Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Chronicles Concerns Regarding Lack of Access to Critical Safety Information, press release, 4 Jun 2026

For immediate release: June 8, 2026

Plutonium "pit" production now a $60 billion program -- $20 billion down, $40 billion to go

Contact: Greg Mello: 505-577-8563
Permalink * Prior press releases and backgrounders

Albuquerque, NM -- Today the Los Alamos Study Group released updated cost estimates for the acquisition of plutonium warhead core ("pit") production capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico, the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, and other sites.

The estimate is based on the President's budget request (PBR) (here and here) for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for fiscal year 2027 (FY27) and prior PBRs.

In its estimates, the Study Group relied on enacted prior-year spending, NNSA's request for FY27, NNSA's estimated future spending through FY31, and near-term extrapolations from these.

Program (operational) spending was included through the years in which NNSA estimates pit production construction would be complete at each site (FY34 at LANL, FY35 at the earliest for SRS).

NNSA has not yet produced "baseline" pit construction cost estimates for the main pit projects at either site, but claims it will produce ones for both sites by September 30, 2026. (This milestone is called "Critical Decision 2/3" in the data sheets for these projects.)

At SRS, essentially all pit-related construction falls within the scope of the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (SRPPF) project, which has been assigned a $25 billion (B) "placeholder" cost, pending approval of a project baseline.

At LANL, acquiring pit production capability requires many different construction, remodeling, and equipment installation projects as well as a large annual program budget. The program budget is used not just for operational purposes but also for many smaller capital projects (costing up to tens of millions of dollars) as well as equipment.

One big LANL project, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project, has become a "basket" for various evolving subprojects across multiple buildings, with a projected overall timeline that is now expected to stretch from 2004 to 2034.

Even after NNSA produces baselines for its big pit projects, large cost uncertainties of several kinds will remain. What we have done is to make the best estimates we can with the data available, while also reporting the assumptions we used.

In addition to the two main sites, pit production also involves work, and costs, at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), the Kansas City National Security Campus (KCNSC), and possibly Pantex. Recent speeches by NNSA officials (in Study Group files) and other available documents suggest LLNL, NNSS, and SRS may all three be newly-tasked with assisting LANL's pit mission.

Takeaways, under the assumptions we report, include these:

Estimated total acquisition and startup costs at LANL through FY34 are about $29.2 B, or $32.2 B if $3 B in pre-2019 program costs are included as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) tallied in 2023 (at p. 12, after subtracting the construction costs we counted separately).

Estimated forward acquisition and startup costs at LANL are $17.8 B.

Estimated total acquisition and startup costs at SRS (through FY35, in our assumptions) are about $29.4 B.

Estimated forward costs at SRS are $21.6 B.

The estimated combined total cost of restoring pit production under the two-site plan is $61.6 B (including $3 B for LANL pit program costs from FY05-FY18, per GAO).

The estimated combined forward cost of restoring pit production under the two-site plan is $39.6 B.

For reference, total Manhattan Project costs through December 31, 1945 were $46.5 billion, if updated to April 2026 dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation calculator (see Schwartz et. al., Atomic Audit, p. 60).

For further background please see Current & historical cost estimates for reconstituting plutonium pit production, details, Aug 29, 2025 and its references. Further background on pit production more generally can be found here (LANL and general references) and here (for SRS).

Study Group director Greg Mello:

"This is a very large program, by far the largest in Department of Energy and NNSA history even running back far into the Cold War. Nothing else comes close. In constant dollars, it is now expected to cost considerably more than did the entire Manhattan Project through 1945.

"Unfortunately there has been little news coverage regarding this program, and even less coverage that goes beyond merely saying 'more pits are unnecessary, bad and expensive' versus 'the sky will fall if we don't make more pits ASAP.'

"Cost overruns at both sites are by now horrendous. At LANL, estimated costs have marched steadily upwards, increasing by about a factor of 10 from 1996 to 2018, and then by another factor of 10 from 2018 to today. At SRS, estimated costs have risen by a factor of about 5 from 2018 to today.

"We believe NNSA will not be able to sustain the staggering costs of this program at two sites indefinitely. Unfortunately, NNSA has ignored its only analysis of pit production alternatives, which supported neither the two-site production plan nor the use of LANL's Building PF-4 as an enduring production facility. NNSA is now attempting both.

"In 2019, the Institute for Defense Analyses again warned NNSA against attempting to run PF-4 around the clock to reach higher production levels, which is precisely what NNSA has recently chosen to do.

"Making all future pits at LANL is neither legal nor physically possible. LANL alone cannot maintain any realistically foreseeable arsenal. LANL’s pit facilities are not adequate, enduring, or adequately supported by infrastructure on and off the site, and all the investment in the world won't change that. The environmental burden NNSA is asking of the region is very heavy.

"So if LANL hosts a pit factory, SRS must also build and operate one. The reverse is not however true. SRS can provide an adequate pit facility by itself. The SRS facility is being designed to be just that.

"The great justification for LANL pit production has been speed. But there is no need to make pits now, or any time soon, to maintain each and every U.S. nuclear weapon.

"The U.S. should be negotiating to avoid an arms race, rather than rushing into one. Making pits at LANL for unnecessary new weapons is precisely what we should NOT be doing."

***ENDS***

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