For immediate release May 10, 2024

"Pit" project is NNSA's largest in 7 decades; huge & rising cost raises questions of scale,value, and sustainability -- and of what Congress knows

Previous, germane: "Los Alamos to make plutonium cores ("pits") for new ICBM, Savannah River to make pits for new submarine missile warhead," 4/17/24

Contact: Greg Mello, 505-265-1200 office, 505-577-8563 cell

Permalink * Prior press releases

Albuquerque, NM -- New information and analysis are available regarding the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's) plutonium warhead core ("pit") project, the largest warhead infrastructure effort "since shortly after the Manhattan Project," in the words of NNSA Administrator Dr. Jill Hruby.

NNSA's challenges with its pit production program are symptomatic of wider issues in nuclear weapons modernization, and also directly affect warhead modernization schedules and ambitions. 

Yesterday we summarized some of the new information -- particularly as regards costs -- in a Bulletin sent to our members: "Pit production, the largest nuclear warhead infrastructure project in 7 decades..." That Bulletin and its references, especially this recent briefing in South Carolina, are the principle source for this Backgrounder; see also the 4/17/24 Press Release linked above.

At the Savannah River Site (SRS), estimated pit production construction costs have risen by a factor of 3 or 4 since the 2017 Analysis of Alternatives, in constant (CPI-corrected) dollars. The expected schedule to full production still lies within the window estimated at that time (up to 2036), despite a year's delay in starting (from an assumed 2018 start to 2019). Meanwhile the scope of the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) has expanded from "at least 50" pits per year (ppy) to some larger capacity, presumably closer to NNSA's 2017 vision for that facility (i.e. "at least 80" ppy).

At LANL, full startup costs up to the reliable production of at least 30 ppy have risen by a factor of about 6, in constant dollars. The expected date for nominal production of at least 30 ppy has been extended by about 4 years (from 2026 to 2030), and for reliable production, by 6 years (to 2032).

NNSA estimates the total cost of acquiring pit production capability at $28-37 billion (B). We estimate it at $40-47 B, or about the same as the inflation-corrected cost of the entire Manhattan Project through 1945 ($43.6 B).

On a per-pit basis, it appears that pits produced at the LANL will be about five times as costly as those produced at the larger and more optimized SRPPF. 

LANL pit production facilities are expected to age out some time in the 2040s. The lifetime total number of pits that will be available from LANL is quite limited.

Meanwhile pit production at LANL faces multiple challenges unique to LANL's facilities and location., which we briefly outline.

LANL pits, if made, are destined for the proposed W87-1 warhead, which would add the capability to deploy multiple, highly-accurate warheads on the proposed Sentinel missile system. 

Postponing the W87-1 indefinitely, and terminating the effort to build LANL pit production capacity (while retaining pit R&D, demonstration, and training functions at LANL), would save roughly $43 billion -- $16 B for the W87-1 warhead (p. 201) and $27 B (using forward costs only, slide 38) for the LANL W87-1 pits.

No new pits or warheads are needed to equip Sentinel missiles with modern, accurate, long-lasting warheads in a single-warhead-per-missile deployment pattern, as the W87-0 warheads, already planned for deployment on Sentinel, meet these criteria.

NNSA has stated that it is evolving away from being "cost-constrained" (p. 3). We are unsure as to whether congressional committees fully understand and appreciate the value equation in this particular program.

Further information is available on this page.

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