For immediate release March 17, 2022

Biden nuclear agency plan continues all current and proposed warhead and bombs; 6 warhead programs to run simultaneously

Ambitious plan would start building four all-new nuclear warheads 2030-2039, future warheads after that

$74 billion in related construction said needed for new factories and labs; no overall cost is provided

Contact: Greg Mello, 505-265-1200 office, 505-577-8563 cell

Permalink * Prior press releases

Albuquerque, NM -- The Biden National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) yesterday released its "Fiscal Year 2022 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan" (FY22 SSMP, "Plan").

NNSA calls the 368-page plan its "annual report describing its comprehensive approach to maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and the capabilities of the nuclear security enterprise."

The Biden Plan calls for continuing all current and proposed warhead and bomb programs, including open-ended support for the 1.2 megaton B83-1 gravity bomb and the proposed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile Warhead (SLCM-N) warhead. The FY22 SSMP hopes the latter warhead could be a slightly modified version of the W80-4 warhead being developed for the Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) missile.

From p. 2-15:

DoD is conducting an Analysis of Alternatives on an employment platform and a delivery platform for a nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile. To meet schedule requirements and fit within the existing nuclear security enterprise production footprint, the Nuclear Weapons Council issued notice of a preferred warhead solution, a W80-4-like variant, to minimize impacts to the strategic nuclear stockpile. However, the final selection will be determined at the conclusion of the Analysis of Alternatives. This program would need to start in FY 2022 with a Phase 6.2/6.2A-like effort to integrate with the W80-4. Major objectives in FY 2022 include assisting the Navy in defining operational requirements and translating those requirements into specific warhead performance characteristics that will define the extent of the warhead alteration.

Our understanding is that the SLCM-N Analysis of Alternatives has already been done, and the Navy has emphatically rejected being saddled with this missile and its warhead, for which it sees no need and from which many practical problems would stem.

While a "variant" of the W80-4 would be the easiest warhead option as stated above, these are two very different situations, and missiles.

Study Group director Greg Mello: "We believe the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile project is a dead man walking. It was already being slow-walked under Trump. It is possible that it is being kept alive, at least in public, until the release of the Nuclear Posture Review in order to provide some "good news" for the liberal, arms control-ey wing of the electorate. Conversely, the recent savage ramp-up of hatred toward all things Russia may be enough keep the SLCM-N afloat for a while. Assuming that a variant of a warhead NNSA would by then have handy looks a lot like wishful thinking. Let's hope Congress can pay attention to this long enough to see through the posturing that's going on."

Regarding the B83-1 bomb, the congressional decision many years ago to proceed with the controversial B61-12 precision-guided gravity bomb was based on the promise the B61-12 would be retired. That decision could still be seen in Pentagon planning as late as 2020 (see slide 7, from this DoD publication). The Trump Administration decided instead to retain the B83-1 and the Biden Administration is continuing with this.

Upon information and belief, the decision to keep the B83 is based on the (slightly) greater ability of the B83-1, compared to other nuclear weapons, to eliminate deeply-buried bunkers -- for example leadership bunkers.

Mello: "Cratering and seismic effects scale at roughly the cube root of the explosive yield, meaning the 1.2 megaton B83-1 is only slightly more effective at digging huge holes than other nuclear attack options -- but the fallout and civilian deaths would be much greater.

"There would be few if any U.S. survivors in a nuclear war. Still, rejecting that big bomb would show a sliver of conscience and rationality."

There are currently five warheads and bombs in various stages of production and design (p. 2-10). These are the B61-12 precision-guided bomb, the W88-Alt 370 high-yield submarine-launched warhead, the W80-4 LRSO warhead, the W87-1 warhead for the so-called Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), and the W93 submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead.

If Congress should authorize a SLCM-N warhead, that would be six simultaneous warhead programs starting as soon as next year, far more work than the warhead complex has attempted since the Cold War.

The Biden plan (refer to p. 2-10 again) would also starting building four new warheads in the 2030s: the W87-1, the W93, a "Future Strategic Land-Based Warhead (FSLW)" to replace the existing W87, and a "Future Strategic Sea-Based Warhead (FSSW)" to replace the W88.

A fifth brand-new warhead, the "Future Air-Delivered Warhead (FAW)" is shown in the early 2040s. (There is a typo in the dates for this last warhead.)

After all these, unnamed new warheads would be designed and built in succession on 5-year intervals (p. 4-4; "the "phase 5" referred to in the figure is "First Production" of each new warhead in the cycle).

Mello: "Setting aside the overall irrationality of these doomsday investments, there is a lot that does not add up in these ambitious plans. For example, NNSA's warhead core ("pit") production plans, even if successful, could not provide pits for even two new warhead programs in the 2030s, let alone four."

Of interest, this Plan does not include any estimate of the total cost of these endeavors.

The FY22 SSMP is the first nuclear weapons planning document to "hit the streets" from the Biden Administration. Two others are expected in the near future, the FY2023 Congressional Budget Request, and the Nuclear Posture Review, the latter to be presented as part of the Administration's overall National Security Strategy.

Mello: "The FY22 SSMP is a planning document and does not by itself make policy, or authorize or fund programs.

"That said, NNSA's warhead contractors have a virtual "a seat in the cabinet," and the highly-privatized warhead complex has enormous political power. NNSA feeds and shepherds these contractors.

"This Plan sets the stage for the debates to come. Any abridgement of NNSA's grandiose plans will be met with howls of protest from captive members of Congress and the contractors they represent."

***ENDS***