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Stockpile
Stewardship Conference Planning Meeting Minutes Pentagon,
Room 3C912 0930-1200
Purpose: In concert with the NPR, evaluate the issues of maintaining confidence in the nuclear deterrent;
evaluate the risks in
our current assessment process and ways to reduce those risks, and the
current and planned infrastructure capacity and capability.
ATSD(NCB)
– Dr. Klein, Chairman
STRATCOM
- RADM Byrd Joint
Staff – RDML Walsh OSD
(P) - Dr. Payne NNSA
- Dr. Beckner SAG
- Dr. Burnett (advisor) SSP Strategy & Risk Panel Chair– Brig Gen Haeckel (NNSA) Future
Arsenal Panel Chair – Dr. Hardebeck (STRATCOM) NNSA
and DoD Infrastructure Chair – Mr. Beck (NNSA) Strategy
and Policy Panel Chair – Dr. Maaranen (OSD(P))
·
Evaluate the DoD/NNSA Requirements
process. Do we adequately identify
requirements, and their priority in existing systems?
Attachment 1 List of Attendees Mr. Beck, NNSA Dr. Burnett, SAG (Advisor) Dr. Younger, DTRA Ms. Montie, DTRA Dr. RADM Dr. Immele, LANL Dr. Goldstone, LANL Dr. McMillan, LLNL Dr. Goodwin, LLNL Dr. Beckner, NNSA Brig Gen, Haeckel, NNSA Dr. Maaranen, OSD(P) Mr. Victory, OSD(P) CAPT Mr. Celec, OSD/AT&L (NM) Ms. Stoner, OSD/AT&L (NM) Mr. Steinhoff, OSD/AT&L (NM) (NNSA) Mr. Hatch, OSD/AT&L (NM) Dr. Wolkerstorfer, OSD/AT&L (NM) Mr. Wade, NNSA Mr. Bentley, SNL/NNSA Mr. Schoenbauer, NNSA Ms Hood, OSD/AT&L (NM) CAPT Manaskie, JS Dr. Stichman, SNL Brig Gen Smolen, AF/XON Dr. Mullins, AF/XON Dr. Hannah, Navy SSP Mr. Williams, OSD(P) Consultant Invited but did not attend: RDML Walsh, JS Dr. Harvey, NNSA Dr. Payne, OSD(P) Attachment 2 Panels: Draft Topics Lists and Members
SSP Strategy
and Risk Panel Major Topics: (1) How well do
we quantify risk in our current assessment
of nuclear weapons [warheads and those aspects of the delivery systems that impact the risk
associated with the warheads] in the stockpile? (2) What existing,
and new SSP tools coming on-line could provide enhanced capabilities
to quantify and minimize performance risk both for the legacy stockpile,
and potential new or modified weapons? (a) What are the anticipated limits of the extent
to which improved understanding of weapon physics is basis for confidence? (b) In consideration of new weapons that might be
needed in a post-NPR environment, are the tools we have the right ones
or do we need to develop new tools? (3) Are there stockpile
performance issues that we cannot now or may not in the future be able
to address fully, or for which developing SSP capabilities are less
certain? What are the risk mitigation measures for these
existing and potential gaps in our understanding? (4) What can we do to strengthen the process for reducing the risk in assessing the military effectiveness of our current and future stockpile? (a) What is the overarching strategy for managing risks in the SSP? (b) Are there alternative (foreign) approaches to managing risks that should be examined? (5) What is the
role of nuclear testing in reducing risk in the stockpile? What parts of those risks are associated with
the absence of nuclear testing, in comparison to the risk associated
with a 150kt threshold or a low-yield test program? What is the uncertainty
in confidence and potential risk threshold
for a test recommendation---what would demand a test?
(6)
Assess the following with regards to the certification infrastructure:
(a) What will be the
impact on (5) of the operation of the NIF over the next 5 – 15 years? Similarly, what would be the impact of the operation
of AHF in 10 –15 years? (b) What are the demands on the capabilities and
capacities of the Certification Infrastructure over time? (c) At what level, over time, can the certification
(also R&D assessment) infrastructure being develop and tested with
current deliverables be transferable and agile for changing priorities?
(7)
Do we need to change the rebuild strategy for QART consumed warheads?
(8)
Is the current Annual Certification
Process sufficient, or does it need to be modified to take into consideration
political considerations regarding testing?
(9)
What are the lessons we’ve learned
since the Stockpile Stewardship Program began? In the decades when we were testing, tests sometimes
revealed surprises. What have
we learned from this? SSP Strategy
and Risk Panel Membership
John Birely SAG
advisor Future Arsenal Panel Major Topics: (1) What are the warhead characteristics and advanced concepts we will need in the post-NPR environment? (a) Establish methodology for making choices (b) Strategy for selecting first “small builds” (c) Requirements for low-yield weapons, EPWs, enhanced radiation weapons, agent defeat weapons (d) Effects modeling capabilities to effectively plan for these weapons (e) What forms of testing will these new designs require? (f) What obvious weaknesses exist in our ability to attack targets and assess target damage for present and future targets and weapon systems? (2) How do we link service-provided platform requirements for the arsenal? (a) What is the testing strategy for weapons more likely to be used in small strikes? (b) Does a requirement for higher confidence in small strikes drive larger test asset inventories? (c) Hardness and compatibility of conventional and dual use platforms (i) How do we institutionalize these requirements? (d) Leverage on existing SAGSAT efforts on dual-use platforms (e)
Reliability requirements (f) Other requirements (e.g. precision) (3) Given the size and composition of the operationally deployed stockpile, are our assumptions correct as we size the stockpile? (Leverage on existing US STRATCOM and NWC work.) (a) Reliability replacements (b) Augmentation quantities (c) Reserve (4) Plans for modernization of delivery platforms (a) Are these plans consistent with the SSP and NMMP? (b) Is the LEP schedule tuned to DoD needs? (5) Regarding guidance requirements and assumptions on availability of GPS: (a) Is GPS, or other advanced systems, available for all plans or just special cases? (b) Do we put GPS on all systems, or just a few? Future Arsenal Panel Membership
George Miller
SAG advisor NNSA and
DoD Infrastructure Panel [ Note from Major Topics (1) Assess the adequacy and robustness of assessment and planned capability and capacity at and NNSA design, assessment, test, and production sites and appropriate DoD facilities. Determine if the NNSA and DoD infrastructures are agile enough to support a ‘small build’ strategy. [Panel should look at DoD infrastructure where it impacts NNSA’s ability to do its tasking—flight testing, ranges, simulators, etc.] (2) Examine the balance and flexibility between design, research and development, production, maintenance, and small builds. (a) What is most stressing task? (b) Are the required skill sets transferable and agile for changing priorities? (c) Can we cover plausible unforeseen stockpile emergencies? (d) What are the tradeoffs between maintenance of production capability/capacity and the supporting R&D base? (3) Comment on the success of implementing the Chiles
Commission Recommendations and on the health, experience, and training
of design, engineering, and military staffs.
(4) What recommendations can be made as to how NNSA’s SSP and DoD’s programs can be better harmonized? NNSA and DoD Infrastructure Panel Membership
Tom Seitz SAG advisor Strategy and Policy Panel Major Topics (1) The contribution of nuclear forces to each of the four principal defense goals: assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat (2) The proper relationship of nuclear forces to the non-nuclear strike and missile defense elements of the Triad (3) Qualitative differences in nuclear forces that may be needed to implement the strategy (4) Policy guidance and policy issues that must be resolved to facilitate the necessary changes in nuclear forces and infrastructure (a)
Reexamine the policy issues of the various levels of testing. Should the (b) How do we frame the explanation of emerging policy to show the deterrent the value of reduced-collateral damage, precision, agent defeat, and penetrating nuclear capabilities in meeting our national security objectives? (c) What should be the policy and process for granting authorities to adapt and build small quantities? Strategy and Policy Panel Membership
Paul Robinson SAG advisor |
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