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For immediate release: April 28, 2025
Contact: Greg Mello: 505-577-8563 cell
Permalink * Prior press releases
Albuquerque, NM -- Last week, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released its latest biennial estimate of the costs of nuclear weapons over the coming decade (2025-2034).
CBO's nuclear weapons cost estimates are built from the budget projections of the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy's (DOE's) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), as well as CBO's own estimates of likely cost increases for these programs over the period in question, based on CBO's historical records for comparable programs.
CBO estimates that nuclear weapons will cost a total of $946 billion (B) over the coming decade, an average of about $95 B per year. This is $190 B (25%) higher than CBO's estimate from two years ago.
Of this sum, $357 B (44%) is to be incurred by the operation and sustainment of current and future nuclear forces and support activities (p. 2). The balance is for modernization of nuclear forces.
This cost growth has three components (p. 1; graph on p. 11):
- The inclusion, in this report, of two relatively higher-cost years at the end of the decade (2033-2034) while leaving behind two relatively lower-cost years (2023-2024); this factor increased CBO's estimate by $65 B from its previous report;
- Cost growth projected by the DoD and NNSA over the 8 years during which this estimate overlaps with the previous one (a $93 B increase); and
- Growth in CBO's own estimates of "potential additional costs based on historical cost growth" (p. 1) (a $33 B increase). In each of its last five reports, CBO revised its estimate of "potential additional costs" upwardly. Apart from this aggregate estimated cost estimate, CBO assumes every program is completed as planned without any cost or schedule overruns.
In the case of the Sentinel silo-based missile system, CBO's estimates explicitly "do not include all of the cost growth that the program is likely to experience" (pp. 6-7). In other words, CBO knows its estimate is too low but cannot provide a defensible better one, because it would only be a guess at this point. Neither DoD nor CBO have any real idea what Sentinel will cost.
Many nuclear weapons-related costs, such as DOE environmental cleanup, are not included.
The report breaks down its findings in several ways, all clearly presented. Year-by-year estimates are not provided.
CBO's findings include these items of particular interest regarding NNSA:
- NNSA's facility modernization plans are likely to cost $72 B over the coming decade, out of a total of $110 B that NNSA will spend on facilities over this period (p. 5). NNSA's facilities will thus cost much more than the $16 B earmarked for "stockpile services" (NNSA's part in maintaining existing weapons), or the $67 B to be spent on "other stewardship and support activities" (p. 4).
- "CBO projects that the costs of nuclear acquisition programs would represent 11.8 percent of DoD’s total planned acquisition costs over the next decade as outlined in the 2025 budget submission...Competition for funding among
acquisition programs will force DoD to make difficult choices about which programs to pursue." (pp. 5-6).
- NNSA's projected total 10-year costs have increased by 27% over just the past two years. Some 85% ($45 B / $83 B) of these costs are not associated with any particular warhead but are rather expenses associated with NNSA's capabilities overall (p. 10). CBO believes NNSA's programs will cost an extra $11 B over the decade beyond NNSA's projections, a little more than $1 B per year.
- Regarding NNSA's cost increase, "[a]bout 60 percent of the total increase comes from higher expected costs for operation and modernization of infrastructure, including establishing and operating new pit production facilities, secondary production facilities, tritium production facilities, and domestic uranium enrichment facilities. About 30 percent comes from support programs, such as scientific research to improve the weapon production and sustainment process, and federal employee oversight of contractors operating laboratories." The balance of the NNSA increase comes from new programs and projects, leading to higher annual spending in the 2032-2034 years than in 2023-2024 years, which are now in the rear-view mirror.
- "CBO’s estimates come with substantial uncertainty stemming mainly from two sources: Future plans may not be achievable, leading to cost growth and delays; and the costs of developing, producing, and operating weapon systems are uncertain even when the plans are fully determined" (p. 8).
Study Group director Greg Mello:
"As CBO notes, most nuclear weapons costs are incurred by modernizing the arsenal and its production facilities, not by deploying and maintaining existing weapons.
"NNSA insists that its entire growing portfolio of projects and programs is necessary. There is no distinction between "needs" and "wants." NNSA also believes, and has said, it is no longer "cost-constrained" [NNSA: "Evolving the Nuclear Security Enterprise," Sep 2022, p. 3]. Under these assumptions, NNSA's costs are certain to continue growing rapidly. If the present growth rate continues, NNSA's warhead budget will double in less than 8 years.
"There is one high-dollar NNSA infrastructure program that is not generic to all warheads but rather needed solely for just one, namely pit production at LANL. LANL pit production is explicitly directed to the W87-1 warhead for the Sentinel missile and is unlikely to be sustainable beyond the needs of that program, if indeed it can be established at all. The jury is still out on whether LANL pit production will be possible, or stable and if so, for how long.
"NNSA will not be able to operate two pit facilities, even if it can set one up at LANL. Once the pit facility at the Savannah River Site begins production, every budget hawk on Capitol Hill and the Pentagon will eye LANL's gerry-rigged pit program for closure, assuming it operates at all.
"As CBO notes, there will be increased competition for defense dollars as nuclear weapons programs grow. The huge expenses tallied in this report were not anticipated at the outset of the nuclear modernization program. Since 2015, and with every report, estimated nuclear weapons costs have increased beyond prior predictions, from $348 B in 2015 to $946 B today. The opportunity costs are staggering.
"CBO devotes two big text boxes to the troubled Sentinel program -- why they can't estimate its cost, etc. The buzzards are circling. The coming year will bring more revelations about Sentinel and they won't be good. The White House and Congress should pull the plug on Sentinel now, however difficult that would be.
"In every report since 2015, CBO has revised its estimate of future cost overruns. This year's prediction will also be too low, especially for Sentinel and NNSA.
"The problems faced by nuclear weapons programs cannot all be fixed by pouring in more money. There are very real material and human limitations involved. There will be no return to the 'heroic mode of production' for nuclear weapons. Even if Congress dumped $100 or $200 billion more on nuclear weapons, the system that produces them would not 'jump to the task' for years, if at all. The people, the skills, the facilities, the motivation -- none of these are in place for a nuclear arms race, especially if the U.S. is going to build its manufacturing back and repair its sorry civilian infrastructure. The neocons who want to ramp up nuclear production are ignorant about what that would really entail. They are going to be sorely disappointed.
"Practical problems aside, 'peace through strength' is a mistaken idea in this place and time, especially as regards nuclear weapons. No thoughtful strategy supports the proliferation of US nuclear weapons. Quite the contrary -- present policies are driven by organized greed and fear. US nuclear weapons policies, and as we see here their costs, are out of control."
***ENDS***
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