For immediate release January 11, 2023

-- Further information to be provided tomorrow, as it becomes available --

GAO to Release Year-Long Review of NNSA's Largest Warhead Endeavor: Plutonium Pit Production
Despite decades of preparation, NNSA still does not know how many nuclear warhead cores ("pits") it can make, by when, or at what cost

Construction and start-up costs much higher than expected, especially at Los Alamos; schedules delayed

Largest project in New Mexico history is now many multiples of original cost, serious hurdles remain

Los Alamos Study Group: risk of nuclear war is high and rising -- new pits not needed, counterproductive, and immoral

Contact: Greg Mello, 505-265-1200 office, 505-577-8563 cell

Permalink * Prior press releases

References on request

Albuquerque, NM -- Tomorrow, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) will release the results of its year-long study of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's) program to reconstitute U.S. production of plutonium warhead cores ("pits").

It is the largest program in NNSA's history. In dollar terms, it is the largest nuclear warhead endeavor since the Cold War.

Each nuclear warhead or bomb contains one pit, usually but not always of a type specific to that particular weapon. Pits last at least 80 years from manufacture (here, specifically here and most recently here; see related NNSA testimony here). Unless a reusable pit of an appropriate type is available, each new warhead requires a new pit. All warheads planned through at least 2030 will reuse existing pits. Reused pits could also be used later in the 2030s, although NNSA would prefer to begin supplanting existing pits with new ones as soon as possible.

Pit production ceased in the U.S. in 1989, with the exception of 30 pits built at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) over the 2007-2011 period.

The new GAO study is an amalgam of mandates from congressional armed services and appropriations committees, from both the House and Senate.

For the time being, this new report will be the main quasi-independent government resource about the pit production program. The Administration's congressional budget request, traditionally expected on the first Monday in February, will provide at least some further details about the program and its constituent projects.

While we (the Los Alamos Study Group) are not privy to the details of tomorrow's GAO report, the headline conclusion will be this: despite decades of preparation, NNSA still does not know how many nuclear warhead cores ("pits") its two proposed factories can make, by when, or at what cost.

These conclusions will be shocking to many in Congress.

The NNSA is pursuing factories at LANL and at the Savannah River Site (SRS). At the moment, neither proposed factory is operational. Both require billions of additional dollars and years of additional work before production could safely and reliably begin, if indeed it ever can.

In this report, GAO has attempted to add up the costs of NNSA's pit production program, not all of which are encompassed in NNSA's "Plutonium Modernization" budget line.

These costs are much greater than originally projected by NNSA, especially at LANL, where multiple legacy and new facilities must be upgraded or built to handle the new mission, and where limited space for pit production will require 24/7 operations. LANL's plutonium facility is already operating on a 24/7 basis as construction and equipment installation "timeshares" with ongoing plutonium operations.

LANL's legacy plutonium, waste handling, and support facilities face significant and as-yet-unresolved operational and safety problems. Projected costs have also increased at SRS, at first largely due to expansion of the project scope. Costs at both sites are now increasing as construction and specialized equipment, materials, and labor costs rise.

Last May, we compiled NNSA's then-current cost projections in the "Plutonium Modernization" budget line through fiscal year 2027 (FY27). Total pit production start-up and production costs are expected to be higher at LANL than at the larger SRS facility for a number of reasons.

GAO will report a wide range of possible costs for starting up pit production. Life-cycle costs have not yet been prepared by NNSA.

NNSA has consistently refused to release more precise interim cost estimates, citing the unreliability of such estimates during early project phases. The upshot of this reticence is that more than $10 billion will have been spent to build two pit factories before there is a clear idea of what this program is expected to eventually cost. In effect, Congress is funding a somewhat blank check.

GAO will say that NNSA does not have an integrated, resourced master schedule for pit production beyond the very first pit at LANL, as Congress has already reported.

The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the recent FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act says (pdf pp. 99-100, or H9523-H9524) that NNSA has now concluded that the earliest date at which 80 ppy might be achieved is 2036, three years later than NNSA thought in 2017.

While LANL is required by law to demonstrate a steady production rate of at least 30 ppy by FY2026, documents we have obtained under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), augmented by public statements by NNSA senior managers and the LANL Director, say that achievement of 30 ppy will be delayed 1-2 years, with attendant further cost growth.

The GAO's work has been thorough, although its report language may be quite bland as is usual. In recent years, GAO reports have tended to include only those facts which are not disputed by agencies. There will not be as much GAO expert judgment in this report as we in the Los Alamos Study Group would like.

As is always the case, the report's content and conclusion will have been "frozen" weeks or even months before publication, especially considering recent holidays and the election of a new Congress. Followup studies are contemplated.

Here in New Mexico, preparing for pit production is by far the largest capital project in the state's history -- as was, at the time, NNSA's failed, previous (2002-2014) plan to prepare for pit production at LANL by building an additional plutonium facility.

Study Group staff are standing by to supply background references upon request, as best we can. Or feel free to use us as a sounding board, with or without attribution. These are difficult topics, and there are many misconceptions floating around.

Lastly, this comment (from Greg Mello, Executive Director, though it is really the result of several recent conversations here):

"We at the Study Group are appalled by the notion of building and operating a new factory for nuclear weapons. The risk of nuclear war is very high, much higher than even most experts realize, and it's rising.

"There is no need to build pits in the 2020s or early 2030s to maintain every single kind of U.S. nuclear weapon, and therefore no need to build pits at LANL at all. So what exactly is this about?

"Early-to-need pit production is not about "deterrence," so-called. It's about money -- money for contractors, especially. It's about the lust for new weapons, and it's about an unholy desire to dominate other nations, partly out of pride and partly out of organized greed for U.S. companies and interests. These corrupt motives have led to horrible priorities, which are bringing nightmare results. We call on our elected officials to stop, now."

***ENDS***