockpile -- preferred by us but not currently being debated -- successful completion of SRPPF is necessary to support the U.S. nuclear arsenal -- unless a new production facilities are built somewhere at LANL.

As we noted in a letter sent yesterday to the SASC and others, we do not think that is feasible or realistic in LANL's current plutonium area (TA-55), or as far as we can tell anywhere at LANL, for a combination of reasons  (slides 33-34). Over 30 years, no LANL site plan we have ever seen has envisioned opening a new plutonium area away from TA-55 even for large-scale plutonium production, nor does the current pattern of plutonium investment hint at this. NNSA and LANL have known since 2011 that the geotechnical properties of the south side of TA-55 are inimical to the construction of large nuclear facilities.

As you can see from recent aerial photographs (here, here, and here) TA-55 is very crowded. The large greenish field shown east of TA-55 is an old nuclear and hazardous chemical disposal site ("Area C") containing more than 3 million cubic feet of various dangerous wastes shallowly buried. The trailer park shown in this picture is about 3,000 ft. from PF-4, contributing to LANL's failure, so far, to meet DOE's 25-rem exposure guideline in the event of a design basis accident.

At TA-55, office space per person had fallen to 41% of DOE standards by the beginning of FY20. Many conference rooms had been divided into 10-15 workstations, while single-occupancy offices were being occupied by 2-3 people (p. 30).

As a result of crowding both inside and outside of PF-4, the LANL pit production complex will need to operate on a 24/7 basis to produce even as much as 20 ppy, let alone 30 ppy (p. 15). This strategy is likely to fail (IDA, p. vi).

The Senate Armed Services Committee grossly underestimates the costs of adding new nuclear facilities at LANL. [Text ended here; June 1 press release was included in the draft sent.]

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